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Preface and Acknowledgements  
One hundred years ago, William H. Allen—of the then-newly founded Bureau of 
Municipal Research—issued a call in the Journal of Accountancy for “1,000 accountants for 
municipal research.”  Reflecting the Progressive Era’s focus on domestic reform after the 
closing of the American frontier, Allen wrote: 
Only a pessimist will believe that the day is past for the pioneer.  It is 
true that America has been discovered and that the law of diminishing returns 
long since began to operate in the gold fields of California, the wheat fields of 
the Northwest and the oil wells of Pennsylvania.  It is also true that there is 
less opportunity today than ever before for adventure of the story book type.  
But to young men [sic] capable of thrilling with excitement when confronted 
with new problems to solve and new ideas to work out, I wish seriously to 
recommend a substitute for the North Pole—the unexploited field of municipal 
accounting and municipal business.1 
Allen’s call followed the Bureau’s early and remarkable successes, both in exposing 
waste and corruption in New York City’s government and in devising and installing 
managerial systems for increased efficiency and transparency: 
[T]he mayor, comptroller, commissioner of street cleaning, president 
of Bellevue and allied hospitals, commissioner of parks and the 
commissioners of accounts have requested cooperation, and used 
departmental facilities and men [sic] for research and reorganization.  We 
believe that similar cooperation will be obtained wherever private bodies or 
especially trained accountants approach the problem of municipal business 
with the sole motive of advancing the interests of the general public, and not 
with a desire to do sharpshooting, to turn up a scandal or to turn out the 
rascals.2 
History has not recorded the extent to which Allen’s call for 1,000 accountants was 
answered.  History has recorded, however, the very clear and significant contributions of his 
Bureau’s work—particularly its research agenda—to the formation of the field of American 
Public Administration.3  Thus, while Allen certainly perceived the potential contributions of 
administrative research, it’s highly doubtful he could have imagined the development and 
maturation over the next century of this entirely new field of study in the US.  Public 
Administration today includes hundreds of graduate degree programs, dozens of academic 
journals and conferences, and thousands of scholars. The objects of its study have 
expanded from municipal administration to include federal, state, international, and, more 
recently, not-for-profit administration.   
 
                                                
1 Allen, W.H. (1908, July).  Wanted—One thousand efficient accountants for municipal research. 
Journal of Accountancy, 6, 187. 
2 Allen, 1908, pp. 192-193. 
3 Waldo, D. (1984). The administrative state (2nd ed.). New York: Holmes & Meier, p. 31. 
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Today, we issue a call for “1,000 scholars for defense acquisition research.”  As 
Allen believed in the possibilities for municipal research, we also believe in the possibilities 
for melioration of acquisition’s seemingly intractable problems through systematic study.  
While Allen saw the skills of accountants as sufficient for the tasks he had in mind, we 
instead call for a truly interdisciplinary mix of scholars suitable for engaging the diverse 
facets of acquisition’s many technical, managerial, and political issues. 
Obviously, such an ambitious call cannot be answered by a single or even a dozen 
institutions.  Accordingly, the NPS Acquisition Research Program has among its principal 
objectives the cultivation of an interdisciplinary community of acquisition scholars from many 
institutions around the world.  This Symposium is merely a single step toward achieving that 
objective.  Other recent steps include new research partnerships that NPS has forged with 
several other universities and the new International Journal of Defense Acquisition 
Management (http://www.acquisitionjournal.org), a scholarly journal jointly published and 
supported by the Acquisition Research Program and Cranfield University at the Defence 
College of Management of Technology.   
From our limited perspective, such steps may seem woefully inadequate for the task 
of achieving meaningful and lasting acquisition reform.  If so, we may do well to look forward 
into the next century and imagine our intellectual descendents who will study in a fully 
mature field of defense acquisition management and who will commend us for our efforts. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer (Ships) 
• Program Executive Officer (Integrated Warfare Systems) 
• Program Executive Officer (Littoral and Mine Warfare) 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition and Logistics Management) 
• Office of Naval Air Systems Command PMA-290 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and 
Technology 
• Director, Strategic Systems Program 
• Project Manager Modular Brigade Enhancements 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary Air Force (Management Policy & Program Integration) 
• Dean of Research, Naval Postgraduate School 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
James B. Greene, Jr.      Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, US Navy (Ret.)    Associate Professor 
Karey L. Shaffer, MBA 
Program Manager, Acquisition Research Program 
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The NPS A Team 
Rear Admiral James B. Greene, Jr. USN (Ret.)—Acquisition Chair, Naval 
Postgraduate School. RADM Greene develops, implements and oversees the Acquisition 
Research Program in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. He interfaces with 
DoD, industry and government leaders in acquisition, coordinates graduate student projects 
and conducts guest lectures and seminars. Before serving at NPS, RADM Greene was an 
independent consultant focusing on Defense Industry business development strategy and 
execution (for both the public and private sectors), minimizing lifecycle costs through 
technology applications, alternative financing arrangements for capital-asset procurement, 
and “red-teaming” corporate proposals for major government procurements.  
RADM Greene served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) 
in the Pentagon from 1991-1995. As Assistant Deputy, he provided oversight, direction and 
budget development for worldwide US Navy logistics operations. He facilitated depot 
maintenance, supply chain management, base/station management, environmental 
programs and logistic advice, and support to the Chief of Naval Operations. Some of his 
focuses during this time were leading Navy-wide efforts to digitize all technical data (and, 
therefore, reduce cycle-time) and to develop and implement strategy for procurement of 
eleven Sealift ships for the rapid deployment forces. He also served as the Senior Military 
Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) from 1987-1990; as such, he 
advised and counseled the Under Secretary in directing the DoD procurement process.  
From 1984-1987, RADM Greene was the Project Manager for the AEGIS project. 
This was the DoD’s largest acquisition project, with an annual budget in excess of $5 
billion/year. The project provided oversight and management of research, development, 
design, production, fleet introduction and full lifecycle support of the entire fleet of AEGIS 
cruisers, destroyers, and weapons systems through more than 2500 industry contracts. 
From 1980-1984, RADM Greene served as Director, Committee Liaison, Office of 
Legislative Affairs followed by a tour as the Executive Assistant, to the Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy (Shipbuilding and Logistics). From 1964-1980, RADM Greene served as a 
Surface Warfare Officer in various duties, culminating in Command-at-Sea. His assignments 
included numerous wartime deployments to Vietnam, as well as the Indian Ocean and the 
Persian Gulf.  
RADM Greene received a BS in Electrical Engineering from Brown University in 
1964; he earned an MS in Electrical Engineering and an MS in Business Administration from 
the Naval Postgraduate School in 1973.  
Keith F. Snider—Associate Professor of Public Administration and Management in 
the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California, where he teaches courses related to defense acquisition management.  
He also serves as Principal Investigator for the NPS Acquisition Research Program and as 
Academic Associate for resident NPS acquisition curricula.   
Professor Snider has a PhD in Public Administration and Public Affairs from Virginia 
Polytechnic Institute and State University, a Master of Science degree in Operations 
Research from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Bachelor of Science degree from the 
United States Military Academy at West Point.  He served as a field artillery officer in the US 
Army for twenty years, retiring at the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  He is a former member of 
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the Army Acquisition Corps and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the 
Defense Systems Management College.   
Professor Snider’s recent publications appear in American Review of Public 
Administration, Administration and Society, Administrative Theory & Praxis, Journal of Public 
Procurement, Acquisition Review Quarterly, and Project Management Journal.   
Karey L. Shaffer—Program Manager for General Dynamics Information Technology 
in support of the Acquisition Research Program at the Graduate School of Business and 
Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School. As PM, Shaffer is responsible for operations and 
publications in conjunction with the Acquisition Chair and the Principal Investigator. She has 
also catalyzed, organized and managed the Acquisition Research Symposiums hosted by 
NPS.  
Shaffer has also served as the Project Manager for Imagicast, Inc., and as the 
Operations Manager for the Montana World Trade Center. At Imagicast, she was asked to 
take over the project management of four failing pilots for Levi Strauss in the San Francisco 
office. Within four months, the pilots were released; the project lifecycle was shortened; and 
the production process was refined. In this latter capacity at the MWTC, Shaffer developed 
operating procedures, policies and processes in compliance with state and federal grant 
law. Concurrently, she managed $1.25 million in federal appropriations, developed 
budgeting systems and secured a $400,000 federal technology grant. As the Operations 
Manager, she also designed MWTC’s Conference site, managed various marketing 
conferences, and taught student practicum programs and seminars.  
Shaffer holds an MBA from San Francisco State University and earned her BA in 
Business Administration (focus on International Business, Marketing and Management) from 
the University of Montana.  
A special thanks to our editors Jeri Larsen, Breanne Grover and Jessica Moon for 
all that they have done to make this publication a success, to David Wood, Tera Yoder and 
Ian White for production and graphic support and to the staff at the Graduate School of 
Business & Public Policy for their administrative support. Our program success is directly 















Announcement and Call for Proposals 
The Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School 
announces the 6th Annual Acquisition Research Symposium to be held May 13-14, 2009 
in Monterey, California.   
This symposium serves as a forum for the presentation of acquisition research and the 
exchange of ideas among scholars and practitioners of public-sector acquisition.  We seek a 
diverse audience of influential attendees from academe, government, and industry who are 
well placed to shape and promote future research in acquisition.   
The Symposium Program Committee solicits proposals for panels and/or papers from 
academicians, practitioners, students and others with interests in the study of acquisition.  
The following list of topics is provided to indicate the range of potential research areas of 
interest for this symposium: acquisition and procurement policy, supply chain 
management, public budgeting and finance, cost management, project management, 
logistics management, engineering management, outsourcing, performance 
measurement, and organization studies.   
Proposals must be submitted by November 7, 2008.  The Program Committee will make 
notifications of accepted proposals by December 5, 2008.  Final papers must be submitted 
by   April 3, 2009 to be included in the Symposium Proceedings. 
Proposals for papers should include an abstract along with identification, affiliation, and 
contact information for the author(s).  Proposals for papers plan for a 20 minute 
presentation. Proposals for panels (plan for 90 minute duration) should include the same 
information as above as well as a description of the panel subject and format, along with 
participants’ names, qualifications and the specific contributions each participant will make 
to the panel.   
Submit paper and panel proposals to www.researchsymposium.org . 
^`nrfpfqflk=obpb^o`eW==
`ob^qfkd=pvkbodv=clo=fkclojba=`e^kdb=
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May 15, 2008 Keynote Speaker 
8:00 a.m. – 
9:15 a.m.  
Keynote Speaker 
General Bruce Carlson, United States Air Force, Commander, Air Force 
Materiel Command 
 
General Bruce Carlson serves as Commander, Air Force 
Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH. 
The command conducts research, development, test and 
evaluation, and provides acquisition management services 
and logistics support necessary to keep Air Force weapon 
systems ready for war. 
Carlson was born in Hibbing, MN. He was commissioned in 
1971, after completing the University of Minnesota's Air Force 
ROTC program as a distinguished graduate. He has held 
various assignments in flying units. Staff assignments have 
included positions at Tactical Air Command, Headquarters 
US Air Force, the offices of the Secretary of the Air Force and 
Secretary of Defense, and as the Director of Force Structure, 
Resources and Assessment with the Joint Staff. Additionally, 
he commanded the Air Force's stealth fighter wing, the 49th, 
at Holloman AFB, NM. Prior to assuming his current position, 
Carlson served as the Commander, 8th Air Force, Barksdale 
AFB, LA, and Joint Functional Component Commander for 
Space and Global Strike, US Strategic Command, Offutt 
AFB, NE. 
Carlson is experienced in multiple aircraft weapons systems, is a command pilot with more than 
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Panel 11 - Plenary Panel – Academic Research on 
Contracting 
Thursday, 




Dr. Steve Kelman, Professor of Public Management, John F. Kennedy 
School of Government, Harvard University 
Discussants:  
Dr. Matthew Potoski, Associate Professor, Department of Political 
Science, Iowa State University 
Dr. G. Frederick Thompson, Professor of Public Management and Policy, 
Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University 
Dr. Andrew B. Whitford, Associate Professor of Public Administration and 
Policy, School of Public & International Affairs, The University of Georgia  
 
 
Chair: Dr. Steve Kelman is the Weatherhead Professor of Public Management at Harvard 
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. A summa cum laude graduate of Harvard 
College, with a PhD in Government from Harvard University, he is the author of many books and 
articles on the policymaking process and on improving the management of government organizations. 
His most recently published books are a study on how to improve the government computer 
procurement process, entitled Procurement and Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the 
Quality of Government Performance (AEI Press, 1990), and Making Public Policy: A Hopeful View of 
American Government (Basic Books, 1987). In l996, he was elected a Fellow of the National 
Academy of Public Administration. In 2001, he received the Herbert Roback Memorial Award, the 
highest achievement award of the National Contract Management Association. In 2003, he was 
elected as a Director of The Procurement Roundtable.  
From 1993 through 1997, Kelman served as Administrator of the Office of Federal Procurement 
Policy in the Office of Management and Budget. During his tenure as Administrator, he played a lead 
role in the Administration’s “reinventing government” effort. He led Administration efforts in support of 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1995. 
Discussant: Dr. Matthew Potoski is an Associate Professor at Iowa State University, where he 
teaches courses on politics, administration, and policy. In 1997 and 1998, he taught at the University 
of Kentucky’s Martin School of Public Policy and Administration, first as a visiting fellow and later as 
visiting faculty. Potoski received his PhD from Indiana University in 1998, his undergraduate degree 
from Franklin and Marshall College in Lancaster, PA, and his Master’s degree from the University of 
Vermont. 
Potoski’s research and teaching interests lie at the nexus of public policy, administration, and politics. 
His research examines how people address collective action problems and uncertainty inherent in 
developing, implementing and managing public policies. These problems in various guises undermine 
peoples’ ability to solve complex problems and produce sound public policy. Such problems span 
levels of government and policy areas. He has published over two dozen articles in journals such as 
American Journal of Political Science, Journal of Politics, Journal of Policy Analysis and 
 =
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Management, Public Administration Review, Policy Studies Journal, State Politics and Policy 
Quarterly and the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory.  Potoski is the recipient of 
the Indiana University Department of Political Science’s 2000 Greenough Award for best dissertation 
completed in previous year, and the Iowa State University College of Liberal Arts and Sciences’ 2004 
Award for Early Achievement in Research/Artistic Creativity. He is the co-editor of International Public 
Management Journal and serves on the editorial board of Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory. 
Discussant: Dr. G. Frederick Thompson is the Grace and Elmer Goudy Professor of public 
management and policy at Atkinson Graduate School of Management, Willamette University. 
Discussant: Dr. Andrew B. Whitford is an Associate Professor of public administration and policy in 
the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. He is a specialist in the areas of 
bureaucratic politics, organization theory and political economy. His interests in public policy include 
environmental, regulation and public health policy, and his research has been supported by the 
National Science Foundation (NSF), the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Russell Sage 
Foundation. He has served on NSF advisory panels and is on the editorial board of Political Research 
Quarterly. His articles have been published in Administrative Science Quarterly, American Journal of 
Political Science, British Journal of Political Science and the Journal of Public Administration 
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Panel 12 – Budgeting and the Acquisition Process 
 
Thursday, 
May 15, 2008 Panel 12 - Budgeting and the Acquisition Process 




The Honorable Douglas A. Brook, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Financial Management and Comptroller 
Discussant:  
Ms. Wendy Kunc, Director, Naval Center for Cost Analysis 
Rear Admiral Charles H. Goddard, Program Executive Officer, Ships 
Paper:  
Rethinking Acquisition Reform: Cost Growth Solutions May Aggravate the 
More Important Problem 
Philip J. Candreva, Senior Lecturer of Budgeting, Naval Postgraduate 
School 
 
Chair:  The Honorable Douglas A. Brook is Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial 
Management & Comptroller). Prior to reporting to the Pentagon, he was Professor of Public Policy 
and Director of the Center for Defense Management Reform at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California. From 2002 until 2005, Dr. Brook was Dean of the NPS Graduate School of 
Business and Public Policy.  
Before joining NPS, Dr. Brook was Vice President—Government Affairs for The LTV Corporation. 
Prior to joining LTV, Brook served in two Presidentially appointed positions. In 1992, he was Acting 
Director of the US Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the central personnel management 
agency of the Federal government. From 1990 to 1992, Brook was Assistant Secretary of the Army 
for Financial Management.  
Brook began his career as Director of Public Finance of the National Association of Manufacturers in 
New York. Subsequently, he joined the Libbey-Owens-Ford Company and served as Vice President 
and head of the company’s Washington, DC, office.  
In 1982, he founded Brook Associates, Inc., a public affairs consulting business serving corporate 
and trade association clients, which he managed until assuming duties at the Pentagon. He also 
served two elected terms on the Town Council of Vienna, VA.  
Brook grew up in East Detroit, MI. He attended the University of Michigan, graduating with a Bachelor 
of Arts degree in Political Science in 1965 and a Master of Public Administration degree in 1967. In 
2001, he earned his PhD in Public Policy at George Mason University. He also completed the 1977 
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Brook served on active duty as a Navy Supply Corps officer and was a member of the Naval Reserve 
for 30 years. He retired with the rank of Captain. 
Discussant: Ms. Wendy P. Kunc was selected to the Senior Executive Service in March 2005 and 
currently serves as Director, Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA) and leader of the Department of 
the Navy Cost Analysis and Management Sciences community.  Prior to holding this position, Kunc 
headed NCCA’s Cost Analysis Tools division and served as Naval VAMOSC program manager.  
Kunc held several positions within the Department of the Air Force, including Chief of the Cost 
Factors Branch within the Air Force Cost Analysis Agency.  She also led the transition of Air Force 
VAMOSC to the more comprehensive Air Force Total Ownership Cost (AFTOC) system.    
Kunc holds a Bachelor’s degree in Mathematics from the University of Missouri and Master of 
Science degrees in Computer Information Systems from St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, and 
National Resource Strategy from the National Defense University.  She completed the National 
Defense University’s CIO certification program in 2005.  Kunc is a Certified Defense Financial 
Manager, is Level III certified in the Defense Acquisition Workforce, and is a member of the 
Acquisition Corps. 
Discussant: Rear Admiral Charles Goddard graduated from the US Naval Academy in 1978 with a 
Bachelor of Science degree in Naval Architecture. He also holds a Master of Science degree in Naval 
Architecture and Ocean Engineer from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).  
Goddard achieved Surface Warfare Qualification in USS Robert E. Perry (FF 1073), where he served 
as Anti-Submarine Warfare Officer and Auxiliaries and Electrical Officer.  
He became an Engineering Duty Officer in 1981. His engineering duty officer tours include: Pearl 
Harbor Naval Shipyard as Ship Superintendent, 1981-1982; Long Beach Naval Shipyard as Ship 
Superintendent and Type Desk Officer, 1986-1989; David Taylor Research Center as System 
Engineer for the Advanced Surface Machinery Program, 1989-1992; Naval Sea Systems Command 
as Surface Stealth Project Officer, 1992-1995; Supervisor of Shipbuilding San Diego as New 
Construction Officer, 1995-1998; Naval Sea Systems Command as Director of Ship Research and 
Development, 1998; and as Strategic Sealift Deputy Program Manager (PMS 385), 1999. Goddard 
served as a Chief of Naval Operations Fellow on the Strategic Studies Group from 1999-2000, 
Executive Assistant to Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command from 2000-2001; DD(X) Program 
Manager from 2001-2005; and as Vice Chief, Naval Sea System Command from 2005 to 2007. He 
assumed his present duties in February 2007. He is a member of the Acquisition Professional 
Community and a graduate of the Program Manager’s Course at the Defense Systems Management 
College.  
Goddard’s personal decorations include the Legion of Merit (two awards), Navy Meritorious Service 
Medal (two awards) and Navy Commendation Medal (two awards). He is the author of several articles 
on the topic of ship design and construction, and recipient of the American society of Naval Engineers 
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Rethinking Acquisition Reform: Cost-growth Solutions May 
Aggravate More Important Problems 
Presenter: Phil Candreva, M.S., Senior Lecturer of Budgeting, Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy, NPS.  Candreva’s research investigates how government organizations use 
financial information in such areas as resource allocation decision-making, accounting, 
performance measurement, and management reform. Most contemporary public sector 
management reform efforts are either explicitly tied to financial decisions (e.g., performance-
based budgeting) or are implicitly tied through other management efforts (e.g., efficiency 
programs). Since budgets are the battlefield on which public policy disputes are waged, public 
managers must become proficient at showing how effectively and efficiently those resources are 
being used in order to preserve or expand their resource base. Such efforts are a critical 
dimension of contemporary management reform. 
Philip J. Candreva 
Senior Lecturer of Budgeting 
Senior Associate, Center for Defense Management Reform 
Naval Postgraduate School 
555 Dyer Road 




There is increasing dissatisfaction with cost growth in major defense acquisition 
programs. Cost growth crowds out other investments, stresses budgets or causes schedule 
slips, all of which result in a military force that is less capable than previously expected. 
Several recent studies have recommended two categories of reforms: capital budgeting 
reforms seek stability in acquisition accounts, and rational cost model reforms seek to 
reduce the percentage increase of final cost over budget estimates. In both categories, 
undesirable secondary effects may be worse than the desirable primary effects; specifically, 
reforms that reduce cost growth may do so by driving total costs higher. This study 
examines these reforms and discusses their secondary effects. The paper concludes that 
the current practice of generating low estimates, coupled with dissatisfaction with cost 
growth may best serve to limit total cost. 
Introduction 
Cost growth in defense acquisition programs is a problem that captures the attention 
of the general public, the media, Congress, defense reformers, and the acquisition 
community. Cost growth is said to reduce the affordability of the long-term defense program, 
resulting in top-line budget increases, reduced or late programs, or a combination of the two. 
Despite over a decade of growing defense budgets (even when one excludes the burden 
and cost of GWOT borne outside the regular budget process), service chiefs feel 
increasingly constricted in their procurement accounts. From 2001 to 2007, the planned 
investment in new programs doubled—from a portfolio valued at approximately $750 billion 
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 Historical performance has not been good. The GAO has included defense 
acquisition management among its High Risk programs since the list began in 1990, 
in part due to cost management. “Weapons systems routinely take much longer to 
field, cost more to buy, and require more support than provided for in investment 
plans” (GAO, 2007, January, p. 61).  The GAO’s review of 27 weapons systems 
showed total cost growth of 19%, RDT&E growth of over 33% and schedule 
slippages of 23% (GAO 2007, March, p. 9). Looking back over the last three 
decades, RAND has shown that cost growth has averaged about 46%—that is, 
programs actually cost 46% more than estimated at Milestone B—and that cost 
performance has not improved despite numerous and continuous acquisition reform 
efforts (Younossi et al., 2007).  
 The problem is expected to continue into the future. Using historical performance as 
a predictor of future needs, the CBO projects that the investment accounts in the 
FYDP are underfunded by about 28% (CBO, 2007, p. 14).   
 The phenomena are well-understood and documented. The Defense Acquisition 
Performance Assessment (DAPA) report stated:  
Over many years, 128 studies have been done to address perceived 
problems with the system and to prevent waste, fraud and abuse. Historically, 
we observed that cost and schedule instability have been a problem in all 
system acquisitions since the Civil War. We see some of the same issues as 
problems today that the Packard Commission saw 20 years ago. (Kadish et 
al., 2006, p. 2)  
 The critics and ideas are not all external to the Department. The DoD’s own 
Acquisition Transformation Report to Congress lists seven implementation goals. 
Three include the term “cost-effective” in their title, and a fourth relates to 
governance and decision processes (Kreig, 2007, p. 6). It is not that DoD is turning a 
deaf ear; the intentions are all good. 
There is no shortage of recommendations and plans to fix the problems of cost 
growth. Defense contractors, advisory bodies, and R&D centers have spent vast sums over 
the years chronicling such problems and offering solutions. Ninety (42%) of the 212 defense 
management reform initiatives in the period 1990-2006 dealt with acquisition and budgeting 
(Francis & Walther, 2006).   The study of reform agendas and recommendations is an 
exercise in organizational evolution. Just as Darwin noted the beaks of the finches on the 
Galapagos Islands adapted gradually to their environments, recommendations to fix 
acquisition evolve slightly from report to report. This article takes a radically different tack—a 
leap on the reform recommendation evolutionary path, if you will. This article will argue that 
the cost-growth phenomenon may not even be a problem. It probably is less of a problem 
than the proffered solutions. In fact, if we assume DoD policies and procedures have 
evolved purposefully with competent managers in light of the available knowledge, then the 
current system may be the best available to ensure programs are delivered at the lowest 
cost.  Attributes of some of the solutions to cost growth may actually drive total costs higher.  
Those who study defense acquisition point to several problems associated with cost 
growth. One set of problems is related to the decision whether to invest. Underestimation 
“leads to poor investment choices” by starting more or larger programs than the department 
can afford (Melese, Franck, Angelis & Dillard, 2007, p. 358). If there is a business rule that a 
certain cost-benefit ratio threshold must be exceeded to make the initial investment, then an 
underestimate of cost may cause those making resource allocation decisions to err. 
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Similarly, in an analysis of alternatives, if the cost estimates are not uniformly inaccurate, 
resource-allocation decision-makers may make the wrong choice. 
Another set of problems is related to the effects of growth after it occurs. Because 
the budget is a social contract, breaches of cost estimates can damage trust and 
relationships within government (Melese et al., 2007, p. 359). In some cases, they may 
breach legally imposed thresholds, the so-called Nunn-McCurdy breaches. When costs 
overrun, the remedy may involve stretching out schedules or reducing quantity, thereby 
reducing the new system’s effect on the operating forces. The remedy may instead be a 
reallocation of funds away from a lower-priority program, thereby causing a different 
program’s schedule or quantity to suffer. The remedy may also be a request for additional 
budget authority, imposing an opportunity cost for the nation as a whole. 
The two most commonly proposed solutions to cost growth address the two sides of 
the problem that are most under governmental control: budget stability and cost-estimation 
accuracy. The former contends that increased funding stability would allow the program 
manager to shift attention to non-financial factors by insulating the program from the 
vagaries of politics and execution-year fiscal maneuvers.  The GAO reported that over one-
third of program managers said the biggest obstacle they faced was funding stability (GAO, 
2005, p. 44). The latter contends that the problem originates with inaccurate cost estimates 
and that improved accuracy will contain cost growth. These reforms address the problem of 
unmet expectations by minimizing the amount of cost growth. In the process of doing so, 
they unfortunately fail to alleviate the effects of cost growth. In some cases, these reforms 
would introduce additional undesirable effects. This paper argues that instead of seeking to 
minimize relative cost growth, decision-makers should focus attention on minimizing total 
cost. Paradoxically, some of the very forces that hold total cost down are rooted in the 
dissatisfaction with cost growth.  
Capital Budgeting Reforms  
Private industry—as well as many state and municipal governments—employs 
separate processes to budget for capital items and operating expenses. Most people in 
managing their household budgets do the same: we apply one form of decision logic when 
budgeting for the electric bill or groceries and a different logic when deciding to purchase a 
new car or major appliance. Within the DoD, procurement budgets are worked alongside 
operating and salary budgets, and both are appropriated on an annual line-item basis. 
Reformers have often questioned this practice. Most recently, the 2006 Quadrennial 
Defense Review and the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment recommended a 
form of capital budgeting. 
Capital budgeting involves the analysis of costs and cash flows associated with an 
investment project that precedes and informs the decision to invest.  At most levels of 
government (excepting, notably, the federal government), capital investment decisions are 
made in tandem with the decision of how to finance them—most being paid for with revenue 
measures such as a special tax assessment or with debt instruments such as bond 
issuances or loans. There is a deliberate link between the investment and its implications for 
current and long-term budgets, fiscal policy, asset management, and cash flows (Lee & 
Johnson, 1998).  
The budgeting practice for capital investments at the federal level has a different 
flavor. Federal capital budgets do not necessarily need to be separate from operating 
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budgets in the absence of the balanced budget requirements common at the state and 
municipal level. The sovereign federal government may run deficits, raise revenues, print 
money, and borrow more readily than any other organization. Linking the capital purchase to 
a specific revenue stream is not necessary. Annual resource flows are often sufficient to fully 
fund the federal capital projects. Thus, they face they same annual review and trade-off 
decision-making as operating budget accounts.  
Irrespective of the budgetary concern, federal capital projects are sometimes viewed 
as mechanisms for affecting macroeconomic conditions. Capital projects may be started, not 
because the ends of the project are the main objective, but because the job itself, the means 
to the end, is highly desirable. Programs during the Great Depression like the PWA, WPA 
and TVA were as much about creating jobs as they were about building bridges and dams. 
Urban renewal projects are more about sociological factors than buildings. Likewise, some 
capital investments in military systems are made in part to effect public objectives other than 
military capability. These short-term and complementary goals that are achieved through 
capital programs confound the analysis and argue against a separate capital budgeting 
strategy.  
Private-sector capital budgeting practices are similar to those used in government 
and include lifecycle cost and benefit analyses. The costs include the obvious investment in 
the item, financing costs, and any incremental operating and support costs. Benefits include 
new revenue streams or lower operating and support costs. Investment decisions are based 
on one or more analytical techniques, such as payback period, net present value, or internal 
rate of return. These are benchmarked against a hurdle rate which represents the next best 
available use of the funds. Assuming the project will generate sufficient risk-adjusted return 
in a reasonable period of time, a capital budget is prepared. That budget is often distinct 
from, but affects, the organization’s annual operating and support budget. The capital 
budget may be prepared outside the annual operating and support budget cycle, the timing 
more aligned with project schedules than accounting cycles. Funds to pay for the capital 
project also may be raised separately from the revenues raised by routine operations (but 
the service of debt, for example, would be incorporated into future operating budgets). 
One significant problem with adapting capital budgeting for defense items is that 
there is no benefit that is easily defined in financial terms. Computation of a net present 
value or payback period is meaningless if the benefit and the cost cannot be expressed in 
consistent units.4  There is no clear rate of return against which to compare to a hurdle rate. 
What can be done, however, is to perform a cost-effectiveness analysis for competing 
proposals that perform essentially the same task. Two alternative proposals for meeting the 
same need have presumably equal benefits and, therefore, can be compared based solely 
on a cost analysis. But comparison of capital budgets for items that generate disparate 
benefits is very problematic. 
Acquisition reformers argue that best (or at least common) capital budgeting 
practices would provide much needed stability to the management of defense acquisition 
programs (Kadish et al., 2006; McCaffery & Jones, 2006). One form of the proposal is to 
separate the capital decision from the operating cost decision, to examine each capital 
decision when the program is ready, and to fund fully the development and acquisition costs 
                                                
4 Housel and Bell (2001) recognize this problem and suggest a methodology.  Practical application of 
that methodology in the DoD is unlikely in the near term, if ever. 
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at that time.  It is argued that such a practice will increase the likelihood of program success 
by addressing a significant risk factor. The FY 2007 Defense Acquisition Transformation 
Report to Congress clearly shows that the DoD accepts this argument (Kreig, 2007, p. 20). 
Such proposals, however, involve risk. Indeed, secondary costs may outweigh the primary 
benefit.  
Isolating the capital investment decision necessarily removes it from the larger 
discussion of overall defense policy and resource allocation. The legislature prefers to 
debate and decide defense matters once in the annual authorization and appropriation 
process. Separating the capital items may cause the same issues to be debated twice or 
may mask interrelationships that should be considered as a whole. Just as the DoD 
considers the full portfolio of options during the programming phase of PPBE, the legislature 
needs to do the same. By separating the capital items from the rest of the program during 
budgeting, decision-makers could eliminate that possibility. Given the legislature’s 
constitutional power to raise and support armies and provide and maintain a navy, such 
proposals seem politically infeasible. 
 Separation of the capital investment decision also has little practical benefit. Under 
existing full-funding policies, the entire amount to build an end-item is presumably budgeted 
and appropriated. If prepared properly, the budget request should have considered the 
lifecycle cost and independent cost analyses. If Congress appropriates the full funding in 
multi-year appropriations, based on the President’s Budget, then the goals of a capital 
budgeting process have already been met. Curiously, the trend in the DoD, at least in the 
Navy, has been to expand the use of incremental budgeting over full funding—a practice 
clearly at odds with the stated recommendation to adopt corporate-style capital budgeting 
practices. 
Another form of capital budgeting reform proposes to fence procurement dollars 
once appropriated. The problem this proposal attempts to remedy is that funds too easily 
move out of procurement programs to address contingent needs elsewhere in the budget. In 
some cases, one procurement program which is experiencing problems is assisted with 
funds taken from another procurement program. In other cases, contingencies may affect 
the operating accounts, and without sufficient budgetary slack to address the contingency, 
funds are transferred from procurement programs. The recommendation to fence funds, 
however, is a budgeting reform to what is actually a problem of execution discipline. If the 
services are concerned that funds are taken from one program to address issues in another, 
then they should simply stop doing that. Addressing the problem of execution discipline is a 
more appropriate remedy than creating a new budgetary approach.  Easier said than done, 
critics will say. So if this reallocation is inevitable, what are the effects of such fences? 
Fenced accounts serve to make the resources allocated to procurement more 
important than dollars allocated to operations; or, to put it another way, future readiness 
would become de facto more important than current readiness. It would be short-sighted to 
institutionalize such a decision, as it actually restricts flexibility to deal with unforeseen 
contingencies. If the procurement accounts cannot be a source to deal with the contingency, 
what is the source? Pay accounts? Operations elsewhere around the globe? Such fences 
also tend to restrict funds flowing in both directions. Many an acquisition program has 
benefited from reprogramming actions in which funds are taken from operating accounts; 
separate capital accounts may restrict these flows. The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected 
(MRAP) vehicle program received over a billion dollars in FY 2007 that way.  The current 
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process is not perfect, but it may be better than inappropriately adopting a practice that is 
“best” in a different context. 
To summarize, corporate and non-federal government models of capital budgeting 
do not adapt well to the federal government. While adoption of capital budgeting reforms 
would potentially stabilize the funding outlook for select acquisition programs, such actions 
inject rigidity into a process that demands flexibility in so many other areas. Fiscal law 
already imposes rigidity; the creation of special accounts for acquisition programs simply 
adds to that problem. Capital budgeting reforms are unlikely to be adopted if they limit broad 
analysis of the defense program and trade-offs within it.  Nor will adoption be likely if reforms 
challenge the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches. Existing 
processes already encourage the employment of some capital budgeting analytical 
processes; the specific remedies proposed are unlikely to resolve the problems of cost 
management. Indeed, they may create new problems. 
Rational Cost Model Reforms 
The second area of reform concerns the cost estimate on which the investment 
decision and budget are based. As the GAO recently stated, “If we expect programs to be 
executed within budget, programs need to begin with realistic budgets. The foundation of an 
executable budget is a realistic cost estimate that takes into account the true risk and 
uncertainty in a program” (GAO, 2007, p. 17).  There is widespread dissatisfaction with the 
accuracy of defense cost estimating—both in Congress and within the DoD. When a 
program experiences cost growth above its budgeted amount, the allocation of funds in 
current or future-year budgets must be adjusted to keep the program on track; doing so 
requires either top-line relief or a decrease to one or more other program budgets.  Either 
way, expectations are unmet. Before evaluating some of the proposed remedies to this 
problem, we must understand the nature of the problem. 
Of course, one must acknowledge that the cost-growth problem involves three 
variables. First is the cost estimate (E), which is often cited as a discrete figure, but in reality 
is a range of values defined by a probability distribution. Second is the amount budgeted (B) 
for the program,5 which is a discrete value selected presumably from somewhere along the 
cost-estimate probability curve. Third is the final cost of the program (C), a discrete value. 
The public often scrutinizes the difference between B and C, as these are the figures that 
exist in budget or appropriation documents, contract audits, SAR reports, and the like. 
Scholars and management reformers tend to also focus on the relationship between E and 
B, but the nuances often fail to capture the public’s and politicians’ interest. 
Shown graphically in Figure 1, a notional cost-estimate S-curve (so called because 
of its shape) will define a probability distribution based on the confidence of data populating 
the estimating model and the accuracy of the model itself (E). There is little probability of the 
government meeting the cost estimate at the low-dollar-value end of the curve, but a very 
high probability of meeting program goals at the high-dollar-value end of the curve.  During 
the budgeting process, a value is selected along the curve at the appropriate amount of 
                                                
5 To be even more precise, one could break down this variable into the programmed amount, the 
budgeted amount, the appropriated amount, and the amount actually provided to the program office. 
Those distinctions, though often quite real, are not necessary to make here. 
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funds—the precise point on the curve is the subject of some reform proposals and will be 
discussed shortly. For illustration purposes, the 50% probability value is shown (B). 
Eventually, at program completion, one has a final cost, notionally shown on the chart at 
value C. Cost growth is generally considered the difference between B and C. Many 
definitions of cost growth select B at acquisition Milestone B and C at program completion 
(or latest estimate if still ongoing), and years may pass between the formulation of B and the 
eventuality of C. 
 
Figure 1.  Cost Growth Diagram 
It is important to first note that cost-estimating errors, when they exist, are 
overwhelmingly low compared to the cost estimate. This author has yet to read a study or 
hear a defense official or politician complain that cost estimates are too high and 
overestimating errors are a problem. While this may seem facetious, it is a critically 
important point. If cost-estimating errors were a function of poor-quality data or technically 
inaccurate models, then one would expect normally distributed errors with a mean near 
zero. What we see is more of a lognormal distribution with very few observations of 
overestimation—as in Figure 2, below, from a RAND study.  This distribution suggests that 
there are biases in the data or models. Thankfully, biases can be found and eliminated. That 
is what much of the research and many of the recommendations in this area seek to do. 
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Figure 2. Cost-growth Factors (CGF) of Major Acquisition Programs 
(Arena, Leonard, Murry & Younossi, 2006, p. 22) 
What are the biases that affect cost estimates? RAND cites the following causes for 
cost growth: “overoptimism, estimating errors, unrecognized technical issues, requirements 
creep, lack of incentives to control cost, and schedule extensions” (Younossi et al., 2007, p. 
xxi). While unrecognized technical issues may indicate a poor estimate, unrecognizable 
errors do not. Most cost-estimating models make allowances for the likely ones; the 
unknowable ones should be distributed randomly, as should errors. Schedule extensions 
and requirements creep may help explain why final costs are higher than the estimate; 
however, they are not estimating problems if the changes to schedules and requirements 
occur subsequent to the estimate, and the estimate correctly considered the original 
schedule and requirement.  Further, it is incorrect to view cost growth as a problem in a 
situation in which requirements grow, and the cost of those requirements—had they been 
considered—would have been consistent with the estimate. In those cases, the item 
purchased is not the same as the item estimated.6 And in many cases, schedule extensions 
are an effect, not a cause, of cost growth. These are matters of program management 
discipline, not cost-estimating accuracy. A lack of incentives to control costs is also a matter 
of program management or oversight and is not a matter of cost estimating, directly. It may 
be an indirect factor, as we shall see below. That leaves overoptimism as a source of non-
normal bias in the estimate. 
Melese and his co-authors blame two factors: “bad incentives (psychological and 
political-economic explanations) and bad estimation (methodological explanations)” (Melese 
et al., 2007, p. 359). Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2006) cites three categories of factors. One 
(technical estimating errors) he dismissed because of the non-normal distribution of errors 
                                                
6 It is important here to acknowledge that, politically, this distinction may not matter. The public at 
large does not hold that information and only sees that the latest fighter (or ship or other program) 
has grown in cost. It does not see that the airplane that was bought is better than the one estimated. 
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and the general lack of improvement over time. The other two, optimism bias and strategic 
misrepresentation,7 are characterized as psychological and political factors, respectively. 
Thus, all three studies identify similar biases, but they suggest different remedies.  
The problem is that two types of bias exist in cost estimating: optimism and strategic 
misrepresentation. These biases affect the cost estimate, the amount budgeted for the 
program, or both. There are other forces that affect the final cost figure and manifest during 
the execution of the program: requirements creep (including the unforeseen technical 
issues), some schedule extensions, and incentive structures. Let us consider three 
proposed remedies to the cost-estimating problem in light of these biases and factors. 
DAPA Recommendation—budget higher on the curve. To its credit, the DAPA report 
did not look solely at cost-estimating errors, but rather at the totality of issues affecting 
defense acquisition.8 As part of its authors’ comprehensive examination, recommendations 
were offered in several areas, including budgeting and cost control. Among those budgeting 
and cost control recommendations was the proposal to “Adjust program estimates to reflect 
‘high confidence’—defined as a program with an 80% chance of completing development at 
or below estimated cost” (Kadish et al., 2006, p. 13). Acknowledging the overoptimism and 
strategic misrepresentation biases in the system, which they refer to as “the conspiracy of 
hope” (p. 102), the authors assert that using optimistic estimates (defined as the 50% 
confidence level) results in excessive restructuring of budgets and programs. Essentially, 
the DAPA report suggests an appropriate level of funding: that B should be set at a specific, 
higher, point on the E curve. 
There is an attractive logic to the DAPA proposal. If B were set higher on the E 
curve, one can be reasonably certain that the degree of cost growth would diminish. 
Presumably, only 1/5 of programs would risk cost growth, and 4/5 should cost approximately 
what was budgeted. This would reduce the need for budgetary and programmatic 
adjustments, as far fewer programs would experience growth problems. This proposal, 
however, results in higher overall spending for the same programs. 
Federal appropriation law and the norms of the federal government are such that 
every dollar appropriated is expected to be spent. If a program is funded at the 50% 
probability level, there is an even chance it will either cost what was budgeted or will cost 
more.  In other words, there is nearly a 100% chance it will cost at least the 50% level. By 
funding that same program at the 80% probability level, there is zero chance that it will cost 
the amount of the 50% or the 60% or the 75% estimate. There is a nearly 100% probability it 
will cost at least the 80% estimate. While funding at the higher level reduces the likelihood of 
cost growth, it does so by guaranteeing the higher cost in the first place. There is no longer 
the possibility of a negative effect on other programs; it is foreordained. Rather than risk the 
                                                
7 Jones & Euske define strategic misrepresentation as “the planned, systematic distortion or 
misstatement of fact—lying—in response to incentives in the budget process” (1991, p. 437). This 
definition is consistent with Flyvbjerg’s use of the term. 
8 The report warns that one should implement comprehensive change rather than incremental 
change.  “Past practices are replete with examples demonstrating that if you adjust one part of the 
system with corrective measures, challenging issues surface in other parts of the system. When 
untested corrective action is taken, over time it can result in unintended consequences” (Kadish et al., 
2006, p. 82). This author agrees wholeheartedly; in fact, the purpose of this report is to draw attention 
to those unintended consequences. 
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possibility of disrupting secondary programs or altering schedules and reducing quantities of 
the primary program, those changes necessarily occur at the outset.   
Melese et al. Recommendation—TCE. In a study that looked specifically at cost-
estimating accuracy, Melese and his colleagues employ transaction cost economics (TCE) 
theory to the problem of cost growth. While acknowledging the psychological and political 
biases that create bad incentives, they mainly focus on improving bad estimation 
methodologies. The authors suggest the use of TCE will obtain less biased estimates which, 
in turn, will reduce the mean and variance of cost growth. Noting that inaccurate estimates 
may result from omitting variables, the estimator is encouraged to consider costs beyond 
production to “include coordination and motivation costs such as search and information 
costs, decision and contracting costs, and monitoring and enforcement costs” (Melese et al., 
2007, p. 359). After clearly describing factors within the DoD and their contractors that drive 
cost growth, the authors conclude that “cost estimating techniques must properly anticipate 
extra transaction costs […] that can quickly overwhelm initial production cost estimates” (p. 
365). 
There are two concerns with this approach. First, “TCE predicts contracts and other 
governance structures will be chosen that reduce transaction costs and improve the gains 
from exchange between buyers and sellers” (p. 367).  This is true only so far as both buyer 
and seller are motivated by a concern for economic efficiency. This is not necessarily true 
when one of the actors is a government. Rules governing competitive bidding, free trade, 
the use of small businesses, and Buy-American provisions all add transaction costs and 
often raise production costs. The public value in such rules is not economic; it is elsewhere 
in the complexion of values that define the public sector: values such as fairness, equity, 
accountability, or justice.  The evidence is not at all clear that the DoD is motivated to design 
governance structures, for instance, that reduce transaction costs. The excessively 
bureaucratic structure of the acquisition review and approval processes is hardly designed 
to be efficient. Those processes are arguably designed to limit undesirable effects more 
than they are designed to encourage desirable ones. 
Second, since acquisition cost growth is measured predominantly in production cost 
terms, the increases that are routinely experienced are in production costs; they are not 
caused by the omission of transaction costs. Cost growth is most commonly defined as 
increases in development and production costs as reported in Selected Acquisition Reports. 
In other words, those costs are the ones funded through RDT&E and procurement 
appropriations.  The majority of the transaction costs, on the other hand, are funded in 
operations appropriations. Contracting, contract administration, auditing, data collection, 
oversight, etc., are neither included in the baseline nor in the final cost estimate.9 The salary 
of the program manager is not even included. The omission of such costs does not account 
for the growth.  
The value of a TCE approach comes from the knowledge that managing those 
activities may reduce cost growth, but including them in the estimate will not. Inclusion of 
                                                
9  Volume 2A, Chapter 1 of the DoD Financial Management Regulations says: “The cost of civilian 
personnel compensation and other direct costs (i.e., travel, office equipment leasing, maintenance, 
printing and reproduction) incurred in support of procurement and/or production programs by 
departmental headquarters staff, contracting offices, contract audit offices, system project offices, and 
acquisition managers are expenses.” As expenses, they are not funded in the procurement accounts. 
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those costs in the estimate would have the additional unintended consequence of ascribing 
an economic value to those activities above the other social values they were intended to 
create. Audits are done not to reduce cost but to provide accountability and assurance to the 
public. Governance structures exist not only to hold economic costs down, but also to 
ensure against waste and fraud and to ensure compliance with the law.  Many of those laws 
are motivated by social, not economic values. Because of that, decision-makers should 
focus not on minimizing their drain on the acquisition of weapon systems, but rather on 
reducing the cost of attaining that social goal irrespective of the weapons system.  
Undoubtedly, a better understanding of the role transaction costs play in the 
motivation of sellers can assist in the negotiation and administration of contracts; that may, 
in turn, help lower the cost of production. But because many of those transaction costs 
serve non-economic goals, they should remain outside the cost estimate and the final cost 
tally.  
Flyvbjerg Recommendation—reference class forecasting.  There is another way to 
address the psychological and political biases other than using TCE. Flyvbjerg (2006) 
recommends using reference class forecasting—an estimating methodology based on 
Kahneman and Taversky’s (1979) work in decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. 
Reference class forecasting addresses optimism and strategic misrepresentation biases by 
relying on the actual performance of a reference class of comparable projects. To combat 
the optimistic bias inherent in an “inside view” of the project, under reference class 
forecasting, those estimating the cost of a project assume an “outside view” by considering 
the experiences of comparable projects. In his study of public works projects, Flyvbjerg finds 
that different classes of projects improve their cost-estimating accuracy by apply various 
“uplifts” to the inside view estimates. He finds that to achieve the 80% probability level (the 
same probability the DAPA report recommends), estimates for road, bridge/tunnel, and rail 
projects should rise 32, 55 and 57%, respectively. 
Reference class forecasting suffers from the same effect as the DAPA 
recommendation: improvements in cost-estimating accuracy are achieved by forfeiting the 
possibility of lower total costs. Reference class forecasting is not a new idea for defense 
acquisition. The “outside view” was the motivation for the creation of the Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group in 1972 and the requirement for independent cost estimates (Melese et 
al., 2007). The Congressional Budget Office employs this basic concept in their report series 
Long-term Implications of Current Defense Plans (CBO, 2007). The knowledge exists. One 
could even assume it is considered by decision-makers; it simply is not used. The important 
question is why not? 
All three studies suggest remedies to improve the accuracy of cost estimates and to 
lower the likelihood of cost growth in defense acquisition. They each acknowledge that cost 
growth is less a technical estimating problem as it is a problem of psychological and political 
bias. The three recommendations would all bring B closer to C on Figure 1 and would be 
able to claim gains in cost-estimating accuracy. This paper concedes that such methods are 
likely to reduce cost growth, but it also warns that they do little to address the ultimate 
problem of total cost. In fact, all three recommendations would aggravate rather than 
mitigate the ultimate problem: high costs crowding out other spending and their effect on 
military force structure. Why? Because all three methods program those costs with certainty 
rather than risk the possibility of them occurring later.  
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One should notice that all three methods suggest that the DoD more fully consider 
costs known to exist. I submit that those costs are considered and intentionally dismissed for 
one of two reasons. One reason—acknowledged by Melese et al. and Flyvberg—is that a 
lower estimate may be politically necessary to achieve the “camel’s nose in the tent” effect. 
Wildavsky (1979) suggested that low initial budget estimates, while inaccurate, serve a 
useful purpose by getting a program initiated. Then, once it is initiated, upward adjustments 
are easier to obtain in the future than approval of the program at the higher amount in the 
first place. Strategic misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Jones & Euske, 1991) is a common 
occurrence and one not undertaken lightly. Those engaging in strategic misrepresentation 
weigh the benefit of a higher probability of program initiation against the higher probability of 
a cost to one’s reputation and the inevitable downstream budget pressure. Evidently, in 
some cases, the balance tips in the favor of under-representing cost. 
Another reason for underestimating is that the Defense Department may be wittingly 
or unwittingly engaging in target costing (Monden & Hamada, 1991; Cooper & Slagmulder, 
1997). Target costing is the practice of intentionally setting aggressive financial targets as 
an inducement to achieve those targets. It is done with full knowledge that there is a risk of 
cost growth, but that risk is accepted in exchange for the possibility of hitting the lower 
actual cost. Costs are managed through value engineering programs. The Navy’s recent 
goal of producing a Virginia class submarine for $2 billion is an example. Target costing is 
the opposite of what the three studies recommend. Target costing can be effective if the 
environment is such that: (a) program managers are not punished for missing cost goals if 
their actual performance is reasonable, and (b) resources are slack enough to cover the 
inevitable cost growth. Both conditions tend to exist in the DoD. 
Whether the reason for perpetuating low estimates is an example of the camel’s 
nose theory or target costing, such low estimates are of value to the DoD. In the first case, a 
desired but politically risky program is begun and, once begun, is likely to perpetuate. In the 
second case, pressures are applied to programs to hold costs down, and the possibility of 
actually hitting those ambitious targets is left open. The two reasons may co-exist: through 
ambitiously low estimates, sufficient resources are apparently made available to initiate a 
new program. In some cases, this is evidently preferable to raising the estimate of the first 
program to reduce the likelihood of cost growth and, consequently, to eliminating the 
possibility of initiating the second.  
Paradoxically, it is the dissatisfaction with cost growth that permits practices like 
target costing to work, and it is the dissatisfaction with cost growth that limits the use of 
strategic misrepresentation. Funding at a low level of probability can be revisited during the 
annual budget cycle, but in the presence of constrained resources and dissatisfaction with 
cost growth, program managers are pressured to hit those ambitious targets and minimize 
growth. These existing practices likely hold total costs lower than would be the case if the 
recommendations were adopted. Why? Those recommendations relieve the pressure to 
contain cost growth but do so in exchange for nothing other than the satisfaction of having 
met the estimate. Defense behavior has shown that two programs bursting at the budget 
seams is preferable to one program managed comfortably. 
Conclusion 
Dissatisfaction with cost growth has generated a set of recommendations designed 
to eliminate that growth. Unfortunately, adopting an inappropriate or unnecessary model 
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may not be helpful; rigidity is not helpful when flexibility is needed, and foreordaining higher 
costs is not helpful. The dissatisfaction itself is helpful. 
Recall that the main concern with cost growth is that it affects the total defense 
program. Systems are delivered later or in smaller quantities than expected. Root causes of 
the growth are psychological and political biases that manifest in the behavior of 
programmers, program managers, budgeters, contractors and politicians. These biases exist 
for a reason, and accounting for them does not make them disappear. Accounting for them 
simply makes explicit what many actors in the system know implicitly.  Failing to account for 
them serves to add pressure and incentives to the system, which may result in holding costs 
lower than they would be if the biases were accounted for.  
The underlying concern should be spending in total—not spending relative to an 
estimate. However, defense leaders and stakeholders should not be complacent about 
growth because their dissatisfaction serves a useful purpose. Rather than eliminate that 
dissatisfaction, it should be understood for the role it plays. Indeed, the present state may 
very well have evolved—not unlike Darwin’s finches—to achieve a satisfactory balance 
among all the forces at play: in this case, economic, psychological and political ones. 
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Chair:  Stan Z. Soloway is president of the Professional Services Council—the principal national 
trade association representing the government professional and technical services industry. PSC is 
known for its leadership on the full range of government acquisition/procurement and outsourcing and 
privatization issues. Soloway assumed the presidency in January 2001.  
Soloway is an expert on the relationship between the public and private sectors, and is routinely 
sought out by the media, federal agencies, congress and others to provide commentary and 
perspective on the full range of procurement and outsourcing issues. He also writes a monthly 
column in Washington Technology magazine, and was a member of the congressionally mandated, 
national panel on the future of government outsourcing chaired by the Comptroller General of the US.  
Prior to joining PSC, Soloway served as the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Reform) 
and concurrently as director of Secretary of Defense William Cohen’s Defense Reform Initiative. As 
Deputy Under Secretary, he was the department’s senior official responsible for the development and 
implementation of far-reaching reforms to the DoD’s acquisition processes and policies, and for the 
oversight of the training, education and career development of the 200,000-member defense 
acquisition workforce. As director, DRI, Soloway led significant department-wide re-engineering and 
reform initiatives in areas as diverse as privatization and outsourcing, electronic commerce, financial 
management reform, logistics transformation, and the quality of life for American troops.  
In recognition of his leadership at the DoD, Soloway was awarded both the Secretary of Defense 
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In 2007, Soloway was confirmed by the US Senate for a seat on the bi-partisan Board of Directors of 
the Corporation for National and Community Service. Mr. Soloway is a principal of the Council on 
Excellence in Government, and was an expert panelist for studies conducted by the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies on the future of defense technology and acquisition policy. He is 
also a member of the Board of Advisors of the National Contract Management Association, was a 
2005 recipient of the prestigious Federal 100 Award, and speaks frequently to industry and 
government organizations on government technology, acquisition, human capital, and strategic 
management issues.  
Before his appointment to the DoD, Soloway was a public policy and public affairs consultant for more 
than 20 years, and a highly regarded expert in (and frequent lecturer on) acquisition, privatization, 
and outsourcing issues. He also co-produced the critically acclaimed “Great Confrontations at the 
Oxford Union,” a series of prime-time specials that aired nationally on public television. He earned a 
degree in Political Science from Denison University, where he was elected to the National Men’s 
Journalism, National Men’s Leadership, and National Political Science honorary societies. 
Discussant: Captain Stephen H. Huber was born in West Chester, PA. He graduated from the US 
Naval Academy and was commissioned in 1980, having earned a Bachelor of Science Degree in 
Oceanography/Physics. After graduation, Huber served as a Naval Academy Seamanship and 
Navigation Instructor, followed by Surface Warfare Officers' School in Coronado, CA. At sea, he has 
served aboard USS STEIN (FF 1065) as Gunnery Officer, ASW Officer and Navigator/Administrative 
Assistant; USS REASONER (FF 1063) as Weapons Officer; and USS GARY (FFG 51) as Executive 
Officer. He also served on the Afloat Staff of Destroyer Squadron 5 as Operations Officer, and on the 
staff of Commander, THIRD Fleet, as Flag Secretary. Huber was Commanding Officer in USS FIFE 
(DD 991) from September 1998 through April 2000. During his command tour, FIFE deployed to the 
Eastern Pacific in support of Counter-Narcotics Operations, was the first ship to go through an 
availability using a private contractor in a public shipyard,  and was awarded the SECNAV Energy 
Conservation Award. Ashore, Huber has served as Aide to the Commandant, Naval District 
Washington, DC, and on the staff of Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, as the Assistant Surface 
ASW Officer and Special Operations Officer.  
During tours in Washington, DC, he has served as the Combat Systems Training Officer on the staff 
of the Chief of Naval Operations and at NAVSEA, in the Surface Ship Technology Directorate (SEA 
53) and as Deputy Program Manager in PMS 430—the BFTT program office. His last assignment 
was as Deputy Director, Human Systems Integration Directorate (SEA 03B). 
Huber assumed command of Port Hueneme Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center in May 2004. 
Under his command, Port Hueneme Division has been awarded the 2006-2007 Shingo Silver 
Medallion in the Public Sector Category; the California Award for Performance Excellence, Bronze 
level 2005 and Silver level 2006; the Deming Award for Training Excellence 2005; the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Government Contracting Office/Facility Award during 2005; was the NAVSEA 
Nominee for the CNO Safety Award 2005; the 2006 CNO Environmental Award; and received the 
Industry Partnership Award from the California Regional Consortium for Engineering Advances in 
Technological Education (CREATE), 2006. A strong supporter of the Navy's Lean Six Sigma 
initiatives, Huber's leadership has resulted in recorded savings in excess of $26 million during his 
tour. 
Huber's awards include the Meritorious Service Medal (with two gold stars), the Navy Commendation 
Medal (with four gold stars), the Navy Achievement Medal, and several unit awards. He holds a 
Master of Arts degree in International Studies from Old Dominion University, and a Master of Arts 
degree in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. He was inducted into 
the International History Honors Society, Phi Alpha Theta, in 1993. He was designated an Acquisition 
Professional in January of 1997 and DAWIA Level III certified in Program Management in February of 
2002. He was a 2003 National Security Studies Fellow at the Maxwell School, Syracuse University. 
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Commercial-Off-the-Self (COTS): Impact to Reliability, 
Maintainability and Availability (RM&A) from an In Service 
Engineering Perspective 
Presenter: Robert Howard, Systems Engineering and T&E Division Supportability Manager, 
Land Attack Department, Naval Surface Warfare Center, Port Hueneme Division 
Abstract 
With the proliferation of COTS within Military systems based on DoD acquisition 
directives, RM&A processes and products requirements during acquisition need to evolve to 
ensure systems are meeting lifecycle expectation. RM&A disciplines and products have 
limited focus based on traditional MIL-STD architecture, which was based primarily on 
hardware failures represented by the traditional bathtub curve.  This paper discusses some 
of key observations and solutions being applied from the In-service Engineering Agent (PHD 
NSWC) along with lessons observed to mitigate future risks.   
Acquisition development strategies (such as incremental and spiral) are utilizing 
more COTS components for hardware and open architecture computing strategies for 
software. This drives a nasality to reevaluate traditional RM&A efforts performed during 
concept, development, integration and fielding. It also forces decision-makers to assess fleet 
feedback systems and their capability to provide meaningful data to understand and perform 
root-cause analysis on issues impacting operational availability, manpower, and operational 
cost.  Lifecycle RM&A observations were made on the level of accuracy and confidence 
required to support COTS Refresh Selection, changes in Duty Cycle and their relative 
impact to failure-rate calculation, reduced applicability of the Bath Tub Curve for RM&A 
prediction, and Human System Interface (HSI) impacts to failure rate.  Through 
understanding of these observations, this paper provides insight into reducing and avoiding 
introduction and sustainment risks and costs associated with COTS and OA. 
The in-service engineer must be involved through government oversight to verify 
both that system requirements are articulated and captured to the appropriate level to reach 
the desired end-state and that RM&A analysis tools are adapted based on technology 
insertion.  During development, production, and systems integration, the in-service engineer 
must ensure OEMs capture data and indicators which could identify shortfalls in planned or 
completed analysis, as these could impact the expected reliability, maintainability, or 
supportability of the system. Finally, as systems are fielded, assessment of quantitative 
feedback mechanism must be complimented with qualitative feedback if decision-makers 
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Dynamic Cost Risk Assessment for Controlling the Cost of 
Naval Vessels 
Presenter: Dr. Edouard Kujawski is an associate professor in the Systems Engineering Department at the 
Naval Postgraduate School.  His research and teaching interests include the design and analysis of high 
reliability/availability systems, risk analysis, and decision theory.  He received a PhD in theoretical physics 
from MIT, following which he spent several years in research and teaching physics.  He has held lead 
positions at General Electric, Lockheed-Martin and the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.  He has 
contributed to the design of particle accelerators and detectors, space observatories, commercial 
communication systems, the Space Station, and nuclear power plants.  He was a participant and contributor 
to the Lockheed Martin LM21 Risk Management Best Practices and the original INCOSE Systems 
Engineering Handbook.  He is a member of the San Francisco Bay Area Chapter of INCOSE and has served 
on the board of directors. 
Edouard Kujawski 
Systems Engineering Department 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
Author: Dr. Diana Angelis is an Associate Professor in the Defense Resources Management 
Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA.  She joined the faculty in 1996.  She 
studied accounting at the University of Florida and received a BS in Business Administration in 1977 
and a BS in Electrical Engineering in 1985.  She received her PhD in Industrial and Systems 
Engineering from the University of Florida in 1996.  Her research interests include the application of 
activity-based costing in government organizations, cost estimating, the valuation of R&D through 
options theory, and business reforms in defense management.  She was commissioned an officer in 
the United States Air Force in 1984 and served as a program engineer until 1989.  She joined the 
USAF Reserves in 1990 and has worked in both acquisition and test & valuation with the Air Force 
Materiel Command.  Dr. Angelis is a Certified Public Accountant and a Lieutenant Colonel in the US 
Air Force Reserve currently assigned to the Air Force Flight Test Center at Edwards AFB, CA.   
Diana Angelis 
Defense Research Management Institute 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 93943 
Abstract 
Naval vessels, like most large-capital projects, have a long history of cost growth.  To 
get a handle on this problem, NAVSEA’s Cost Engineering & Industrial Division, NAVSEA 
05C, has introduced Probabilistic Cost Risk Analysis (PCRA) into the Department of 
Defense (DoD) Planning, Programmatic, Budgeting, and Execution System (PPBES).  The 
quantification of cost in terms of cumulative probability distribution functions (CDF) or “S-
curves” provides a macroscopic view of project risk.  Risk curves alone do not provide 
adequate visibility into the individual project risk drivers; therefore, they are insufficient for 
planning and managing risk reduction activities (RRA).  Complex projects typically involve a 
set of high-consequence, project-specific risks that require detailed analysis and for which 
risk response actions need to be developed and implemented. The analysis of specific risks 
and RRAs requires a microscopic view.  We present a practical and mathematically sound 
approach using scenarios and Monte Carlo simulation within the framework of decision trees 
and risk curves.  The approach is detailed using a realistic but simplified case of a project 
with three technical risks. 
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Cost growth has been a major problem for the US Navy.  Over the past four 
decades, the growth of US Navy ship costs has exceeded the rate of inflation.  In the past 
50 years, annual cost escalation rates for amphibious ships, surface combatants, attack 
submarines, and nuclear aircraft carriers have ranged from 7 to 11% (Arena, Blickstein, 
Younossi & Grammich, 2006).  Along with real cost growth, the DoD has had significant 
problems with cost estimates.  By and large, the DoD and the military departments have 
underestimated the cost of buying new weapon systems.  A recent study by RAND (Arena, 
Leonard, Murray & Younossi, 2006) indicates that there is a systematic bias toward 
underestimating weapon system costs and substantial uncertainty in estimating the final 
cost of a weapons system. 
The DoD recognizes that uncertainty is an important part of cost estimating.  During 
a 2007 seminar with a naval aviation program official, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for 
Research, Development and Acquisition, Dr. Etter (Burgess, 2007), stated:  
Program managers not only need to know a realistic cost estimate for their program, 
they need to know the percent probability of achieving that target.  For example, a 
ship with a 40% chance of coming in on budget has a 60% chance of being over 
budget.  Such a situation should prompt the project manager to seek help from the 
acquisition community. (p. 42) 
There is an ongoing major shift in R&D and complex engineering projects from 
deterministic to probabilistic approaches.  Probabilistic Cost Analysis (PCA) provides the 
proper framework for handling the many different elements of cost uncertainty, including 
project-specific, high-consequence risks.  These risk drivers must be identified, assessed, 
mitigated, and controlled through formal risk management—which is an essential and critical 
discipline implemented in today’s DoD projects.   The Risk Management Guide for DoD 
Acquisition (2006) reads: 
Risk management is a continuous process that is accomplished throughout the life 
cycle of a system. It is an organized methodology for continuously identifying and 
measuring the unknowns; developing mitigation options; selecting, planning, and 
implementing appropriate risk mitigations; and tracking the implementation to ensure 
successful risk reduction. Effective risk management depends on risk management 
planning; early identification and analyses of risks; early implementation of corrective 
actions; continuous monitoring and reassessment; and communication, 
documentation, and coordination. (p. 3) 
The DoD considers the definition, implementation and documentation of risk 
management essential to acquisition success.  The DoD risk management process outlined 
in the Risk Management Guide consists of the following five activities performed on a 
continuous basis: Risk Identification, Risk Analysis, Risk Mitigation Planning, Risk Mitigation 
Implementation, and Risk Tracking. 
This process is consistent with the AACE definition, which includes identifying and 
analyzing risk factors or drivers, mitigating the risk drivers where appropriate, estimating 
their impact on plans and monitoring and controlling risk during execution (Hollman, 2006).  
To be effective, PCA must interface with each of the risk management activities.   
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An emphasis on risk management supports efforts to reduce lifecycle costs of 
system acquisitions.  An often-neglected concept in project risk management is the 
consideration of the entire project lifecycle.  Analysis of risk over the lifecycle of a system 
can yield substantial benefits.  Conversely, ignoring important stages of the lifecycle can 
lead to substantial problems in terms of risk for product development at the beginning of the 
lifecycle and for product upgrade or replacement at the end (Pennock & Haimes, 2001). 
Many sources of cost uncertainty in naval vessel construction—such as 
economic/business factors (rates-wages, overhead, G&A, vendor/supplier stability, inflation 
indices, multi-year assumptions, etc.), learning/rate/curve assumptions, and cost-reduction 
initiatives—are well understood within the framework of a macroscopic perspective; these 
are effectively modeled with classical Probability Distribution Functions (PDF) such as the 
triangular, Beta, lognormal, and Weibull distributions.  However, these factors constitute only 
a fraction of today’s typical project risk drivers and, therefore, cost uncertainty.   
The construction of naval vessels, like most complex engineering projects, is also 
susceptible to project-specific risk drivers, such as: low Technology Readiness Level (TRL); 
high design, manufacturing, and complexity; significant requirement changes; sizeable 
quantity changes; large funding uncertainty; severe acts of nature; and serious accidents. 
It is tempting to assume or claim that the PDFs typically elicited for cost elements 
also quantify the project-specific, high-consequence risks.  Sometimes cost analysts will go 
through the effort of identifying and discussing risk drivers, but when it comes to quantifying 
the risks and estimating contingency, they simply apply high/low ranges to WBS elements 
without thinking about how a particular risk driver affects one or more cost elements.  We 
think it is invalid and counterproductive to do this because it leads to the loss of valuable 
information and visibility into these risks.  Also, this approach tends to focus on cost 
reduction rather than risk mitigation.  Hollmann (2007) notes that in best practice, risk 
analysis should begin with the identification of risk drivers and events.  The cost impacts of 
the risk drivers and events are then considered specifically for each event. 
 The analysis of specific risks and Risk Response Actions (RRA) requires a 
microscopic view and is best carried out with tools such Decision Trees (DT), influence 
diagrams, or other discrete representations.  This microscopic perspective offers many 
benefits.  It is a powerful risk analysis method to explicitly model high-consequence risks 
and RRAs, and thereby provides a tool for making better decisions.  It also assists subject-
matter experts (SMEs) to think about credible, high-consequence events and better deal 
with overconfidence or optimism biases.  However, the microscopic view is too cumbersome 
to individually analyze every risk and source of cost uncertainty.  It complements and needs 
to be integrated within the PCA.   
In this paper, we propose to develop a microscopic/macroscopic PCA as an integral 
entity of the DoD risk management process, as follows: 
1. The cost and/or risk analyst (simply referred to as analyst below) and the SMEs 
jointly identify the individual risks using the standard DoD risk-identification process. 
2. The analyst and the SMEs jointly screen the identified risks for further analysis and 
risk mitigation. 
3. The analyst and SMEs jointly identify realistic RRAs for the screened risks. 
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4. The analyst models each risk and its RRAs using a DT. 
5. The analyst works with the SMEs to quantify the value of the decisions and 
outcomes for each DT using discrete and continuous distributions.  We favor the 
Direct Fractile Assessment (DFA) method for data elicitation and fitting the 
associated cost elements with a three-parameter Weibull distribution.  
6. The analyst quantifies the DTs using Monte Carlo simulation.  Risks and RRAs are 
then modeled in terms of risk curves.  We, thereby, avoid relying on the minimum 
expected risk value, which is a serious shortcoming of standard decision analysis.   
7. The analysis is readily performed using commercial Excel add-ins (Crystal Ball, 
@Risk…) or more specialized tools (DecisionPro, Analytica…). 
The goal of this paper is to present a realistic and practical method for explicitly 
analyzing and controlling the cost impact of project risks and realistic RRAs.  Projects can 
then dynamically determine the optimal temporal set of decision gates for a given probability 
of success—thereby reducing cost while increasing the probability of project success.  We 
illustrate the method using a realistic but simplified case of a project with three technical 
risks.  We close with some concluding remarks and recommendations for further 
development. 
The Quantification of Multiple Project Risks 
Consider a project with n credible, high-consequence risks {Ri}.  Each risk, Ri, is 
characterized by a probability of occurrence pi and a spectrum of possible outcomes with a 
PDF Li(x), where x is a random variable that represents the magnitude of the associated 
cost or loss.  One may then think of this set of risks as a risk portfolio or repository (Kujawski 
& Miller, 2007) with a generalized discrete PDF RS(x) given by: 
n
S 1 1 2 2 n n i
i=1
R ( ) p , L (x) , p , L (x) , , p , L (x) , 1 p ,0
⎧ ⎫≡ −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑Kx         (1) 
The total project cost is a random variable that consists of the sum of the m base 
cost elements {BCi} and the explicitly identified risk costs {RCi}.  Depending on the state of 
knowledge of the data, the base cost elements BCi may be modeled as either point 
estimates or continuous PDFs.  The total project cost TC is then the probabilistic sum of the 
m base cost elements and n risk-driver costs: 
 
1 1
( ) ( ) ( )
= =
= +∑ ∑m ni i i
i i
TC x BC x p L x                    (2) 
Equations (1) and (2) provide visibility into the link between the credible, high-
consequence risks {Ri} and the total project cost-risk curve.  Monte Carlo simulation tools 
such as Crystal Ball and @Risk can also provide tornado charts that conveniently quantify 
the importance of the various risk drivers and their link to the overall cost risk.  Projects can 
use this information to rationally identity risks.  This is in sharp contrast with: (1) the use of 
point estimates that are at best ambiguous because overly confident staff provide low cost 
estimates, while others may inflate their cost estimates to make it easier to achieve success, 
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(2) decision-making based on qualitative assessments, and (3) the consideration of only S-
curves, which only provide a macroscopic and somewhat “black box” view of project risk and 
cost uncertainty.   
Modeling and Analyzing Risk Response Actions 
We model and analyze each screened risk and the proposed RRAs using a 
generalized DT—where PDFs rather than discrete branches are associated with the chance 
nodes, and the outcomes are analyzed using Monte Carlo simulation (Kujawski, 2002).   
This provides a powerful technique for dealing with the complex situations typical of today’s 
DoD projects.  It avoids bushy trees and generates risk curves, thereby removing the 
reliance of decision-making based on expected value.   
To illustrate the approach, consider the risk depicted in Figure 1.  To be concrete, 
Risk #1 is associated with fabricating a complex module.  The two risk response actions are: 
(i) Directly fabricate the module, or (ii) Build a prototype and then fabricate the module.  The 
generalized DT follows the standard DT representation.  Decision nodes and chance nodes 
are depicted as squares and circles, respectively.  The branches that originate with decision 
nodes represent the available RRAs.  The branches that originate with chance nodes 
represent the possible probabilistic outcomes.  A descriptive label, a probability, and a cost 
distribution are associated with each branch.  These probability and cost values are 
conditional on the RRA and may also be conditional on the outcome of other risks in case of 
interdependencies.  We model the cost values using a three-parameter Weibull distribution 
fitted to the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles determined in accordance with the Direct Fractile 
Assessment (DFA) method.  
 In this example, we assume that the baseline cost is $1,100K.  Risk is then given by 
the Value At Risk (VAR) relative to this value.  The VAR corresponds to the events whereby 
production of the module exceeds $1,100K.  The ordering of the decision nodes 
corresponds to different temporal deterministic events in the development and fabrication 
cycle of the module.   
 
NOTE: In this hypothetical case, the values may be thought of as $K. 
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Figure 1.  Generalized Decision Tree for Risk #1 and Two Initial Candidate Risk 
Response Actions 
We evaluated each RRA in Figure 1 using the Excel Monte Carlo simulation add-in, 
Crystal Ball.  The selection of a RRA is a deterministic event, and only the associated 
outcomes can be realized.  It would, therefore, be inappropriate to weigh or combine the 
outcomes of the two RRAs since they are mutually exclusive.  The PDFs and risk profiles for 
each individual RRA at the start of the project are depicted in Figures 2a and 2b, 
respectively.  The PDFs are multimodal and cannot be represented using any of the well-
known probability distribution functions.  The peak for the “prototype” RRA corresponds to 
the outcome in which the fabrication of the module fails.  The PDF for the “direct fabrication” 
RRA has two modes corresponding to the sequence of events in which the first fabrication 
and the subsequent fabrication following redesign both fail.   
The Complementary Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDF) or risk curves are 
shown in Figure 2b, in which the exceedance probability is the probability of exceeding a 
given consequence or (1 − the probability of success).  For example, looking at the 
VAR(Fab_A2) curve in Figure 2b, one reads that there is approximately a 30% probability 
that the cost will exceed $1,500K.  Equivalently, one can state that there is a 70% probability 
that the cost will be less than $1,500K.  The risk curve and the cumulative distribution 
function carry identical information content.  Since we are focusing on specific risks and 
VAR, we favor the risk curve or CCDF because, in our opinion, it provides a better view of 
the residual risk and management reserve than the S-curve (or CDF) that typical represents 
the total cost (including the baseline and risk cost elements). 
For any given value on the x-axis, the risk curve that corresponds to the lowest 
exceedance probability represents the lower risk.  Figure 2b illustrates that the prototype risk 
curve is significantly lower than the fabrication risk curve and, thus, has less risk.  In this 
hypothetical but realistic situation, the investment of $100K for building a prototype provides 
a significant return on the investment as measured by the significant risk reduction.  To be 
more precise, the prototype RRA presents a lower cost of risk mitigation for all values 
greater than $200K.  For the manager trying to decide if it is worthwhile to invest in the 
prototype option, the answer is to invest as long as the anticipated benefits from the 
prototype (whether it be cost savings, time savings, information, etc.) exceed $200K. 
 
NOTE: Given the different scales, the two PDFs are shown separately for greater visibility. 
Figure 2a.  Probability Distributions Corresponding to the Two RRA Options 
for Risk #1   
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Figure 2b.  Risk Curves for the Two RRA Options for Risk #1 
The Dynamic Character of Risk Response Actions 
As a project progresses, its risk picture is dynamic.  The sources and consequences 
of risks continue to evolve and change over time.  As more information is obtained about a 
particular risk, the RRA options might change; thus, it is necessary to constantly monitor 
risk.  In general, at any point in time there will be a mix of acceptable and unacceptable 
results.  The performance of the RRAs should be monitored and controlled to ensure they 
are adequately mitigating risk.  Concurrently, management reserves should be reviewed on 
a periodic basis and dynamically allocated where needed to ensure project success.  The 
Lockheed Management Student Guide (1998, p. 33) states, “Risk management efforts that 
fail do so because the risk control actions did not keep up with a changing program 
situation.” 
 As discussed in the previous section, we use risk DTs to model the evolution 
of the potential RRAs.  For example, Figure 3 depicts the Risk #1 risk curves at the start of 
implementation of the “Prototype” RRA and after the successful demonstration of the 
prototype.  The latter risk curve moves to the left of the original risk curve and is narrower, 
which reflects a reduced risk.  These two risk curves represent the value of the unmitigated 
risk exposure at two different points in time and, thereby, provide a metric for the risk 
exposure characteristics.  This information is essential if analysts are to track the value of 
the residual exposure versus the value or cost of the expended RRAs and modify the RRAs 
as needed to ensure mission success.  Note that if the risk curve moves to the right of the 
original risk curve, it means that risk exposure is increasing, and RRAs need to be re-
evaluated. 
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Figure 3.  Risk Exposure Characteristics for Risk #1 with Development of a Prototype 
for Risk Mitigation at the Start and after Successful Demonstration 
Application to a Project with Multiple Risks 
Now consider the hypothetical project with the following three independent risks: 
Risk #1 depicted in Figure 1; Risks #2 and #3 depicted in Figure 4a and 4b, respectively.  It 
is both rich and simple enough to illustrate: (1) several diverse RRAs and their analysis, (2) 
the dynamic nature of the risk picture, and (3) the monitoring of individual risks and 
allocation of management reserves.  The approach readily extends to dependent risks using 
different probability and outcome values that reflect causality effects among the risks. 
Figure 4a may be thought of as the prime contractor subcontracting the engineering 
and fabrication of a complex module.  The prime is considering the following two options: (1) 
subcontract to a single contractor A, denoted by the branch PDR_A associated with the 
initial node; (2) carrying two subcontractors and selecting the best one for fabrication at the 
Preliminary Design Review (PDR).  The labeling is somewhat cumbersome because each 
branch needs to be uniquely identified.  The PDR_A sequence represents the decision to 
proceed with a single contractor.  The PDR_AB sequence represents the decision to 
proceed with two contractors and, at PDR, to select the best one for manufacturing.  By 
selecting two different contractors with different offerings, the prime significantly reduces the 
probability of PDR failure.  RW represents the cost associated with rework; it is modeled 
with a three-parameter Weibull distribution specified in terms of the 90th, 50th, and 10th 
percentiles provided by SMEs or historical data.   
Figure 4b may be thought of a prime contractor who considers two different 
Verification and Validation (V&V) strategies as a means for risk reduction.  The branch 
VVS_1_(Start or CDR) represents the use of the standard approach with planned 
expenditures of $300K.  The branch VVS_2_ (Start or CDR) represents the use of a more 
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thorough V&V strategy with greater use of simulation and planned expenditure of $1,000K.  
The branch RW_1_(PDR or CDR) represents the rework following the PDR and CDR, 
respectively.  The rework is assumed to be inversely related to the V&V effort, and it is 
modeled with a three-parameter Weibull distribution specified in terms of the 90th, 50th, and 
10th percentiles provided by SMEs or historical data.   
 




NOTE: The start (or PDR) and CDR periods are shown separately to simplify the 
representation of the sequence of events. 
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Figure 4b.  Generalized Decision Tree for Risk #3 and Two Initial Candidate Risk 
Response Actions 
Given the above illustrative project—with three risks each with two potential RRAs—
there are eight possible initial Total Project RRAs (TPRRA).  As previously discussed, the 
risk picture is dynamic and gets quite complex as through time.  Consider Risk #1 with 
development of a prototype as a risk reduction option.  The prototype may fail or succeed, 
and the fabrication of the final module may fail or succeed.  The full representation of the set 
of all possible outcomes for even this project is overwhelming and beyond the scope of a 
symposium paper.   We, therefore, limit ourselves to reporting an interesting subset of the 
complete analysis as follows: 
1. We consider only two of the eight TPRRAS. 
a. Strategy 1.  Use of the lowest cost-mitigation option for each risk, which is 
equivalent to proceeding as normal—i.e., no specific RRA for any of the three 
risks.  This is the approach that a risk-seeker project manager would favor. 
b. Strategy 2.  Use the most effective RRA for each risk.  This corresponds to: (1) 
developing a prototype for Risk #1, (2) proceeding with two contractors for Risk #2, 
and (3) implementing a more thorough V&V effort for Risk #3.  This is the approach 
that a risk-averse project manager would favor. 
2. For each strategy, we assume the best possible outcomes for the probabilistic nodes 
through time T1: the Risk #1 prototype and the Risk #2 review PDR_AB succeed.  
Risk #3 has no gates; the risk reduction is directly accounted in the magnitude of the 
rework.  Figure 5 compares the initial and residual risks under the two strategies.   
3. For each strategy, we assume the worst outcomes for the probabilistic nodes 
through time T1: the Risk #1 prototype and the Risk #2 review PDR_AB fail.  Risk #3 
has no gates; the risk reduction is directly accounted in the magnitude of the rework.  
Figure 6 compares the initial and residual risks under the two strategies. 
4. For convenience, we also report the 50th, 80th, and mean values for the aggregated 
risks and individuals risks for strategies 1 and 2 in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.   
Useful Information about Risk 
We now make a few brief observations.  By plotting the risk curves over time for 
each strategy, we can see from Figure 5 that if the best outcome is realized, both strategies 
reduce risk (as seen by the T1 curves moving left and becoming more vertical than the start 
curves over most of the range of analysis).   Likewise, we see that if the worst outcome 
prevails as shown in Figure 6, then both strategies actually increase the cost risk exposure 
of the project.  Graphing risk curves over time thus provides a metric to measure the 
success of risk mitigation efforts.
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Figure 5.  Risk Exposure Characteristics for a Risk-seeking Strategy (Strategy 1) and 
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Figure 6.  Risk Exposure Characteristics for a Risk-seeking Strategy (Strategy 1) and 
a Risk-averse Strategy (Strategy 2), Assuming Murphy’s Law Prevails on the Project 
But the graphs provide even more information.  They allow us to consider the risk 
mitigation qualities of each strategy and to quantify our risk exposure.  This information can 
be used to choose between the two strategies.  Note that under the best-case scenario 
(Figure 5), at the start of the project, Strategy 1 offers a lower risk exposure below $1,500K, 
while Strategy 2 offers a lower risk exposure above that value.  Both strategies are equal in 
terms of exceedence probability (60 %) at the “breakeven” point of $1,500K.  What do we 
gain by extending the analysis to time T1?  We see that the “breakeven” point is lower 
($1,200K), and the risk at that point is also lower (40%).  So, which one is the best choice?  
If we were optimists and certain that the best outcome would be realized, we could make a 
choice based on the expected benefits.  As long as the expected benefits of the RRA are 
greater than $1,200, we would choose Strategy 2.  But of course, we have no such 
assurance, so let’s examine the worst-case scenario. 
Figure 6 shows the results of implementing each strategy over time assuming the 
worst outcome (Murphy’s Law).  As expected, the risk-seeking Strategy 1 significantly 
increases our cost risk exposure when things go bad, but the more conservative Strategy 2 
is much less sensitive to bad outcomes.  In fact, at T1, Strategy 2 dominates Strategy 1— 
meaning it has a lower risk for any value.  If we were pessimists, our choice would be 
simple: Strategy 2 is especially effective in providing insurance against the worst outcomes.   
Which strategy is chosen depends on the decision-maker’s risk aversion.  Is he/she 
an optimist or a pessimist?  In either case, if the expected benefits of risk mitigation exceed 
$1,200K, Strategy 2 is the best choice.  We believe examining risk information in this way 
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Table 1.  Strategy 1 Risk Characteristics at Start and at T1, Assuming that Murphy’s 
Law Prevails on the Project 
 















80th percentile 1575 671 1599 3692
Mean 1491 443 1149 3083
50th percentile 1398 344 1000 2945
Risk #1 Risk #2 Risk #3 Composite risk















80th percentile 1388 343 1687 2868
Mean 620 222 1148 1990
50th percentile 150 134 878 1850
Risk #1 Risk #2 Risk #3 Composite risk
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Table 2.  Strategy 2 Risk Characteristics at Start and at T1, Assuming that Murphy’s 
Law Prevails on the Project 
Tables 1 and 2 suggest that the use of mean values is not necessarily a cautious 
approach for planning project contingency.   















80th percentile 825 868 1068 2589
Mean 588 553 960 2101
50th percentile 490 456 900 2015
Risk #1 Risk #2 Risk #3 Composite risk















80th percentile 457 230 1340 2329
Mean 305 207 1160 1672
50th percentile 171 152 1100 1846
Risk #1 Risk #2 Risk #3 Composite risk
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We have presented a method for evaluating and tracking project-specific risks at the 
microscopic level.  This type of analysis, as opposed to the macroscopic-level risk analysis, 
is essential for risk management.  While the macro level provides some information about 
total cost risk, the micro level allows the project manager to plan and control risk response 
actions that influence total cost risk.   
We demonstrated the use of risk decision trees to model the evolution of the 
potential RRAs, and we used risk curves to evaluate the risk.  We believe risk curves are 
better than the expected-value results usually given by traditional DT analysis because they 
contain all the risk information both in terms of probabilities and value at risk.  This thorough 
approach allows management to consider what they mean by “acceptable” risk and explicitly 
models the tradeoff between risk and benefits of any given RRA. 
We recommend the use of risk curves to evaluate the performance of RRA and to 
track their performance over time.  If the RRA is working (at reducing risk), we should see 
the corresponding risk curve move to the left and/or become more vertical.  This tracking 
over time is key to understanding the dynamic nature of risk management and can reveal 
necessary changes in strategy. 
Risk curves derived from Monte Carlo simulation on DTs are particularly useful when 
analysts are comparing different risk-mitigation strategies.  The “breakeven” points help the 
risk manager understand the conditions under which each strategy is most appropriate.  
Combined with scenario analysis, it offers an opportunity to make cost-benefit tradeoffs 
among strategies. 
We think that these results provide the detailed information that program managers 
need and want when they face hard decisions on programs.  There is a cost for this type of 
analysis, but it is small considering the potential benefits.  The proposed approach is both 
practical and mathematically valid and can be implemented using commercially available 
tools such as Crystal Ball and @Risk.  The challenge is to start implementing these more 
refined cost models and risk management practices. 
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Abstract 
This paper describes how the US Navy structures fixed-price and fixed-price, 
incentive-fee shipbuilding contracts and how labor- and material-cost indexes can mitigate 
shipbuilder risk in either type of contract.  The Navy frequently uses the Steel Vessel 
material-cost index, a Bureau of Labor Statistics-derived cost index based on the mix of 
materials in a typical commercial cargo ship constructed in the 1950s.  The Steel Vessel 
Index has excessive weighting on iron and steel, thereby providing shipbuilders with a 
mismatch between their actual and the Index-assumed material-cost structure.  We 
recommend the Navy use a material-cost index with more up-to-date weightings. 
Introduction 
The Navy wants to provide its shipbuilders with appropriate incentives to produce 
militarily effective vessels at minimum cost to the Navy. 
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Fixed-price contracts provide incentive to a shipbuilder to produce at minimum cost.  
After contract award, cost savings the shipbuilder can implement flow directly to the 
shipbuilder, resulting in higher profit.  Conversely, cost overruns are borne by the 
shipbuilder, resulting in lower-than-anticipated profits.   
Fixed-price contracting becomes problematic, however, when a shipbuilder is forced 
to bear risk outside of its control.  For instance, ship construction requires material inputs 
like steel, wire, cable, and myriad others.  If the global prices of these commodities rise, a 
fixed-price shipbuilder will have lower profits (or increased losses) external to the 
shipbuilder’s efforts. 
Ultimately, the Navy can induce a shipbuilder to agree to any arrangement, including 
having the shipbuilder bear material-cost risk, by offering the shipbuilder a high enough 
price.  But it is likely to be preferable, at least ex ante, for the Navy to dissipate risk external 
to its shipbuilder in order to pay less for the systems the Navy needs. 
Conversely, the Navy should not fully immunize a shipbuilder against risks within the 
shipbuilder’s control, e.g., if the shipbuilder’s own failures cause a cost overrun.  In such a 
case, the shipbuilder should incur at least a portion of the loss.  Of course, it can sometimes 
be difficult to distinguish problems within a shipbuilder’s control versus those caused or 
exacerbated by Navy decisions (e.g., changing requirements) versus those related to 
external issues (e.g., the rising global price of steel).  The Navy uses labor- and material-
cost indexes to attempt to correct for several significant cost risks outside its shipbuilders’ 
control.  The indexes reflect industry- or economy-wide costs, not the costs of the specific 
shipbuilder. 
How the Navy uses Labor- and Material-cost Indexes 
In this section of the paper, we present illustrative examples of how the Navy uses 
labor- and material-cost indexes.  We start with a highly oversimplified example of a fixed-
price contract to illustrate the basic intuition.  Subsequently, we turn to an enhanced (though 
still less complex than reality) example of a contract more in accord with current Navy 
practices.  This latter example is a Fixed-Price, Incentive Fee (FPIF) contract.  An FPIF 
contract is no longer a “pure” fixed-price contract in that it requires the Navy and the 
shipbuilder to share cost changes from the negotiated level with incentives and disincentives 
for underruns and overruns (whereas a textbook fixed-price contract would not).  The 
shipbuilder’s actual costs are considered in an FPIF contract; they are not in a fixed-price 
contract. 
A Very Simple Example.  Let us suppose the Navy signs a fixed-price contract for a 
$220 million ship on January 1, 2007, with completion scheduled for January 1, 2010.  If 
$100 million of the payment is to cover expected labor costs, another $100 million is to 
cover expected material costs, and the final $20 million is intended to be contractor profit.  
Of course, the actual cost the shipbuilder incurs determines the shipbuilder’s profit.  Figure 1 
shows the shipbuilder’s profit as a function of the actual labor and material cost of the ship.  
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Figure 1. Shipbuilder Profit as a Function of Labor and  
Material Cost with a Fixed-price Contract 
Adding material-cost indexes to this fixed-price contract would protect the shipbuilder 
against exogenous cost risk. 
Let us also suppose, during the period 2007-2010, the external labor-cost index 
designated in the contract goes up 5%, while the designated material-cost index goes up 
20%.  Then the Navy’s actual payment to its shipbuilder would be $245 million ($105 million 
for labor, $120 million for materials, $20 million in intended or target profits—assuming the 
profit level does not increase with the indexes).  The shipbuilder’s actual profit would then go 
up and down based on whether their actual cost growth was above or below the indexes’.  
Obviously, it is of central importance that the cost indexes are agreed upon up front. 
If, on the other hand, the labor-cost index had risen 5% while the material-cost index 
had fallen 10%, the Navy’s payment to the shipbuilder would be $215 million ($105 million in 
labor, $90 million in materials, $20 million for target profit).  Again, actual profit would 
depend on whether the shipbuilder’s total costs had fallen less than or more than the 
indexes suggested. 
Both this example and the one that follows are over-simplified.  Both examples 
assume all labor is incurred and material purchased on the last day of the contract.  If one 
alternatively assumes the postulated inflation, labor hours, and material purchases occur 
uniformly between 2007 and 2010, the average inflation rate would be half as large.  In 
reality, material purchases peak before labor hours are incurred, so there are two cost timing 
distributions to account for.  Actual Navy escalation clauses calculate these effects on actual 
costs incurred monthly.  The Appendix discusses such an enhancement. 
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A More Realistic Example.  The Navy does not generally write shipbuilding 
contracts that are as simple as the preceding example.  Instead, the norm is to use FPIF 
contracts with “compensation adjustment clauses” or “escalation provisions” to: 
 Ensure the incentive provision operates independent of outside economic forces that 
impact shipbuilder costs. 
 Keep the shipbuilder from including contingent amounts in its price to cover 
economic uncertainty associated with external cost pressure. 
In this approach, subsequent changes in specified cost indexes result in payments 
(or refunds) tied to the shipbuilder’s actual labor and material costs incurred.  Notice this 
approach is no longer a “pure” fixed-price contract; shipbuilders’ actual costs are 
considered.  FPIF contracts actually operate as cost-type incentive contracts within a certain 
range of costs. 
We can consider a similar example as above with the Navy signing a contract for a 
ship on January 1, 2007, with completion scheduled for January 1, 2010.  It is anticipated 
$100 million will be spent on labor and another $100 million on material.  Let us suppose the 
Navy also agrees to a 10% target profit rate and a sharing ratio of 50/50 for increases or 
decreases in cost.  Figure 2 illustrates shipbuilder profit under this FPIF contract versus the 
preceding fixed-price case (prior to consideration of cost-index issues).  Since this FPIF 
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Figure 2. Shipbuilder Profit as a Function of Labor And Material Cost  
with Different Contract Structures 
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As above, it would enhance realism to include labor- and material-cost indexes into 
this contract. 
Let us suppose, during the period 2007-2010, the labor-cost index designated in the 
contract goes up 5%, while the designated material-cost index is up 20%.  We assume base 
period labor and material costs of $100 million each.  If the shipbuilder’s actual labor cost 
was $105 million, the Navy would pay a compensation adjustment of $5 million ((0.05 
divided by 1.05) multiplied by $105 million).10  If actual material costs turned out to be $115 
million, the Navy would make a material compensation adjustment of $19.17 million ((0.20 
divided by 1.20) multiplied by $115 million).  The “de-escalated base cost” of the ship would 
be $195.83 million (the actual $105 million plus $115 million less the compensation 
adjustments of $5 million and $19.17 million).  The $4.17 million decrease between the initial 
base cost and the de-escalated base cost would translate into a $2.08 million increase in 
profit for the shipbuilder given the assumed 50/50 cost change-sharing ratio.  The 
shipbuilder is rewarded because actual material costs did not rise as rapidly (+15%) as the 
material-cost index (+20%). 
The Navy’s actual payment to the shipbuilder would be comprised of $195.83 million 
in de-escalated base cost, $5 million in labor escalation payments, $19.17 million in material 
escalation payments, $20 million in target profit, plus $2.08 million in incentive profit—
totaling $242.08 million.  Shipbuilder profit would be $22.08 million. 
By contrast, holding the shipbuilder’s incurred costs the same as above, suppose the 
labor-cost index had again risen 5% while the material-cost index fell 10%.  The labor 
compensation adjustment would remain $5 million ((0.05 divided by 1.05) multiplied by $105 
million).  The material compensation adjustment would now be a reimbursement from the 
shipbuilder of $12.78 million ((-0.10 divided by 0.90) multiplied by $115 million).  The “de-
escalated base cost” of the ship would be $227.78 million ($105 million plus $115 million 
minus $5 million plus $12.78 million).  This increase in the de-escalated base cost would 
result in a $13.89 million profit penalty for the shipbuilder (50% of the difference between 
$227.78 million and $200 million).  Then, the Navy would pay the shipbuilder $226.11 million 
($227.78 million in de-escalated base cost plus $5 million in labor escalation payments less 
a $12.78 million material de-escalation reimbursement plus $20 million in target profit less a 
$13.89 million incentive profit penalty).  The shipbuilder profit would be $6.11 million. 
As in the “Very Simple Example,” we have ignored realistic timing issues, e.g., the 
fact that median material cost probably precedes the median labor cost and that neither cost 
is incurred, on average, in 2010.  The Appendix discusses the effects of incorporating labor 
and material-cost time-phasing. 
Figure 3 summarizes the differential results of these examples, holding fixed that the 
labor-cost index increased 5%, while realized shipbuilder costs were $115 million for 
material and $105 million for labor.  Not surprisingly, when the shipbuilder spends more on 
material than included in the original price while the overall material market has falling 
prices, the cost disincentive built into the contract reduces the Navy’s payment and, hence, 
the shipbuilder’s profit.  (The shipbuilder would have performed very poorly if it paid $115 
million for material while material prices were, on average, falling.) 
                                                
10 For expositional simplicity, we are assuming actual labor costs match the increase in the 
labor-cost index, allowing us to concentrate on material-cost issues. 
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Figure 3. Shipbuilder Profits Are Greater When the Material-cost Index Rises More, 
Realized Costs Held Constant 
The Fixed-price Contract line and the FPIF Contract curve cross at a 15% increase 
in the material-cost index.  We have assumed the shipbuilder’s actual material-cost increase 
was 15% or $15 million.  If the shipbuilder can keep its actual material-cost growth below the 
index level, its reward is greater in the fixed-price case, in which there is no cost-change 
sharing with the Navy.  Conversely, the shipbuilder’s profit does not diminish as rapidly if its 
actual material costs increase more than the Material-cost Index with the FPIF contract’s 
cost sharing. 
If the shipbuilder’s skillful management kept ship costs from rising as much as similar 
costs in the general economy, greater profits are an appropriate reward.  However, if greater 
profits result from escalation payments calculated by an external price index that does not 
accurately reflect what the shipbuilder purchases, then greater profit is not warranted.  
Conversely, it would be unfair to penalize a shipbuilder if an inappropriate cost index 
declines or increases less than the shipbuilder’s actual cost environment.   
The Steel Vessel Index 
A longtime material-cost index in Navy shipbuilding is the “Steel Vessel Index.”  
Based on an estimate by the Maritime Administration of the mix of materials in a typical 
commercial cargo ship constructed in the 1950s (GAO, 1972), it is a weighted average of 
three Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) producer price indexes (45% Iron & Steel, 40% 
General Purpose Machinery and Equipment, and 15% Electrical Machinery and Equipment).  
If, for instance, the Iron & Steel price index increased 3% in a year, the General Purpose 
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Machinery index increased 2%, and the Electrical Machinery index fell 1%, the Steel Vessel 
Index would increase 2% (0.45*0.03+0.4*0.02-0.15*0.01).11 
One criticism of the Steel Vessel cost index is that it does not accurately cover the 
materials used in building a modern ship.12  No modern US Navy ship, for instance, has 45% 
of its material costs in Iron & Steel.  To combat this shortcoming, the DDG-5113 and T-AKE14 
programs created their own material-cost indexes, using different weights on the same three 
underlying BLS indexes (DDG-51: 20% Iron & Steel, 43% General Purpose Machinery, 37% 
Electrical Machinery; T-AKE: 10% Iron & Steel, 60% General Purpose Machinery, 30% 
Electrical Machinery).  See Pfeiffer (2006).  In the preceding paragraph’s example, whereas 
the Steel Vessel Index would increase 2%, the DDG-51 index would increase 1.09% 
(0.2*0.03+0.43*0.02-0.37*0.01), and the T-AKE index would increase 1.2% 
(0.1*0.03+0.6*0.02-0.3*0.01). 
There is an additional challenge with any of these indexes: even if one correctly 
identified the mix of materials that went into the ship, the materials would be purchased at 
different stages of ship construction.  Steel, for instance, is required early in the construction 
process.  Conversely, combat systems and electrical equipment (perhaps more akin to 
General Purpose or Electrical Machinery) are not delivered to the shipyard and, 
consequently, do not become incurred costs until much later in construction.  Time-phasing 
the mix of an overall material-cost index could provide greater fidelity.  However, it is unlikely 
any material-cost index will completely dissipate a shipbuilder’s exogenous material-cost 
risk. 
Historically, BLS’s Iron & Steel price index has been much more volatile than the 
General Purpose Machinery or Electrical Machinery indexes.  Figure 4 displays these 
indexes’ quarterly returns (with a positive “return” if the cost index value went up, negative if 
it fell) between the second quarter of 194715 and the fourth quarter of 2006.  We also display 
the quarterly change in the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) price deflator, a measure of overall inflation in the economy. 
                                                
11There does not appear to be an Air Force analog to the Steel Vessel Index.  Air Force procurement 
contracts may include BLS-based labor- or material-cost indexing, but this is done on a case-by-case 
basis at the discretion of the program office.  There is no standard aircraft material-cost index.  An 
aircraft’s construction duration is typically much briefer than that of a ship, so inflation issues are less 
prominent. 
12Indeed, criticism of the Steel Vessel Index pre-dates what we might term “modern” ships.  Geismar 
(1975) suggests the Steel Vessel Index was ill-suited to the DD963, Spruance Class destroyer, and 
the LHA, Marine amphibious assault ship—two 1970s-era ship programs.  (Both of these ships were 
very late in delivering, implying inflation issues proved to be more important than would have been 
the case had their production been more timely.) 
13The DDG-51, the USS Arleigh Burke, is a destroyer commissioned on July 4, 1991.  The moniker 
“DDG-51” refers to the class of destroyers of which the USS Arleigh Burke was the first (US Navy, 
2006). 
14“T-AKE” refers to the Lewis and Clark class of dry cargo/ammunition ships.  The USNS Lewis and 
Clark, the USNS Sacagawea, and the USNS Alan Shepard have been delivered to the Navy; the 
USNS Richard Byrd is under construction (US Navy, 2007; Bigelow, 2007). 
15Monthly BLS data on these cost indexes are available back to January 1947.  However, the BEA 
GDP deflator data are only available quarterly, so we aggregated the BLS data to the quarter level. 
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Figure 4. Quarterly Changes in Different Cost Indexes 
(US DoL, BLS, n.d.; US DoC, BEA, n.d.) 
Naturally, given the Steel Vessel Index’s greater relative weighting of the Iron & Steel 
price index, it has been more volatile than the DDG-51 or T-AKE indexes.  In Figure 5, we 
plot the standard deviation in the quarterly return and the mean quarterly return for the three 
ship material-cost indexes and the GDP deflator between the second quarter of 1947 and 
the fourth quarter of 2006.16  The Steel Vessel Index has the greatest standard deviation in 
its quarterly return. 
                                                
16None of the three ship material-cost indexes existed in 1947.  But, we can use BLS data to 
retrospectively compute how they would have evolved. 
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Figure 5. Quarterly Standard Deviation and Average Return  
of Different Material-cost Indexes 
What Figure 5 does not show is how closely correlated any of these indexes is with 
the actual cost variability a shipbuilder experiences.  The best cost index is the one that 
minimizes a shipbuilder’s exogenous risk and, therefore, minimizes the risk premium the 
Navy must pay the shipbuilder.  We know, however, the Steel Vessel Index over-represents 
iron and steel costs in current naval warship contracts. 
The fact the Steel Vessel Index has had a mean quarterly return greater than the 
other indexes and greater than the economy-wide inflation rate is not prima facie bad news 
for the Navy.  In a competitive setting, a shipbuilder will submit a lower bid up front if it 
expects super-normal escalation.  Therefore, the Navy’s expected costs are not, in 
equilibrium, affected by the Index’s mean. 
What is more problematic is the known mismatch between the Steel Vessel Index’s 
composition and a shipbuilder’s material-cost structure.  The shipbuilder bears a risk, for 
instance, that the prices of iron and steel may tumble while the shipbuilder’s do not.  A risk-
averse shipbuilder will require a premium to bear this mismatch-driven risk. 
This mismatch-driven risk could be reduced if the shipbuilder could take a short 
position on steel futures, i.e., hedge against the risk steel prices will fall.  Currently, however, 
there is no functioning steel futures market.17  
                                                
17There is an ongoing debate as to the feasibility and desirability of a steel futures market.  
See, for instance, Anderson (2006). 
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Paradoxically, if the shipbuilder locked in its steel input prices through a long-term, 
fixed-price contract with a steel mill, the shipbuilder’s mismatch-driven risk could be 
exacerbated, not mitigated.  If future steel prices fell, the shipbuilder would receive no 
advantage on the cost side while receiving reduced revenue from the Navy. 
We do not know the “right” material-cost index to use to minimize a shipbuilder’s 
material-cost risk.  We do know, however, the Steel Vessel Index is imperfect due to its 
over-representation of iron and steel.  As shown in Figure 5, there is little difference between 
the DDG-51 and T-AKE approaches; their quarterly returns are positively correlated at the 
0.985 level.  (By contrast, the Steel Vessel index has a 0.936 correlation with the DDG-51 
index and 0.873 with T-AKE.) 
Of the three Navy material-cost indexes, T-AKE (0.655) and DDG-51 (0.636) are 
more highly correlated with the GDP deflator than is the Steel Vessel Index (0.538).  The 
explanation for the Steel Vessel Index’s relative lack of correlation with overall inflation in the 
economy is that the Iron & Steel cost index has a much lower correlation (0.360) with the 
GDP deflator than the General Purpose Machinery (0.634) and Electrical Machinery (0.609) 
cost indexes.  So, a material-cost index that over-samples Iron & Steel moves away from 
representation of economy-wide costs. 
The foremost argument in favor of the Steel Vessel Index is its familiarity and, 
consequently, the comfort some shipbuilders have with the Index.  Almost everyone we met 
in the nautical construction industry knows of the Steel Vessel Index, and most have 
experience with contracts tied to it.  The Steel Vessel Index is, perhaps, akin to the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average in that one would not invent it anew (or at least not with its current 
weightings), but its fame and tradition keep it in use.18 
If shipbuilders are familiar and comfortable with the Index, the Navy and the 
government benefit, as this may imply shipbuilders can be paid less when the Index is in 
use.  The best material-cost index minimizes the exogenous risk shipbuilders perceive they 
face so as to therefore minimize Navy ship acquisition costs.  Unless one believes familiarity 
is extremely important, however, the manifest cost structure mismatch of the Steel Vessel 
Index suggests its usage does not minimize the Navy’s expected costs.   
Conclusions 
We do not think the Navy should use the Steel Vessel Index to adjust for material-
cost changes in future shipbuilding contracts.  The Steel Vessel Index clearly puts excessive 
weight on Iron & Steel relative to the materials actually used in constructing a modern ship.  
Usage of the Steel Vessel Index does not appropriately mitigate contractor material-cost 
                                                
18Discussing an earlier version of this paper, Jim Jondrow of the Center for Naval Analyses raised the 
following analogy to the Navy’s continued use of the Steel Vessel Index: let us suppose one owned a 
portfolio that mirrored the NASDAQ Composite Index, but one observed the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average (or vice versa).  On March 10, 2000, the NASDAQ Composite Index closed at an all-time 
high of 5046, but then fell precipitously, ultimately hitting a bottom of 1114 on October 9, 2002.  See 
“Nasdaq Composite” (n.d.).  Meanwhile, the Dow Jones Industrial Average closed at 9929 on March 
10, 2000, and at 7286 on October 9, 2002. See Yahoo! Finance (n.d.).  The indexes were positively 
correlated with one another, but the magnitudes of the changes were sharply different. 
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risk.  Indeed, from a shipbuilder’s perspective, a new risk is created: the risk the prices of 
what the shipbuilder actually buys will rise faster than the price of steel. 
The shortcomings of the Steel Vessel Index have been known for many years.  The 
DDG-51 and T-AKE programs created their own material-cost indexes with lower weight on 
Iron & Steel.  Their material-cost indexes, which empirically have been highly correlated with 
one another, are doubtlessly better indexes than the Steel Vessel Index, though they still 
appear to put too much weight on Iron & Steel (DDG-51: 20%, T-AKE: 10%). 
We urge the Navy to develop a “Modern Vessel Index” that more appropriately 
represents the material used in constructing ships.  Movement toward a better index would 
also be an opportunity to explore a time-phased material-cost index—e.g., reflect the fact 
shipbuilders typically buy keel steel early in production, with on-board electronics procured 
much later in the construction process.  The more accurately a material-cost index captures 
a shipbuilder’s external material-cost risk, the less the Navy may expect to pay its 
shipbuilders. 
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Appendix 1. Time-phasing Material- and Labor-cost Indexes 
In the examples in the body of this paper, we unrealistically assume all shipbuilder 
expenses are borne at the end of the three-year build cycle; we then use the material and 
labor-cost index values at the end of the build cycle to determine the Navy’s payment to the 
shipbuilder. 
In fact, actual Navy shipbuilding contracts are more sophisticated.  Instead of 
assuming all costs are incurred at the end of the build cycle, a month-by-month expenditure 


































Figure A.1. An Illustration of Assumed Percentages of Total Costs Incurred by Month 
Figure A.1, like most Navy shipbuilding contracts, assumes the shipbuilder generally 
bears material costs (e.g., buying keel steel) in front of labor costs.19 
The effect of this cost time-phasing assumption is to move forward the implicit 
median date of contractor expenditure and, therefore, to reduce (assuming the labor and 
material-cost indexes generally increase) the shipbuilder’s inflation-related adjustment.  This 
reduction is generally more marked for material costs because of the standard assumption 
material costs are borne sooner. 
                                                
19 Standard shipbuilding contracts do not, however, differentiate between types of material.  An 
enhancement we urge the Navy to consider would be to break up material costs, e.g., assume steel 
expenditures for the keel precede electronics-type expenditures for onboard weapon systems. 
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Revisiting a Very Simple Example.  As above, let us suppose the Navy signs a 
fixed-price contract for a ship on January 1, 2007, with completion scheduled for January 1, 
2010.  We assume the ship has $100 million each in expected labor and material costs plus 
an additional expected or target profit of $20 million.  However, labor and material costs are 
expected to be borne in accord with Figure A.1’s pattern. 
Let us suppose, during the period 2007-2010, the external labor-cost index 
designated in the contract goes up 5% while the designated material-cost index goes up 
20%.  In addition, (though one need not make this pedagogically simplifying assumption) 
those increases occur uniformly over the 36-month build period.  Then the effective increase 
in assumed labor costs (given Figure A.1’s cost incurrence pattern) is 2.6%, while the 
increase in material costs is 8.1%.  Notice the effective increase in labor costs is 52% of the 
3-year total increase, while the effective increase in material costs is 40% of the 3-year total 
increase; this differential reflects the assumption that material costs generally precede labor 
costs. 
In the “Very Simple Example’s” contract, the Navy’s actual payment to the 
shipbuilder would be $230.7 million ($102.6 million for labor, $108.1 million for material, $20 
million for target profit). 
Time-phasing contracts does not axiomatically imply reduced shipbuilder profits 
(though one might draw such an inference from juxtaposing this example to the body of the 
paper’s “Very Simple Example”).  The shipbuilder’s initial bid will be made cognizant of how 
(and whether) labor and material costs are to be indexed.  A less generous (but more 
accurate) indexing approach of this sort will doubtlessly cause the shipbuilder’s bid to be 
greater. 
Revisiting a More Realistic Example.  In our “More Realistic Example,” the Navy 
provided the shipbuilder with an FPIF contract with a 50/50 sharing ratio on increases or 
decreases in costs. 
As noted above, if the labor-cost index designated in the contract goes up 5% in 
three years, while the designated material-cost index goes up 20%. The effective increases 
in the indexes are 2.6% and 8.1%, respectively, adjusting for Figure A.1’s assumed 
expenditure pattern. 
In “A More Realistic Example,” we had actual labor costs of $105 million.  If we 
scaled this value down in accordance with Figure A.1, the “adjusted” actual labor costs 
would be $102.6 million.  Similarly, “adjusted” actual material costs would be $106.1 million. 
The labor compensation adjustment would now be $2.6 million ((0.026 divided by 
1.026) multiplied by $102.6 million).  The material cost adjustment would be $8.0 million 
((0.081 divided by 1.081) multiplied by $106.1 million).  The de-escalated base costs of the 
ship would be $198.1 million (the “adjusted” actual $102.6 million in labor and $106.1 million 
in material less the compensation adjustments of $2.6 million for labor and $8.0 million for 
material).  The shipbuilder profit would be increased by $0.9 million. 
As in the body of the paper, the shipbuilder’s profit is greater, holding its actual 
incurred costs constant, when the material-cost index grows more.  The effect of time-
phasing is to roughly halve (more of a reduction for material than for labor) the measured 
indexed inflation rate.  But the comparative static result that the shipbuilder is better off 
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when the material-cost index rises more, holding costs constant, remains.  Again, such 
rewards are appropriate if shipbuilder management held costs down better than might have 
been expected.  Conversely, if greater profits were received because an index used to 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 303 - 
=
=
Panel 15 - Key Issues in Defence Acquisition for the UK - 
Issues for other Nations? 
Thursday, 
May 15, 2008 
Panel 15 – Key Issues in Defence Acquisition for the UK -  
Issues for other Nations? 
1:45 a.m. – 
3:15 p.m. 
Chair:  
Dr. Trevor Taylor, Head of the Department of Defence Management and 
Security Analysis Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the United 
Kingdom 
Discussants:  
Peter Tatham, Commodore (ret.), Defence Acquisition Management 
Deputy Course Director, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the 
United Kingdom 
Dr. David M. Moore, Head of the Acquisition and Logistics Unit, Cranfield 
University, Defence Academy of the United Kingdom 
Paper:  
Five Key Changes for the Management of UK Defence—An Agenda for 
Research? 
Peter Tatham, Commodore (ret.), Defence Acquisition Management 
Deputy Course Director, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the 
United Kingdom and Dr. David M. Moore, Head of the Acquisition and 
Logistics Unit, Cranfield University, Defence Academy of the United 
Kingdom 
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International Security Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) in 
London. He is a past Chairman of the British International Studies Association, and has been Visiting 
Professor at the National Defence Academy in Tokyo.  
Taylor takes a close interest in the UK Smart Acquisition initiative, and teaches defence acquisition 
on his Department's Master in Defence Administration, Defence Logistics Management and Defence 
Acquisition Management degrees. He contributes also to the seven-week and two-week courses on 
the Management and Governance of Defence that support the UK's Conflict Prevention initiatives.  
In 1999, he facilitated the initial short courses in Smart Acquisition training for staff of the MoD's 
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Defence Manufacturers' Association in 2001 and re-elected in 2004. He was appointed as a member 
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Sustained Armoured Vehicle Capability Pathfinder group, which was set up as part of the British 
Defence Industrial Strategy document of 2005.  
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“The Delineation of Defense Equipment Projects in the UK Ministry of Defense” was published in 
Defense and Security Analysis in June 2004 (20(2)); his article “Governments and Industry” was 
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Abstract 
This paper is conceptual in nature and reviews five of the key management 
challenges facing those charged with the management of the UK Defence.  It is argued that 
similar challenges face many Western governments, albeit the solutions are likely to be 
country-specific.  Given the paucity of academic research into the general area of defence 
management, it is suggested that there is considerable potential for focussed application of 
ideas and concepts from a broad range of disciplines that will help improve the UK’s ability 
to maintain its peacetime military capability efficiently whilst retaining its capacity to conduct 
operations effectively.  Whilst the paper does not seek to recommend solutions for the 
issues identified, it does seek to expose the essential features as a means of broadening 
the understanding of the nature of the challenge—and, hence, to help shape the research 
agenda.  
Introduction 
By any dispassionate measure, the management of a major state’s defence needs is 
a hugely complex challenge.  People, training, equipment, information, infrastructure and 
other resources have to be integrated to generate the required operational capability.  Some 
spending makes an immediate and direct contribution to capability, while other 
investments—most notably in defence research and development—may not produce usable 
assets for a decade or more (Taylor, 2005).  In a basic sense, the outputs of defence 
spending can be expressed in terms of units of forces at specified rates of readiness (with 
concomitant levels of manning, equipment, individual and collective training), but this 
disguises the range of missions for which forces may be expected to be ready.  The then-
British Prime Minister Tony Blair (2007) and General Sir John Kiszely (2006) have pointed 
out the challenges of maintaining forces that are ready both for high-intensity combat 
operations and for peace-support activities.  In practice, things are even more complex—
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within the area of UK defence planning assumptions, there is a seven-layer taxonomy of 
military operations from Deliberate Intervention to Evacuation of Non-combatants.  Even 
more importantly, there are, increasingly, no hard and fast geographic or temporal divisions 
in the operational environment.  Hence, as observed by the recently retired NATO Deputy 
Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, we have the development of what is 
becoming known as the “three block war.” “In both theatres [Iraq & Afghanistan] we have 
had high tempo warfighting taking place in the same 50km square and at the same time as 
peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations” (Forbes, 2004). 
The aim of this paper is, based on the authors’ extensive experience of studying and 
implementing defence management, to consider some of the key managerial challenges 
that face those who are charged with planning, directing, organising, coordinating, 
monitoring and improving the use of the resources directed to the defence sector.  The 
paper will not seek to identify any assured route to success; rather, given that a prior 
condition for any such prescription is awareness of the pitfalls, dilemmas and issues that 
need to be addressed, this paper offers a view of five of the most important challenges that 
will be faced by those charged with the higher management of defence.  It has a UK focus 
and illustrates the challenges identified with British examples, but the dilemmas it identifies 
are of universal application.  The paper is, therefore, of interest to a wider audience than just 
those in the UK.  
Any consideration of defence management must take into account contextual factors 
in addition to the operational and capability issues noted above.  In the UK (and in many 
other states) some important elements are: 
The increasing complexity and capability of military platforms, equipment and 
information systems that, while bringing clear benefit in the actual prosecution of 
warfighting, involves extensive acquisition and support costs.  These have been 
estimated by a recent authoritative report to account for 40% of the UK defence 
budget (MOD, 2006, June)—a figure that could rise by as much as 20% if it were to 
include the costs of the engineering and support Regiments within the field army, etc.  
It is unsurprising, therefore, that three of the five challenges considered by the 
authors lie in the acquisition and support arena. 
Shrinking budgets and reducing “headcount” for the Armed Forces (and their civilian 
support staff).  For example, the manpower strength of the Royal Navy has reduced, 
on average, by 2.25% year on year since 1950.  In addition, the recent “Gershon” 
reforms require a reduction of 11,340 Civil Servants from the UK MOD by 2008 
(MOD, 2006, p. 36). 
An increasingly critical public which, whilst profoundly supportive of the individual 
soldier, sailor and airman, is unconvinced that the underpinning managerial structures are 
“fit for purpose.”  This was underlined by the survey of external opinion reported in the MOD 
Annual Report and Accounts for 2006/7 (MOD, 2007, Table 30)—in which those indicating a 
“favourable impression” of the Armed Forces was 76%, whereas those with a “favourable 
impression” of the MOD was just under half at 44%.   
Given the breadth and depth of the management challenges in defence, it is 
surprising that, unlike the study of commercial management that has expanded rapidly since 
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the end of the Second World War, defence gets comparatively little attention from scholars.20  
This lack of academic interest in the management of defence may simply be because it is 
significantly different from everything else or because it requires too much specialistic 
background knowledge for the generic management expert to make sense of it without 
significant effort.  Therefore, this paper, with the five challenges discussed below, is an effort 
to conceptualise some important defence dilemmas and choices. 
Challenge 1—Empowerment versus Coherence 
Striking the right balance between achieving conformity without stifling potentially 
beneficial individualism is a major challenge in many areas of defence management.  In 
wider (and mainly commercial) management thought, the empowering of individuals is seen 
as a key component of organisational success.  As explained by Senge (1992, pp. 287-288), 
“localness means unleashing people’s commitment by giving them the freedom to act, to try 
out their own idea and be responsible for producing results.”  He also added that, “localness 
is especially vital in times of rapid change,” when people lower down the organisation need 
a clearer sense of what is happening to them and how they can best respond.  Similarly, 
Cole (2004, pp. 201-202) observes that, “the best practice is to be found in organisations 
that use delegation positively as an important employee motivator as well as a means of 
facilitating effective decision-making throughout the enterprise.”   
In the operational military context, British Defence Doctrine21 emphasises the 
concept of “Mission Command,” in which the high-level commander’s Strategic Intent is 
clearly spelled out.  Subordinates are then encouraged and empowered to implement this 
objective as they see fit under the emerging operational circumstances.   
A similar theoretical approach has been adopted in the UK’s Smart Acquisition22 (SA) 
programme, which is designed—against the background of some 800 projects which are 
being developed through around 100 Integrated Project Teams (IPTs)—to ensure the 
introduction and support of defence equipment “Faster, Cheaper, Better and More 
Effectively Integrated.”  The underlying SA philosophy was designed to “empower” the IPT 
Leaders (and, indeed, to judge them on their ability) to develop radical solutions to the 
delivery of military effect within a prescribed Performance, Cost and Time envelope.   
                                                
20  As an illustration, an examination of five major academic journals covering logistics and 
supply chain management showed that out of 1020 articles published between January 
2000 and December 2007, only one discussed issues from a defence perspective.   
21  Doctrine is defined as “the best estimate of the way the UK’s Armed Forces […] should 
go about their military business” (MOD, 2001, p. 3-1). However, as eloquently observed by 
the eminent historian Sir Michael Howard (1974, p. 7), the MOD cannot conduct 
experimentation to prove theories of warfare in the same way as a scientist; thus, inevitably, 
Doctrine represents an “educated guess.”  He goes on to suggest that success will favour 
the military force that best develops “the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly 
unpredictable, the entirely unknown.”   
22  When originally launched in 1999, the programme was called “Smart Procurement.” However, its 
title was changed in 2002 to “Smart Acquisition” as a means of better reflecting the whole-life 
implications of procurement decisions.  
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Unfortunately, this focus on the achievement of a successful outcome to an 
individual project means that IPT Leaders can be inherently reluctant to spend their budgets 
on managing important interfaces with other projects.  It is extremely tempting to conclude 
that they should always be sorted out by the IPT responsible for the other side of the 
boundary!  Furthermore, attempts to constrain IPT-level solutions in order to ensure that 
they allow a seamless interface with other IPTs (and virtual constructs such as the Defence 
Supply Chain) frequently result in an increase in the cost of the proposed solution.   
The more complex23 the battlefield becomes, the more prominent such project 
interfaces clearly become.  For example, in the Army environment, a battle group will consist 
of the appropriate mixture of infantry, armour, and artillery to meet the threat of the moment; 
but the grouping is likely to be transient according to the nature of the threat faced.  
Integrating the logistic support for these so-called “Agile Mission Groups” in such a way that 
it does not constrain the commander’s freedom drives towards a unitary support solution for 
the operation as a whole—but this is in direct opposition to the Smart Acquisition business 
drive to deliver unique, optimised support targeted at a particular platform or equipment.  
It is also becoming increasingly apparent that the integration problems associated 
with information systems are even more challenging, not least as the technology refresh rate 
here is measured in terms of 2-3 years (rather than the decades for, say, the transition from 
steam to gas turbine as a means of maritime propulsion).  The challenge of integrating 
Information Systems is also exacerbated by both the internal demands of the UK’s Network 
Enabled Capability24 (NEC) and the desire to link, on the one hand, to US systems and, on 
the other, to those of our European allies.   
In order to resolve this conundrum, a number of concepts have been championed.  
For example, some look to the expert use of systems engineering techniques (see Stevens, 
Jackson, Brook & Arnold, 1998); others suggest that a central guidance and lobbying body 
such as the Integration Authority within the UK’s Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) 
organisation can make the required impact.  A further alternative prescribes defining “open 
system architectures” to allow easy integration and modification of modules—but none of 
these approaches has yet to prove entirely satisfactory.   
Nevertheless, one procurement choice that is currently gaining attention 
recommends seeking out companies with generic systems integration expertise, as 
signalled by the UK selection of W.S. Atkins for the British Future Rapid Effects System 
(FRES) programme.  That said, it has been observed that the Lead Systems Integrator role 
in the US has driven companies to seek to win contracts only in weapons areas in which 
they have little specialist expertise (Moon & Schoder, 2005).   
Perhaps the optimum approach is a more modest one, in which separate systems 
are procured, then integrated through a series of ad hoc patches; these may be in the form 
of software and hardware, or they may involve putting a human in the loop.  Indeed, such an 
approach aligns well with the concept of Incremental Acquisition in which the required 
                                                
23  Such complexity arises not only within an environment (e.g., Land, Sea or Air), but because 
current and future operations increasingly (indeed, probably, inevitably) require the joint effects of two 
(if not all three) Services.    
24  For a series of short articles dealing with the acquisition of Network Enabled Capability, see 
(2004, July). RUSI Defence Systems, 7(1), pp. 62-85. 
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capability is achieved through a number of relatively small (and, thus, from a scientific or 
engineering perspective, less risky) advances.  This has the benefit of allowing adjustments 
in emphasis to be made as the nature of the threat unfolds, but invariably involves additional 
expense not provided for in the budgets of individual projects. 
The centralisation-delegation pendulum has undoubtedly swung back and forth over 
the last five years with the initial development of a voluntary “Support Solutions Envelope” 
designed to curtail the more extreme approaches.  However, this is now being modified, and 
the current trend is clearly towards constraining the IPT Leaders rather than giving them 
greater discretion, but this of course means that focus on and commitment to achieving the 
specific project goals may be weakened.  Striking the right balance between empowerment 
of the IPT Leader to develop novel solutions and achieving coherence of support for, say, all 
the equipment in a Brigade Group is a fascinating, but extremely challenging, balancing act.  
Furthermore, as indicated earlier, the balance chosen is likely to reflect cultural and other 
environmental factors; for example, from an external perspective, the US defence machine, 
in both operational and managerial sectors, often appears more centrally directed and rule-
bound than that found in the UK. 
Another area in which the Empowerment v Coherence tensions can be readily 
observed is in the subtle balance between the role of the single Service Commanders-in-
Chief and that of the Chief of Joint Operations.  Current UK operational thinking, supported 
by recent experience in several theatres, emphasises the need for “jointery”—but, for good 
reason, the peacetime programme designed to ensure the maintenance of a particular 
capability tends to be undertaken on a component (i.e., Navy/Army/Air Force) basis.  This 
leads, not least, to the reinforcement of cultural differences that need to be quickly 
overcome when a joint force is fielded.  The UK is becoming increasingly aware of the need 
to approach both managerial and operational issues from a joint perspective, but this 
prescription may not be appropriate to every country.  Nevertheless, many, if not all, will 
need to develop the appropriate mechanism to ensure the coherence of military output 
without diminishing the essential differences between the components. 
Challenge 2—What should the governmental defence sector do 
for itself, and what should it outsource from others? 
Even in the US, in modern times, western governments do not develop and produce 
all the goods and services that their armed forces need.  This is equally true of states such 
as France, Italy and Turkey, where notwithstanding the presence (even in the early 21st 
Century) of a large nationalised defence industrial sector, their Ministries of Defence still 
look to private firms for the provision of the sort of products used by the general population 
(such as food), as well as those emanating from high-technology sectors (such as 
electronics and aerospace).  However, driven mainly by a belief that private firms working in 
a competitive environment are more efficient than publicly owned monopolies, some 
countries (with the UK in the lead) have undertaken a significant programme of privatisation 
of their state-owned, defence-related industries.  For example, over the last two decades, 
the Royal Dockyards and Royal Ordnance Factories have become fully fledged businesses 
within the private sector; indeed, even the UK’s nuclear weapons plants, whilst still formally 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 310 - 
=
=
Furthermore, the UK (along with the US and others) has increasingly outsourced the 
design, development and production of defence equipment to the private sector.  In addition, 
the UK Ministry of Defence has not been immune from the general pan-Whitehall drive to 
implement the government’s Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public-private 
Partnerships25 (PPP).  For example, a recent review (RUSI, 2004) indicated that between 
1995 and December 2003, the MOD had signed contracts for 45 PFI projects and 6 PPP 
arrangements—involving some £3.5 billion of capital costs, and with the annual payments 
representing some 6% of the Defence budget.  Furthermore, as an indication of the 
increasing momentum behind this approach, another 37 projects (worth some £12 billion) 
were at that time either under consideration or in the process of going to contract.   
Unsurprisingly, the areas of business initially transferred out were those providing 
support services such as cleaning and catering.  This was followed by a second wave of 
projects covering a broad swathe of training functions, including, for example, that for 
armoured vehicle drivers and for helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft pilots.  However, recent 
initiatives have been significantly more ambitious and are increasingly linked with the overall 
model for the transition of defence support.   
In essence, in developing this policy, the then-UK Chief of Defence Logistics (CDL) 
believed that in order to improve the reliability of military equipment—with the concomitant 
beneficial effects in terms of, for example, a reduction in both Through-life Costs and a 
reduced logistics footprint on operations—it was necessary to engage commerce and 
industry more closely in the delivery of military effect.  The net result has been a developing 
generation of PFIs that sees the capital cost of military equipment being borne by industry—
which also provides ongoing support in the shape of some or all of maintenance, training (of 
both operators and military engineering staff), management of obsolescence and provision 
of spare parts.  Recent examples of this include the Skynet 5 satellite system, the £600 
million contract for the provision of so-called “C” vehicles26 announced in June 2005, and the 
Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA) which requires industry to raise some £3 billion—
making this, by far, the largest UK PFI ever contemplated.   
Significantly, the use of contractors for many of these roles is not restricted to home 
activities, but also extends to deployed operations.  As a result, there is now a real debate 
as to the extent to which governments should rely on Contractors on Deployed Operations 
(CONDO)27.  For example, Ukrainian companies have become major suppliers of air 
                                                
25  Whilst there are financial and accounting distinctions between PFI and PPP programmes, the 
essence of both is that private (i.e., non-government) funding is used to provide the capital cost of, 
say, a new building. This is paid back by defence over the long term (typically in excess of 20 years) 
by means of a stream of rental income.  In all probability, the totality of these annual payments will 
exceed the cost of in-house provision, but this is tolerated not only because of the extent to which 
“spikes” in capital expenditure (which represents some 25% of the Defence budget) can be reduced, 
but also because of the beneficial effects on the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) and 
the reduced headcount that is directly funded from the government’s payroll. 
26  Military vehicles can be broken down into generic groups: “A” vehicles include armoured 
platforms such as tanks.  “B” vehicles cover the soft-skin group such as 4x4 vehicles.  The “C” vehicle 
category includes engineering plant such as bulldozers and earthmovers.  The final category is 
known as the “White Fleet,” which covers all forms of staff cars and minibuses which are already 
provided through a PFI contract. 
27  See, for instance, a series of articles in (2004, Summer). Defence Studies, 4(2). 
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transport to the UK defence establishment, while Kellogg, Brown & Route holds an enabling 
contract (known as “CONLOG”) to provide a whole range of services in support of UK 
operations, and the next generation of air-to-air refuelling aircraft is highly likely to 
contracted under a CONDO arrangement.  The leading edge of this generation of CLS 
initiatives is that of the Heavy Equipment (e.g., Tank) Transporter (HET) fleet, in which 1/3 of 
the drivers and maintainers are civilians who, as a condition of their employment, must 
accept Reservist status.  The benefit of this approach is that the drivers can, at short notice, 
be “re-badged” as military personnel with minimal interruption to the level of support 
provided.  A similar approach has recently been agreed for the RAPIER Ground-to-Air 
missile system; the operationally deployable 2nd Line test and repair facility formerly manned 
by military technicians is now being provided by the company (MBDA) using the “sponsored 
reserve” concept.   
In pursuing the outsourcing route, the UK MOD is clearly following guidance from the 
literature of commercial management.  For example, writers in this field such as Hamel & 
Prahalad (1994) and Johnson, Scholes and Whittington (2005) recommend that companies 
should seek to identify their “core competencies”—i.e., areas in which they excel and, thus, 
hold competitive advantage.  These authors assert that companies should contract with 
others that have particular expertise for other necessary, but non-core, functions.  
Unfortunately, what is lacking currently in the UK (and, arguably in most Western nations) is 
any clear view about what the core competencies of the governmental defence sector are 
and need to be.   
A further implication of outsourcing is that it changes the nature of one of the more 
significant challenges facing any organisation—namely how to select one’s suppliers. There 
are many prescriptions developed by academics and practitioners, but no sure route to 
success. Outsourcing should not be used to avoid a difficult problem, and defence, which 
buys complex products and services, is certainly taking on risk if it entrusts provision to 
prime contractors without detailed oversight of how those primes will deal with the supply 
chains below them.  In many cases, the UK has little choice regarding a prime, since BAES 
is the supplier of 90% of land platforms and 80% of fixed-wing aircraft, and so cannot 
introduce supply chain management as a significant element in a competitive tendering 
activity.  
One area in which the MoD (but not the Government as a whole) has drawn the line 
is in its refusal to place lethal force in the hands of contractors, though contractors are 
certainly being placed nearer to the front line.28  However, it has been reported that the 
Royal Norwegian Navy’s Fridtjoff Nansen class frigates are taking outsourcing to novel 
territory.  They will remain in the ownership of IZAR, their Spanish shipbuilders, who will be 
not only responsible for the support and maintenance of the ships, but will also provide one 
third of the crew (Cushway, 2006). 
This increasing use of CONDO underlines two challenges.  First, there is a need to 
ensure the integration of the output of potentially disparate groups of contractors to provide 
                                                
28  Interestingly, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has gone even further by accepting 
that private military companies can arm their personnel for such tasks as guarding oil fields 
and associated facilities such as pumping installations, etc.  Indeed, there may be as many 
as 20,000 armed guards in Iraq under US contracts—albeit many are not of American or 
Iraqi nationality.  
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“joined up” logistics in support of the front-line troops.  This requires greater imposition of 
common standards in many areas—including information systems, health and safety, and 
welfare/discipline, etc.  Secondly, and perhaps even more importantly, it raises the question 
of how the services that they are delivering will be provided if a previously benign area 
becomes markedly more dangerous.  This is a difficult balancing act in this era of 
asymmetric warfare— particularly if the UK follows the US lead and, for example, deploys 
contractors in direct support of armoured vehicles.  This approach is used to support its 
Stryker Brigade, in which 
“Approximately 120 specialized contractors are an integral part of the Stryker 
Brigade Combat Teams’ (SCBTs) highly complex systems maintenance, 
sustainment and technical support. […] many contractors are actually operating in 
the forward areas of the SBCT” (Alderete, 2005; GAO, 2003, June).    
A decision to outsource requires not just the confidence that an external supplier 
should be able to provide a capability or service more effectively and efficiently.  There must 
be confidence that the contractor can be incentivised to perform reliably, even when the 
physical and/or political environment has become challenging.  This is obviously most 
relevant in the military operational context, but there must also be a viable procurement 
strategy available that will give the outsourcing authority confidence that value can be 
obtained.  This is increasingly leading to the development of “Partnering” solutions that 
combine elements of both PPP/PFI and Outsourcing.   
Challenge 3—How should support for equipment be arranged in 
a time of frequent and surprising operations? 
Across the broad swathe of UK military commentators, there is a clear recognition 
that the current defence supply chain model needs to be significantly developed from that 
originally created to support the British Army when facing a potential Soviet threat on the 
plains of Northern Germany.  In considering how it should be improved, planners are faced 
with exhortations that supply chains should be “lean” and use a “just-in-time” approach 
modelled on commercial operations such as those providing fast-moving consumer goods 
(FCMG).  Such a prescription is potentially attractive, not least as it is believed that it will 
enable a reduction in the existing stockpiles and, hence, reduce financial overheads.  
However, the Armed Forces, whose lives depend on stocks of ammunition and spare parts 
being replenished promptly, have traditionally preferred a “just-in-case” approach.  This 
feeling is well captured by the then-US Assistant Secretary for Defense who observed that, 
“In the absence of rock solid information regarding the availability of materiel, the warfighter 
will always buy readiness insurance in the form of excess local stocks” (Kaminski, 1996).  
On the other hand, carelessness or mismanagement can also lead to stocks being held for 
contingencies that have long become unthinkable.  For instance, the establishment of the 
UK’s Defence Logistics Organisation (DLO) in 2000 led to the discovery of jigs and tools that 
would have supported the re-launched production of 2nd World War-type aircraft!   
From an academic perspective, the reluctance to embrace the “just-in-time” (JIT) 
model is entirely logical, as this concept operates best when demand is relatively stable and, 
hence, predictable (Towill & Christopher, 2002).  This, unsurprisingly, sits uncomfortably 
with the doubly unpredictable nature of warfare, in which we cannot be confident about the 
timing and location of military operations, or about precisely how they will unfold once they 
have begun. Thus, the alternative “Agile” supply chain management model would appear 
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more promising in a military context as it recognises that all forecasts are inherently 
imperfect and is, therefore, designed “to thrive and prosper in an environment of constant 
and unpredictable change” (Maskell, 2001). 
The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are exceptional and, since 1945, the 
requirement for the UK’s Armed Forces to prosecute the Queen’s enemies has been applied 
infrequently.  Certainly, large numbers of UK troops are often engaged in hazardous 
missions, but the periods of time in which they are fighting in a major conflict (as distinct 
from Peace Support or Peace Enforcement Operations) are relatively short—perhaps for 
some six months during a ten-year window.  Therefore, use of an efficient business model 
makes good sense in peacetime when the armed forces are, typically, engaged in routine 
training in order to ensure that they develop and maintain their expertise.  The 
consequences of a vehicle breakdown, and any delay to its repair or replacement, may 
result in a waste of valuable resources and be very frustrating for all concerned—but rarely 
is life put at risk.  Contrast this with the operational situation in which supply chain failures 
can, and regrettably do, lead directly or indirectly to death or injury.  Thus, the operational 
supply chain must be optimised towards effectiveness (with its certainty of supply) rather 
than efficiency.   
Thus, the Defence Supply Chain sits firmly on the horns of a dilemma: whether to 
reduce inventories in order to reap the peacetime efficiency benefits, or to continue to pay 
this “insurance” cost in order to help ensure the effectiveness essential for successful 
operations.  In theory, there will be an optimum level of “leanness” (Christopher & 
Rutherford, 2004)—but ascertaining this for each of 1.7 million SKUs,29 in the face of the 
uncertain future demand pattern that is the inevitable consequence of the uncertain nature 
of future warfare, may well be beyond even a significant investment in sophisticated 
modelling.  Hence, it is unsurprising that the military response to a combination of uncertain 
demand and long-lead time supply characteristics is likely to continue to result in significant 
stockpiling—but it is just such stockpiling that then becomes a target for challenge in 
subsequent spending rounds. 
To the stresses between JIT and Agile must be added the dimension of resilience: 
that supply chains should be able to avoid or absorb shock.  Arguably, defence needs to 
take evaluate risks to effective supply, including reliance on single plants that may be 
destroyed in fires or other accidents.  Stocks in different locations can clearly enhance 
resilience, but such strength rarely comes without cost.  Costs must always be weighed 
against the perceived risks—but persuading those who control the defence purse strings of 
the merits of these observations generally remains an unmastered challenge. 
Overall, however, the response of the UK MOD has been to enhance the importance 
of potential operations in the planning and management of the DE&S organisation.  The UK 
also is giving increased recognition to security of supply in times of crisis—for instance in the 
1998 Letter of Intent with European States30 and the 2000 Declaration of Principles with the 
United States.  Perhaps significantly, Switzerland—a relatively friendly country—placed an 
                                                
29  SKUs = Stock Keeping Units. The UK’s defence inventory should be compared with the 20-
30,000 SKUs that might be found in a typical supermarket outlet (Fernie & Sparks, 1999).  
30  It is planned that this Letter of Intent will be developed through the introduction of EU Code of 
Conduct on Defence Procurement (MOD, 2005, p. 7). 
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embargo on the export of grenades to the UK as a reflection of its government’s disapproval 
of the 2003 Iraq War (NAO, 2003).  Fortunately, this had no tangible effect on the outcome 
as sufficient had been stockpiled, but it was a salutary lesson for planners.   
It is suggested that the keys to the MOD’s difficulty here are threefold.  Firstly, there 
has been a solid record of recent operational success.  It is argued, therefore, that 
“warts and all,” the current system which, whilst clearly not perfect, may be just about 
as good as it will get given the variables in play.  This “do nothing” (other than to 
continue to tune the system) approach clearly has advantages for those within the 
MOD and industry whose interests are well served by it.  Challenging these power 
bases without a clear idea of what the successor system will look like is a career-
threatening move in any arena! 
Secondly, the lead time for a significant volume of materiel support is long and, in 
many cases, growing.  This is generally the result of the niche-status of defence engineering 
(both mechanical and electronic) and its relative lack of players (as discussed above).  
Given that defence is generally recognised as not following the normal economists’ model of 
a perfect market, there is only limited pressure that can be placed on those remaining 
companies to improve their performance—especially in the time dimension.  This 
exacerbates the pressure on individual IPTs to take the easy (and generally risk-free) option 
of developing stockpiles rather than seeking more agile solutions.  But as the move towards 
partnering takes greater hold with its metrics based around delivering an agreed-upon level 
of equipment availability, this decision is transferred to the industrial partner that must 
increasingly make such stock-level decisions.  Experience to date would indicate that such 
partners are up to this task, but there is a large and diverse body of academic literature that 
raises fundamental concerns over the effectiveness of such collaboration arrangements 
(Kampstra, Ashayeri & Gattorna, 2006). Thus, the inevitable nervousness of operational 
commanders over this fundamental transference of risk may yet prove well-placed. 
The final point is that the capability-based approach is rare, perhaps even unique to 
Defence.  No other organisation spends almost the totality of its budget in the development 
of a capability (across equipment, communications, personnel, training, infrastructure, 
operational planning, etc) and then returns to its shareholders (in the MOD’s case the 
Treasury) for additional finance when they are actually required to employ this capability.  
Even major public-sector ventures such as hospitals and schools aim to balance the supply 
(of operating theatres, nurses, classrooms, teachers) against steady state demand.  Peaks 
can be accommodated through a number of mechanisms (geographic dispersion of the 
requirement, building temporary facilities, hiring agency staff) in relatively short order.  Thus, 
unlike the MOD with its massive equipment lead times, the risk from adopting a surge 
(rather than a stockpile) model is relatively containable.   
As a result, the MOD has no obvious commercial comparators against which it can 
benchmark its activities and is generally constrained by the extremely coarse level of public 
expenditure.  That said, there is an implicit recognition that a country cannot undertake 
major military operations without the support of a capable industry.  But, generally, there is a 
reluctance to confront too squarely the additional costs that have to be incurred in 
peacetime to ensure that sustainability can be assured in war.  
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Challenge 4—In an era of rapid progress in civil technology, 
how does a Ministry of Defence assure its optimum inclusion 
into defence systems? 
Forty years ago, research and development in the West was dominated by military 
spending.  Today, this is no longer the case; technological advance in many sectors, 
including computing and IT and biotechnology, is almost entirely driven by civil spending.  
Even in the UK, where defence Research and Development (R&D) is comparatively 
important compared with other EU members (except France), defence accounts for only 
11% of the national R&D effort (National Statistics, 2005).  This increasing focus on the R&D 
requirements of commerce and industry raises the fundamental question of how defence 
can minimise the chances that it will not miss out on opportunities that may arise in the 
civilian context.  
As part of its response to this challenge, the UK MOD devotes some time and 
resources simply to tracking progress in civil technology across the board and across the 
world.  It also operates a small organisation within the DE&S (the Defence Suppliers’ 
Service) that familiarises businesses seeking work in the defence sector with the contractual 
and other processes of the Ministry of Defence and, in this way, tries to ease the path of 
firms that wish to become suppliers.  On the other hand, the US Department of Defense has 
particular accounting demands that it places on its suppliers; this has led to concerns that 
some generators of “civil” technology do not promote it in the defence sector simply because 
they do not want the trouble of complying with these accounting systems.  
Little in this area is easy.  Much contemporary technology—especially that which 
relies heavily on electronics—has a very short lifecycle and is kept in production for only a 
limited time.  Culturally and procedurally, the UK MOD has developed an increasingly robust 
process for the careful assessment of equipment investment that is able to handle 
programmes with a planned lifetime of two or three decades (albeit many, with subsequent 
life extension programmes, have the period from Concept to Disposal often exceeding 50 
years (DEG, 2005)).  The Investment Approvals Board31 (IAB) is, therefore, not accustomed 
to hearing that a piece of kit will be disposed of after perhaps three or four years—which is 
frequently shorter than the approvals process itself!   
Furthermore, the building of modern computing and information technology into 
complex larger systems also raises questions about whether and how that technology can 
be updated without significant disruption to the system as a whole.  For example, modern 
combat aircraft such as the F22 and the Eurofighter Typhoon contain several thousand 
obsolescent parts, but changing a 486 processor for a modern Pentium version is a risky 
business in such complex systems.  To date, the UK Defence Ministry’s answer to this issue 
has been twofold.  In some cases, a lifetime supply of an item is bought at the time of 
procurement so that a failed component can be simply replaced from existing stock.  
However, this has the obvious downsides of the both the cost of maintaining such a 
stockpile (particularly when its usage rates may prove to be far lower than estimated at the 
pre-production stage), and also its vulnerability to the sort of obsolescence issues outline 
above. 
                                                
31  As its name implies, the IAB is the committee that sanctions proposals for major investment on 
behalf of the UK’s Defence Management Board. 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 316 - 
=
=
The alternative (and increasingly common) approach is to develop a support 
arrangement with a contractor who is obliged both to maintain the system and to update its 
elements under a so-called “Contracting for Availability” approach.  This is particularly useful 
in the procurement of information systems and services and, as a result, the contractor 
shoulders the risk of difficulties associated with the introduction of new technology.  Given 
that the contractor is usually the original equipment supplier, he should (in theory) 
understand the system better than anyone else.  But, with the increasing importance 
accorded to the electronic dimension of a platform such as a tank, ship or aircraft, it is not 
surprising that that some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that the electronics 
should lead the design: “In future, we will invite contractors to design C4ISTAR architectures 
and integrate platforms into them” (Blackham, 200332). 
Challenge 5—Development of a Whole-life and pan-
Organisation Cost mentality 
In an overall “system of systems” as complex as Defence (which is designed to 
operate successfully at some distance from its home base in the most challenging and life-
threatening of environments), it is inevitable that there will be overlaps and interfaces 
between those charged with the management, development and operation of each 
individual component.  Thus, for example, the introduction of an improved equipment design 
is likely, whilst reducing the direct cost (of operation and/or spares provision), to incur 
additional costs in terms of infrastructure (e.g., more sophisticated diagnostic equipment) 
and in personnel (training of maintenance engineers to higher skill levels).   
Indeed, in the UK, the military has recognized eight so-called Defence Lines of 
Development33 (LoDs) as a means of helping ensure that the implications of equipment 
changes are well understood.  The simplest approach sees equipment, at least after the 
signature of a development contract with a company, as the independent variable from 
which other LoDs follow: their management requires their timely and appropriate provision.  
A more complex line of thought presents the LoDs as interacting throughout the 
development process; for instance, a computer programme could be developed expensively 
with few training needs or more cheaply with extensive training needs.  However, viewing 
the LoDs in this way presents significant challenges in the development of robust and 
meaningful contracts with industry.  Intriguingly, as recognised by the UK’s Chartered 
Institute for Logistics and Transport, the LoD approach does seem to commend itself as a 
model in other areas—for example, in planning responses to Humanitarian Disasters in 
which the integration of many strands of support (against the backdrop of uncertainty, 
potentially devastated infrastructure and limited communications) has clear parallels with the 
military scenario. 
                                                
32  Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham was, until 2003, the officer responsible for the development of 
future equipment capability—the so-called “Customer 1,” whose role included the development of the 
User Requirements Document (URD) against which new platforms and equipment are procured. 
33  Known by the acronym “TEPIDOIL,” these encompass Training, Equipment, Personnel, 
Infrastructure, Doctrine & Concepts, Organisation, Information and Logistics. 
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A further twist to this multi-faceted integration problem is the increasing recognition 
that resource-expenditure decisions should be considered on a Whole-life cost34 (WLC) 
basis.  In many ways, it would seem to be entirely perverse not to approach such decisions 
from this perspective; however, there are many examples of procurement projects in 
defence in which the capital cost would appear to have been deliberately reduced without 
formally recognising the implications for the ongoing costs of support, and in the hope that 
the latter will be “lost in the noise” or that the corporate memory will have forgotten the 
original basis for the decision when it crystallises 20 years later.   
It is fully accepted that Whole-life costing is an acknowledged challenge in many 
areas of commerce and industry, but the complexity of military equipment and the breadth of 
operational circumstances in which it can be (and is) used, make cost forecasting a 
particular challenge.  As an example, many items of defence equipment are designed for 
use in one environment but, due to changed political or military circumstances, are actually 
operated in a markedly different way.35  This complexity is exacerbated by the extent to 
which organisational structures influence the potential for “tribal” behaviour.  Thus, in the UK 
MOD, there has been a clear separation between those who are charged with the 
procurement of new equipment, those who maintain it, and those who operate it in combat.  
Particularly in relation to the first two protagonists, this schism has reinforced the suspicion 
that—not least in the face of sustained criticism by the House of Commons Public Accounts 
and Defence Committees—misleading trade-offs between capital and support costs may be 
presented to scrutineers.  
The merger during 2007 of the Defence Procurement Agency and the Defence 
Logistics Organisation—as well as wider responsibilities placed on the Equipment Capability 
Customer organisation—is meant to support the early adoption of realistic whole-life cost 
calculations.  Robust methods for capturing and allocating such costs, however, will need 
further refinement.  Nevertheless, to the extent that the need for Whole-life Costing across 
all the Defence LoDs has been recognised and will lead to greater attention, the Defence 
Industrial Strategy must be applauded.   
Conclusion 
This paper has sought to review, from a largely UK perspective, some of the key 
challenges currently facing the management of defence and, in doing so, has addressed five 
inter-related questions to which there are no easy or final answers.  But, this study has also 
suggested that the current relative paucity of academic endeavour presents a tremendous 
opportunity both for new insights, and also for the development and application of 
prescriptions that have been tried and tested in the commercial arena.  Furthermore, whilst it 
                                                
34  A very useful and concise exploration of some of the key issues surrounding the development of 
robust WLC models is to be found in the Kirkpatrick (2000). 
35  A particularly clear example is the Royal Navy’s Type 23 Frigates that were designed for anti-
submarine patrols to be conducted at slow (and, therefore, quiet) speed in the waters between 
Greenland, Iceland and Northern Scotland.  Thus, given the predicted ambient temperatures, the air 
conditioning systems (for both equipment and crew) were limited, as was the endurance—reflecting a 
concept of operations that saw the vessels being accompanied by an oiler/stores support ship.  
Following the end of the Cold War, the ships are now seen as “General Purpose” frigates and have 
required expensive retrofitting to enable them to operate effectively in, say, the Persian Gulf. 
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is not appropriate to speak of a crisis in defence management, there is little doubt that major 
shortcomings in existing ways of doing business (competitive tendering, outsourcing, and 
relying on rather autonomous Integrated Project Teams in acquisition) are becoming ever 
clearer. 
Finally, the authors are well aware that our selection does not cover all of the 
management challenges facing the UK MOD.  For instance, it is not clear whether the 
benefits gained from the introduction of Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB) have 
exceeded the considerable implementation costs involved.  That said, there is no doubt that 
the MOD has much to do if it is to better understand its own costs (on a Whole-life basis and 
across all aspects such as personnel, training, support and infrastructure) as a means of 
improving the significant balance of investment decisions that it faces.  Also, the prevalence 
and successful achievement of Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) before the Iraq 
War has raised questions about the actual outputs and outcomes of the peacetime defence 
budget, as well as the procurement process as a whole—how can the latter meet the 
demands of UORs but singularly fail to do so in regular procurements (especially in the 
absence of any clear price inflation)?   
Hopefully, the issues raised in some detail will prompt some interest in the 
management challenges facing the defence community.  They might even generate some 
sympathy for those charged with running a country’s defence machine. 
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Abstract 
Several previously published papers have cited the need to include correlation in 
risk-analysis models. In particular, a landmark paper published by Philip Lurie and Matthew 
Goldberg presented a methodology for inducing Pearson’s correlation between 
input/independent random variables. The one subject, absent from the paper, was a 
methodology for finding the optimal applied correlation matrix given a desired outcome 
correlation. Since the publishing of the Lurie-Goldberg paper, there has been continuing 
discussion on its implementation; however, there has not been any presentation of an 
optimization algorithm that does not involve the use of computing-heavy simulations. This 
paper reviews the general methodology used by Lurie and Goldberg (along with its 
predecessor papers) and presents a non-simulation approach to finding the optimal input 
correlation matrix, given a set of marginal distributions and a desired correlation matrix.  
Introduction 
The Complete Correlation Algorithm (CCA) developed by Northrop Grumman and 
recently implemented in NG developed risk models is a product of more than two years of 
research and development. Several previously published papers have cited the need to 
include correlation in risk-analysis models; however, none present an optimization algorithm 
that does not involve the use of computing-heavy simulations. In particular, a landmark 
paper published by Philip Lurie and Matthew Goldberg (1998) presented a methodology for 
inducing Pearson’s correlation between input random variables. This paper reviews the 
general methodology used by Lurie and Goldberg (along with its predecessor papers) and 
presents the Druker Algorithm: a non-simulation approach to finding the optimal input 
correlation matrix given a set of marginal distributions and a desired correlation matrix. 
The CCA was deliberately created bearing in mind identified environmental factors 
that prevent easy implementation of commercially available models. No one on the team 
had any experience implementing correlation into Monte Carlo simulations beyond the use 
of COTS programs, such as @Risk™ and Crystal Ball™. To determine the best 
development method, the following factors were considered:  
1. The Northrop Grumman risk models need to be of an easily transferable electronic 
size, as the models are often shared via email or network drives. 
2. A diverse group of users must be able to run the software in a variety of work 
environments; Microsoft Office is the only platform that is transferable to all parties. 
Users include risk practitioners, program managers and members of pricing 
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organizations; locations include unclassified and classified Northrop Grumman 
facilities, unclassified and classified customer facilities and home offices.  
3. Custom implementations are frequent; much of NGIT-TASC risk work requires risk 
simulations to be built into pre-existing cost and price models. These models are 
generally limited to Microsoft Excel and Access; however, Web-based platforms are 
not unheard of. 
The above concerns drove the decision to use Visual Basic source code to develop 
the CCA.  
Initially, the development was focused on an algorithm that could induce Pearson’s 
correlation between typical distributions in risk analysis: Bernoulli (discrete), Triangular, 
Normal and Log-Normal. By limiting the problem to the most-common applications, in 
theory, the solution should have been easier to find. While attempting to ascertain the 
maximum correlation between any two Bernoulli distributions, however, the general solution 
was uncovered. The resulting algorithm induces Pearson’s correlation between any set of 
random variables (while still preserving the marginal distributions) using the Lurie-Goldberg 
Method and without the use of simulation to find the optimal applied correlation matrix.   
The CCA is a compilation of multiple algorithms (each named for their main 
author(s)) from several sources: existing papers, public source code and internally-
developed code. Most of the algorithms used were taken from a variety of existing papers. 
Although these papers all provided complete algorithms, they sometimes lacked details in 
how to accomplish key steps; in cases such as these, gaps were filled with open-source 
code solutions. The optimization of the applied correlation matrix, the last step in the 
correlation algorithm, was developed entirely by the Northrop Grumman Team.  
Definitions and Assumptions 
Matrix Definitions:  
1. Consistent Correlation Matrix—Consistent Correlation matrices have diagonal 
entries equal to 1.0, all other entries between [-1, 1] are symmetric and positive 
definite. Consistency is necessary for a viable correlation matrix, but a Consistent 
Correlation Matrix may not necessarily be viable given the Parent Distributions. 
2. Input Correlation Matrix (I)—The user-inputted correlation matrix. This matrix may 
or may not be a consistent correlation matrix.  
3. Adjusted Correlation Matrix (L)—The Input Correlation Matrix adjusted to be a 
Consistent Correlation Matrix. This matrix will, by definition, be positive definite. 
Additionally, the adjusted matrix will be viable as correlations between various 
distributions of random variables will be achievable. When (L) is generated, the 
differences between (I) and (L) are minimized.  
4. Applied Correlation Matrix (A)—The correlation matrix used by the grand algorithm 
to generate correlated random number draws. This matrix may be the same, or very 
different from, the Adjusted Correlation Matrix; the extent of the differences will 
depend on the random variables to be correlated. 
5. Optimal Applied Correlation Matrix (A’)—The Applied Correlation Matrix optimized 
using the Lurie-Goldberg Method.  
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6. Outcome Correlation Matrix (O)—The correlation matrix of the simulated variables 
following the simulation run. The goal of the grant correlation algorithm is for (O) to 
be identical to (L). 
Other Definitions: 
1. Parent Distribution—The distributions correlated for use in the simulation. The 
distributions are simulated using the Inverse CDF technique. The goal is to induce a 
desired correlation between these distributions. 
2. Pearson’s Correlation—A parametric statistic that measures the strength and 
direction of a linear relationship between two random variables (“Correlation,” 2008). 
3. Spearman’s Rank Correlation—A non-parametric statistic that measures the 
monotonicity of a function without making any assumptions as to the distribution of 
the variables. 
4. Eigenvalues—A scalar (L) associated with a matrix such that if (A) is a matrix and 
(X) is a vector, AX = LX. The vector (X) is known as the Eigenvector that 
corresponds to the Eigenvalue (L).  
Assumptions: 
1. Normal Distributions—Any reference to the normal distribution, whether in a 
univariate or bivariate case, is assumed to be the Standard Normal distribution 
(Mean of 0, Standard Deviation of 1).  
Pearson’s vs. Rank Correlation 
Most COTS risk tools use Spearman’s rank correlation as a substitute for Pearson’s 
correlation between parent distributions. Spearman’s rank correlation (a non-parametric 
statistic) differs from Pearson’s correlation (a parametric statistic) in that it measures the 
monotony of a function, whereas Pearson’s correlation measures the strength of the linear 
relationship between two functions (see Figure 1). Though studies have shown that, using 
the most common risk distributions, models using rank correlation yield similar results to 
those using Pearson’s (Robinson & Salls, 2004), there is a distinct difference between the 
two. Although this paper will not detail all the differences between the two measures, a quick 
(and exaggerated) example is presented below. The grand algorithm supersedes the need 
to substitute for Pearson’s correlation with Spearman’s rank correlation.  
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Spearman's Rho 1.00  
Figure 1. Pearson's vs. Spearman's Rank Correlation 
Algorithm Overview 
There are three main steps behind the grand algorithm. An outline of these steps 
follows, and the upcoming sections of this paper will review each individual step in detail.  
1. Correct the User-Input Correlation Matrix (I)  
a. Correct I so that it is consistent—both in terms of a general correlation matrix 
and the properties of the parent distributions being correlated.  
b. Through these corrections, the Adjusted Correlation Matrix (L) will be 
generated. 
2. Optimize the Applied Correlation Matrix  
a. Find the Optimal Applied Correlation Matrix (A’) such that when A’ is run 
through the Lurie-Goldberg Method, the Outcome Correlation Matrix (O) is 
identical to L. 
3. Correlate the Input Random Variables 
a. Using A’, apply the Lurie-Goldberg Method to correlate the parent 
distributions. 
For purposes of presenting the methodology, it is necessary to show how the input 
random variables are to be correlated before discussing how to find A’. 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 330 - 
=
=
Correcting the User-Input Correlation Matrix (Part I) 
Giving users the ability to input their own correlation matrix allows for the possibility 
that the User-Input Correlation Matrix (I) may not be a viable correlation matrix. 
Correlation matrices, by definition, have diagonal entries of 1.0. All other entries between [-
1, 1] are symmetric and are positive definite. The first step in inducing correlation between 
input random variables is checking whether I is a consistent correlation matrix. If it is not, it 
must be corrected that it is such.  
The Iman-Davenport Algorithm, which is based on a paper by Ronald Iman and 
James Davenport (1982) is used to correct I in order to make it a consistent correlation 
matrix. While numerous other papers have been published describing methods to correct I 
such that it is altered as little as possible (Higham, 2002), the Iman-Davenport Algorithm is 
the most computationally efficient method the authors uncovered.  Given that additional 
adjustment may be required based on the parent distributions being correlated; the resulting 
matrix is close enough to I to satisfy this requirement. 
The algorithm corrects I in three main phases. First, the algorithm checks whether I 
is symmetric with diagonal entries of 1.0 and off-diagonal entries between [-1, 1]. If it is not, 
the user is prompted to re-input the matrix, correcting for the discrepancies.  
Second, once the above conditions are satisfied, the algorithm checks whether I is 
positive-definite. One way to test this is to find the eigenvalues for I (positive-definite 
matrices have all positive eigenvalues).  The paper referenced did not describe an approach 
for finding the eigenvalues of the matrix. After further research, the Jacobi Eigenvalue 
Algorithm was determined to be a sufficiently efficient way to evaluate a matrix’s 
eigenvalues. As a result, the eigenvalues are produced as the diagonals of an otherwise 
zero-matrix. The Jacobi Eigenvalue Algorithm is computationally inexpensive and pre-
existing source code was used in its implementation. 
If all eigenvalues for I are positive and the other conditions have been satisfied, then 
I is a consistent correlation matrix. Otherwise, in the third phase, negative eigenvalues are 
changed to small, positive values (e.g., .000001). The diagonal matrix of adjusted 
eigenvalues is then multiplied by the associated matrix of eigenvectors (also produced using 
the Jacobi Eigenvalue Algorithm). That product is, in turn, multiplied by the inverse of the 
matrix of eigenvectors to arrive at a new matrix that is similar, but not equal to, I. Lastly, the 
diagonals are reset to 1.0 as they may have changed during the transformation. This third 
section of the algorithm is repeated until all eigenvectors of the adjusted matrix are positive. 
At this point, the user input matrix has been adjusted such that it is a consistent correlation 
matrix. 
Though the User-Input Correlation Matrix is now a consistent correlation matrix, 
the transformation of I is not complete and the Adjusted Correlation Matrix (L) has not 
been determined.  As will be shown later, depending on the parent distributions being 
correlated, there may be a maximum achievable correlation between any two of the 
variables. Determination of L will be covered later in the section: Correcting the User-Input 
Correlation Matrix (Part II). 
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Correlating Input Random Variables 
In order to understand how the Applied Correlation Matrix (A) is to be optimized 
such that the Output Correlation Matrix (O) is identical to the Adjusted Correlation 
Matrix (L), the method for correlating the parent distributions must first be discussed. It is a 
well-known fact that normal random variables can be correlated by multiplying a vector of 
uncorrelated normal random draws by the Cholesky decomposition36 of the desired 
correlation matrix. The Lurie-Goldberg Method takes this one step further using normal 
random variates to generate correlated uniform random variates. These uniform random 
variates are then transformed via the inverse-CDF technique to generate draws from the 
desired parent distributions. In this method, although the correlations between the normal 
random draws are known, as these draws are transformed into other distributions, the 
correlations change. Hence, the core problem emerges: how can the Optimal Applied 
Correlation Matrix (A’) be uncovered such that O matches L? Answering this question is 
key to implementing the Lurie-Goldberg Method. The authors have developed an algorithm 
that addresses this very question, without necessitating any runs of the simulation. 
Additionally, they have begun the process of optimizing this algorithm, finding heuristics that 
allow it to run with a minimal number of calculations. 
Implementation and Application of the CCA 
The CCA’s chief advantage is that it is non-recurring and its implementation requires 
no simulation. Furthermore, because the algorithm only requires looking at pairs of parent 
distributions, once the applied matrix has been found for a set of parent distributions, the 
algorithm must only be run when distributions are added or changed, and even then, only for 
the new/altered distributions. The algorithm also uses Pearson’s correlation while COTS risk 
tools substitute Spearman’s rank correlation. 
The applications of the CCA reach beyond the Cost and Risk analysis community; 
this algorithm is useful anywhere there is a need to induce Pearson’s correlation between 
input variables. For example, this algorithm can applied to auto correlating, stock market 
projections in the financial arena and to traditional modeling and simulation situations when 
correlation is needed. The algorithm was designed with a focus on portability. Because 
algorithm is coded with Visual Basic, it can be easily integrated in existing tools and models.  
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Application of Transaction Cost Economics to Capabilities-
based Acquisition: Exploring Single Service vs. Joint Service 
Programs and Single Systems vs. System-of-Systems 
Authors: Dr. Diana Angelis, Associate Professor, John Dillard, Senior Lecturer, Dr. Raymond 
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Management Institute, Naval Postgraduate School, Dr. Mary Maureen Brown, Associate 
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1. Introduction 
The US Department of Defense (DoD) is in the process of radical transformation—
transformation to a national security strategy predicated on joint Service purchases and 
complex System-of-Systems (SoS) capabilities.37 This paper contributes to a broader study 
that eventually needs to be conducted to evaluate the benefits and costs of increased 
reliance on joint Service SoS programs.  
The DoD’s increasing emphasis on joint Service SoS capabilities has created both 
opportunities and challenges for materiel acquisition. In terms of improving the effectiveness 
of warfighting capabilities, the opportunity exists for joint, interoperable, multi-function, multi-
mission systems that leverage information dominance and improve decisions and outcomes 
by making US and coalition forces not only better informed, but more coordinated, faster 
and more adaptive. In terms of efficiencies, multiple opportunities exist for joint programs to 
cut “economic production costs”—for instance, by reducing duplication, by exploiting 
learning curves, and by achieving economies of scale and scope in manufacturing, and in 
operations and support activities (e.g., joint training and logistics).  
However, there is a dark side. A key barrier needs to be overcome for the DoD to 
achieve the promises of joint Service SoS programs. This involves the challenge of 
“transaction (coordination and motivation) costs.” These are the less visible, but nonetheless 
significant, costs of negotiating, managing and monitoring transactions.  
There are a variety of categories of joint Service programs. These range from 
relatively simple, single-system, single-Service programs to which other Services sign on to 
use the end product, to fully integrated, multi-Service SoS programs. Examples of the latter 
include the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System 
(JSTARS). Clearly, the latter (joint Service SoS) acquisitions are considerably more 
challenging than the former. The reason can be traced to greater interdependence, 
manifested in greater complexity and uncertainty.  
                                                
37 As defined in the DoD Defense Acquisition Guidebook (2004), an SoS is “a set or arrangement of 
systems that results when independent and useful systems are integrated into a larger system that 
delivers unique capabilities.” Joint Program Management is defined as “Any defense acquisition 
system […] or technology program that involves formal management or funding by more than one 
DoD Component during any phase of a system’s life cycle” (DAU, 2004, p.1). DoD Directive 5000.1, 
The Defense Acquisition System, dated 12 May 2003, indicates a policy preference for joint 
development programs over Component-unique development programs (USD(AT&L). 
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Joint Service SoS acquisitions involve more stakeholders, multiple users and funding 
sources, divergent and competing requirements, and conflicting objectives that lead to 
difficult and contentious tradeoffs, diffused authority, negotiated budget arrangements, 
complex project management structures, etc. This increased interdependence is generally 
reflected in greater transaction costs: higher “coordination costs” from increased complexity 
and uncertainty, and higher “motivation costs” from greater asset specificity and limited 
market contestability.  
The higher the transaction costs, the greater economic production cost efficiencies 
need to be to offset them. As recently emphasized by Melese, Franck, Angelis and Dillard 
(2007), if initial cost estimates focus exclusively on economic production costs and ignore 
transaction costs, the result can be systematic cost overruns.  
According to a recent RAND study of major acquisition programs, the average cost 
overruns of weapon systems in the development phase ranged from 16% to 26%. 
Procurement cost growth over initial estimates averaged between 16% and 65%, while total 
weapon program cost overruns averaged from 20% to 54% (Arena, Leonard, Murray & 
Younossi, 2006).  
Since the official “acquisition program baseline” (APB) estimates for these programs 
reflect the best current understanding of the cost, schedule, and performance objectives at 
the time the baseline is established (typically at Milestone B decisions), Congressional 
funding of these programs represents an implicit contract with the Executive Branch. When 
incomplete or unrealistic cost estimates lead to significant cost and schedule overruns 
relative to expectations established in the APB, administrative sanctions, such as statutory 
(Nunn-McCurdy38) unit cost breaches, can be triggered. In turn, these breaches can 
                                                
38 Since the law was enacted in 1982, Title 10 USC Section2433, a “Nunn-McCurdy” unit cost breach 
occurs when a major defense acquisition program experiences an increase of at least 15% in 
program acquisition unit cost or average procurement unit cost above the unit costs in the acquisition 
program baseline. Through 2006, the DoD had the ability to administratively change the acquisition 
program baseline for the purposes of unit cost reporting, and so was able to reduce the number of 
apparent Nunn-McCurdy breaches, despite apparent cost growth that would otherwise trigger the 
Nunn-McCurdy sanctions.   In 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy law was amended.  The FY 2006 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) severely restricted the DoD’s ability to change unit cost reporting 
criteria.  As a result of this change, Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breaches are incurred at 15% 
(“Significant”), and 25% (“Critical”) above the current unit cost threshold.  Additionally, a “Significant” 
Nunn-McCurdy breach is incurred at 30% of the Milestone B unit cost threshold, and a “Critical” 
Nunn-McCurdy breach is declared at 50% growth above the Milestone B unit cost threshold.  Thus, 
the ability of the DoD to mask unit cost growth through changes to unit cost thresholds is restricted.   
The sanctions imposed by Congress on programs breaching Nunn-McCurdy criteria are noteworthy:  
For “Significant” breaches, the Service Secretary must notify Congress within 45 days of the report 
(normally program deviation report) upon which the determination is based (normally a program 
deviation report initiated when the Program Manager becomes aware of the breach).  The program 
must submit a Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) with the required unit cost breach information. 
For “Critical” breaches, the Defense Secretary (usually delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics) must certify to Congress within 60 days of notification that: 
1) the program is essential to national security,  
2) there is no alternative which can provide equal capability at less cost,  
3) the updated estimates of unit cost (calculated independently by the OSD Cost Analysis 
Improvement Group) are reasonable, and 
4) the management structure is adequate to control unit cost going forward.    
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dramatically impact program execution; they also jeopardize relations between the 
Legislative and Executive Branches of government.   
A study conducted by the DoD in 2007 to develop a business case for improving 
system cost estimating in the DoD (Brown, Flowe & Hamel, 2007b) examined the cost 
growth of all major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) from 1995 to 2005 to determine 
the source and relative magnitude of cost growth and schedule breaches. See Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  Cost Growth by Category for All MDAPs 1995-2005 
(Brown, Flowe & Hamel, 2007b) 
As shown in Figure 1, the largest source of cost growth as reported in the Selected 
Acquisition Reports (SAR) is “Estimation.” This indicates that estimates made in establishing 
MDAP acquisition program baselines were often in error, and thus program costs appeared 
to grow despite very little change in the objective content of the program. This “Estimation” 
error accounted for approximately $201 billion in apparent cost growth over the 10-year 
period examined across all major programs.   
Figure 2 is a related analysis that examines the quantity and sources of breaches for 
108 MDAPs over the same 10-year period (1995–2005). With respect to the Acquisition 
Program Baseline (APB), schedule breaches were the most common; occurring 244 times 
                                                                                                                                                    
Failure to certify within the 60-day timeframe will result in suspension of obligations for major 
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over the 10-year period examined, suggesting that multiple schedule breaches is a relatively 
common occurrence in many programs.   
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Figure 2.  Breaches Reported by SAR All MDAPs 1995-2005 
(Brown, Flowe & Hamel, 2007b) 
Development and procurement cost breaches occur with less frequency than 
schedule breaches, but still occur sufficiently frequently that on average, each MDAP can 
expect to have one of each. Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) breaches occur nearly 
as frequently as schedule breaches, indicating that the confluence of development and 
procurement cost increases conspire to increase unit costs at least 10% above that 
established by the APB. Nunn-McCurdy breaches are notably less common, suggesting that 
only about 20% of programs that breach their APB unit costs will grow substantially beyond 
that. Overall, the raw quantity of breaches indicate that expectations regarding costs and 
schedules are usually unmet, to the extent that for the 108 MDAPs examined, each 
breached on average more than twice for schedule and unit cost, and at least once for 
development cost.39  
This paper investigates cost and schedule breaches in a subset of MDAPs that 
includes a sample of 84 programs, divided into “Joint Service” and “Traditional” (single 
Service) acquisition programs, and “Single System” and “System-of-Systems” (SoS) 
programs. (The data is available upon request from the authors.) The results reported in 
Appendix I suggest there is a statistically significant higher risk of cost and schedule 
breaches in SoS programs than in single system acquisition programs. Interestingly, while 
                                                
39 This is not to imply that every program was equally troubled. A subset of particularly troubled 
programs, approximately 30% of the total, breached in some way every year they reported. 
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“Joint Service” programs in general have a weak statistically significant greater risk of 
schedule (and RDT&E cost) breaches than “Traditional” (single Service) programs, there is 
no significant difference between the two in terms of Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) 
breaches or Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) breaches. (See Tables 1 & 2 in 
Appendix I.)  
Based on our sample, SoS programs tend to take relatively longer and cost more 
than single system acquisitions. This preliminary empirical evidence of cost and schedule 
breaches suggests initial cost (schedule) estimates of SoS programs may not be adequately 
capturing transaction costs. In fact, since production cost breaches are significantly greater, 
the transaction costs experienced by SoS programs may be overwhelming any potential 
economic production cost savings (Melese et al., 2007). If this is indeed the case, then the 
anticipated warfighting benefits of SoS solutions need to be sufficiently large to compensate 
for the extra costs and schedule delays experienced by these programs.  
Meanwhile, it appears that while “Jointness” contributes to schedule overruns, it only 
weakly contributes to development cost overruns, and by itself, does not explain production 
cost overruns. While our results suggest joint programs tend to breach their schedules 
relatively more often than single Service programs (“every event in a joint program takes 
longer […] extra time needs to be included in the program schedule” (DAU, 2004, p. 20)), 
joint programs in our sample only experienced a few more cost breaches than single 
Service programs in the early development (RDT&E) stages. There does not appear to be 
any statistical difference in production cost breaches (PAUC or APUC) between joint Service 
and single Service programs. 
One explanation for this is that the joint Service programs in the sample encompass 
a spectrum that includes both single systems and SoS, and that the complexity and 
uncertainty associated with SoS is so significant as to overwhelm any additional complexity 
and uncertainty that might be experienced by joint Service programs. Another possibility is 
that built-in checks and balances tend to offset the extra transaction costs of joint Service 
programs. 
For instance, “joint programs require special attention to multi-service funding 
requirements and to acquiring the right mix of joint expertise for the source selection 
process”; indeed, “full consultation and coordination with the participating components” is 
required (DAU, 2004, pp. 12, 21). The ultimate outcome may be to help anticipate and 
mitigate the extra transaction costs, and to avoid requirements creep in production stages of 
the program. Guidance for joint program managers is designed to inhibit any changes in 
scope, stating that “substantive changes to […] program documentation, such as the 
acquisition strategy or the contract [need to be] negotiated with the participating 
Components prior to making changes” (p. 12). 
With weapon system investments expected to capture a significant, and perhaps 
growing, share of defense budgets, unprecedented attention has been devoted to clarifying 
the determinants of risk, failure, and success in the joint arena (Pracchia, 2004). The 
defense department’s apparent inability to avert or even predict adverse program outcomes 
such as cost and schedule breaches is not only a source of external criticism (GAO, 2006) 
and internal attention (Krieg, 2005), it has undermined confidence in the time-honored 
practices of program management and oversight.  
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To date, there is significant debate regarding the factors that influence the outcomes 
of programs. Thus, the search for root causes and potential solutions of program cost 
growth, schedule delay, and capability shortfall have received increased attention. To help 
explain potential pitfalls associated with joint programs, this study leverages “Transaction 
Cost Economics” (TCE), which has recently been applied to generate new insights into 
defense cost overruns (Melese et al., 2007). 
2. System-of-Systems (SoS) and a Declining Acquisition 
Workforce 
In 2003, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
replaced the “Requirements Generation System” that had identified warfighter needs for 
nearly 30 years (recently updated in CJCS, 2007, May 1). Providing a new, substantive role 
for Combatant Commanders, the JCIDS process reflects a significant shift in the focus of 
defense programming toward joint system capabilities. But an emerging concern is that DoD 
technology investments are becoming increasingly concentrated in very large, very complex 
system-of-systems. 
In several recent cases, the size and complexity of undertaking SoS programs has 
overwhelmed the DoD’s ability to effectively manage them. According to a recent 
Congressional Research Service report, “management and oversight of acquisition 
programs increases as the value of the program increases” (Chadwick, 2007, p. 12). The 
larger the program, “the more difficult it is to sustain communications among staff members. 
In general, if there are “n” people in a program, the potential number of pair-wise channels is 
n(n-1)/2 […L]arger teams […] have a greater chance of communications breakdown” (DAU, 
2004, p. 16). Ceteris paribus, the bigger the program, the larger the transaction 
(coordination) costs. 
Compounding the challenge was a steep decline in the professional acquisition 
workforce available to negotiate, manage, monitor and enforce contracts. The post-Cold 
War draw-down, and the Acquisition Reform initiatives of the mid 1990s saw dramatic 
declines in the defense acquisition workforce, with a corresponding “brain drain of organic 
government program management capability, particularly in specialized acquisition-related 
fields such as systems engineering.”40 The combination of the dramatically increased size 
                                                
40 The consequences of this “brain drain” have been noted by Congress, such that HR1585 (bill as 
passed by the House and Senate) FY08 National Defense Authorization Act SEC. 852. 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT FUND stated as 
follows:   
—Chapter 87 of  title 10, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1704 the 
following new section: ‘‘§ 1705. Department of Defense Acquisition Work force Development 
Fund” (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of Defense shall establish a fund to be known 
as the “Department of Defense Acquisition Workforce Fund” (in this section referred to as the 
“Fund”) to provide funds, in addition to other funds that may be available, for the recruitment, 
training, and retention of acquisition personnel of the Department of Defense. 
 (b) PURPOSE.—The purpose of the Fund is to ensure that the Department of Defense 
acquisition workforce has the capacity, in both personnel and skills, needed to properly 
perform its mission, provide appropriate oversight of contractor performance, and ensure that 
the Department receives the best value for the expenditure of public resources.” 
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and complexity of SoS programs coupled with a reduced DoD acquisition workforce offers 
one explanation for adverse programmatic outcomes that can be informed by TCE (Krieg, 
2005).  
To compensate for its declining internal expertise, the DoD devised and increasingly 
relied upon external “Lead Systems Integrators” to manage complex programs. Based on 
several recent, highly publicized failed attempts to outsource the integration of complex 
systems to private “Lead Systems Integrators” (LSI), Congress passed HR 1585 for 2008 
defense authorizations, which formally issues a “Prohibition on the Use of Lead Systems 
Integrators” (Sec. 802). This effectively brings what are considered to be “inherently 
governmental” responsibilities (such as Lead Systems Engineer, Lead Cost Analyst, 
Program Manager, Deputy Program Manager, Systems Architect) back into the public 
domain by 2011.41  
To the extent the foregoing legislation drives the responsibilities and functions back 
into the public sector (versus simply reasserting Government oversight), it bears noting that 
vertically integrating the responsibility for systems integration within the DoD is not without 
                                                
41 FY07 NDAA SEC. 820. GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE OF CRITICAL ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS. 
(a) GOAL.—It shall be the goal of the Department of Defense and each of the military 
departments to ensure that, within five years after the date of the enactment of this Act, for each 
major defense acquisition program and each major automated information system program, each of 
the following positions is performed by a properly qualified member of the Armed Forces or full-time 
employee of the Department of Defense: 
(1) Program manager. 
(2) Deputy program manager. 
(3) Chief engineer. 
(4) Systems engineer. 
(5) Cost estimator. 
(b) PLAN OF ACTION.—Not later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, the 
Secretary of Defense shall develop and begin implementation of a plan of action for recruiting, 
training, and ensuring appropriate career development of military and civilian personnel to achieve 
the objective established in subsection (a). The plan of action required by this subsection shall 
include specific, measurable interim milestones. 
(c) REPORTS.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and each 
year thereafter, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a 
report on the progress made by the Department of Defense and the military departments toward 
achieving the goal established in subsection (a). 
(d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 
(1) The term “major defense acquisition program” has the meaning given such term in section 
2430(a) of title 10, United States Code. 
(2) The term “major automated information system program” has the meaning given such 
term in section 2445a(a) of title 10, United States Code (as added by section 816 of this Act). 
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its own set of risks. Transaction cost economics (TCE) suggests vertical integration leads to 
internal bureaucratic coordination and motivation issues. These include the risk of internal 
opportunistic behavior (costly lobbying for promotions or budgets), multi-tasking (“what gets 
measured gets done”), and sub-optimization (success achieved at lower levels at the 
expense of the overall success of the program).  
To mitigate these internal transaction costs, Kelman (2005) emphasizes three key 
features of a “bureaucratic organization”: “the extensive use of rules, hierarchy, and 
specialization.” (p. 10). DoD procurement activities are governed by several sets of federal 
government rules/regulations. For contracting, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
applies to the entire federal government. The Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) applies 
only to the DoD. A subordinate set of governing regulations, outlined in Component-unique 
FAR Supplements, apply to individual DoD Components. Still another set of regulations, the 
DoD 5000 series, pertains to the acquisition of materiel— derived from the 1977 OMB 
Circular A-109, Major System Acquisitions. Another layer of complexity is imposed by 
several provisions within Titles 10 and 40 of the US Code, which impose specific additional 
requirements for the procurement of information technology in general, and business 
systems in particular42.   
While these bureaucratic structures are imposed to address transaction costs, some 
argue the “cure is worse than the disease,” in that the layers of often obscure and conflicting 
guidance introduce new transaction costs beyond what would have been experienced in 
their absence. These transaction costs can be experienced as delays in procuring needed 
operational capability, in which case the “discipline” of the regulated bureaucracy translates 
into a lack of agility that imposes “time to market” penalties. 
In light of the competing requirements for governance mechanisms to mitigate 
transaction costs—arising from vertical integration versus requirements for acquisition agility 
and the dramatically increasing complexity of large-scale systems—acquisition policies and 
procedures are undergoing intense scrutiny for their ability to support joint capabilities (DAU, 
2004, Chapter 1, “Joint Program Management Introduction”). Many other changes are 
underway in the acquisition arena. Recognizing that single system acquisition methods may 
not readily apply to joint SoS capability-based acquisition efforts, the search is on for a 
clearer understanding of how various acquisition strategies either support or impede joint 
efforts. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) offers a valuable framework to guide the way 
forward. 
                                                
42 Notably, the Clinger Cohen Act of 1996, 40 USC §1401 et seq., and 10 USC §  2222, Defense 
Business Systems: Architecture, Accountability, and Modernization, establish specific requirements 
for procurement of information technology that, in several key respects, differ from the procurement of 
weapon systems and other major defense acquisition programs, the responsibility for which is 
established by 10 USC §133, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.  
The Clinger-Cohen Act effectively establishes a separate “chain of command” for IT acquisition 
programs, which runs from the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to the DoD Chief 
Information Officer (CIO), established by 44 USC §3506 as the “Senior official of the Department of 
Defense” for IT matters. 
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3. Transaction Costs = Motivation Costs + Coordination Costs 
In business, two costs are typically factored into strategic acquisition decisions: 
production costs and the costs of managing the transaction—or “transaction costs” (Coase, 
1937). Conventional strategies tend to focus on economic production costs (input costs, 
learning curves, economies of scale and scope, etc.). TCE emphasizes another set of 
costs—coordination and motivation costs. Economic production (opportunity) cost 
advantages tend to guide companies to specialize in “core” activities in which they have a 
comparative advantage, and to “transact” with outside suppliers to acquire other goods and 
services. A key contribution of TCE is to formally introduce and fully reveal the nontrivial 
costs of managing those transactions.  
Transaction costs include coordination and motivation costs, such as search and 
information costs, decision, contracting, and incentive costs, and measurement, monitoring, 
and enforcement costs. TCE predicts these costs will vary across weapon system 
acquisition programs to the extent there are differences in certain key characteristics of the 
transaction—complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity—as well as market 
contestability, and the choice of governance (contracting, etc.) mechanisms. A central point 
from TCE is that the choice of contract, organization, and incentives, along with key 
characteristics of the transaction (complexity, uncertainty, frequency, and asset specificity) 
and market contestability, must be considered in order to obtain reliable cost estimates of 
joint programs (Melese et al., 2007). 
One of the key insights of TCE is that capital (and human capital investments) that 
are specific to a transaction (e.g., made to support a joint program acquisition) can generate 
cost savings, but also carry the risk of increasing transaction costs from opportunistic 
behavior. The role of relation-specific investments (“asset specificity”) is an important 
consideration that needs to be anticipated and factored into any analysis of joint Service 
SoS programs.43  
4. Motivation Costs: The Role of Asset Specificity 
Having made a specialized investment in location, physical, human, or other specific 
assets, a supplier often becomes the most efficient provider, which is good from a 
production-cost perspective, but provides incentives for the supplier to look for opportunities 
to extract more from the transaction (perhaps by demanding steep prices for any 
modifications to the contract). After investments in specific assets are made, the relationship 
is transformed from a customer having the choice of a number of competing suppliers to a 
bilateral monopolistic relationship between a buyer and seller.  
                                                
43 Williamson (1996) identifies six types of asset specificity: 1) site, 2) physical asset, 3) human asset, 
4) dedicated asset, 5) brand-name capital, and 6) temporal. These are specialized investments that 
generate high returns within a specific relationship, but offer little value outside it. Site specificity 
refers to the co-location of facilities to minimize inventory or production costs. Physical asset 
specificity refers to the use of customized assets such as specialized dies and equipment. Human 
asset specificity refers to firm-specific knowledge and skills (e.g., “specific” as opposed to “general” 
training). Dedicated asset specificity refers to additional investments in plant and equipment made to 
sell the extra output to a specific customer. Brand-name capital specificity refers to investments in 
reputation. Temporal asset specificity refers to investments that facilitate timing and coordination of 
projects (e.g., investments in critical-path activities). 
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Similar to “sunk costs,” investments in relationship-specific assets (“asset specificity”) 
are potentially valuable, but can increase risks to both parties in a transaction (Klein, 
Crawford & Alchian, 1978). Close-in bilateral bargaining (a principal-agent type game) 
replaces the competitive marketplace. This entails a transformation of the supplier from 
competitive bidder (prior to source selection) to monopoly supplier (after source selection), 
especially if there are no close substitutes. Accordingly, the customer (government) is now 
vulnerable to “opportunistic behavior” from the supplier.  
Unforeseen contingencies, combined with newly inelastic demand, may prompt the 
supplier to extract more of the surplus created in the relationship.44 In this case, suppliers 
can exploit their power in the relationship by renegotiating a basic agreement to their 
advantage, otherwise threatening to dissolve the agreement. The TCE literature refers to 
this as a “hold-up”45 (Klein, Crawford & Alchian, 1978).  
Conversely, a supplier (defense contractor) that makes specific investments in 
assets that are only valuable in the context of the relationship with a specific customer 
(government), can find itself vulnerable to any changes in demand from that customer (i.e., 
the supplier suffers from “demand uncertainty”). Given the government is the only buyer (or 
one of only a few) of joint SoS weapon systems, and given its limited ability to commit as a 
result of the annual nature of most budgetary processes, defense industry sellers often face 
a monopsony buyer that cannot make credible multi-year commitments. This leads to sellers 
facing substantial demand uncertainty and the real risk of strategic renegotiation.  
Whereas relation-specific investments can increase the total gains to both parties, 
the risk exists of opportunistic behavior; either party can hold up the other, for instance, by 
threatening to change the terms of the contract (e.g., the government’s sovereign right to 
terminate a contract for convenience as well as default). The danger is that if neither party 
feels it can recover the full costs of its investment in the relationship/transaction (say through 
                                                
44 Williamson (1975), Besanko, Dranove, Shanley and Schaefer (2000), and others have labeled the 
transition from one prospective buyer and many sellers to one buyer and one seller, or from 
competitive market to bilateral monopoly, as the “fundamental transformation.”  To some extent, this 
transformation occurs after the completion of every military source-selection process. 
45 According to Besanko et al. (2000), a holdup problem arises when a party in a contractual 
arrangement exploits the other party’s vulnerability due to relationship-specific assets). 
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a continuation or renewal of the contract—“frequency”),46 then efficiency-generating, specific 
investments will not be made, resulting in higher costs.47  
It is important to note at this point that whereas TCE has traditionally examined the 
customer-supplier relationship in the context of a contractual arrangement, the domain of 
joint capabilities acquisition is distinctive (though not exclusively so) in the establishment of 
partnerships among government entities (such as between DoD Services or Agencies), as 
well as teaming arrangements among private-sector enterprises within the defense industrial 
base (e.g., product development contractors and their first- and second-tier suppliers). 
These internal relationships also incur transaction costs related to coordination and 
motivation costs, search and information costs, decision, contracting and incentive costs, 
etc. This notion is explored further below. 
Whereas defense acquisition has traditionally focused on economic production costs, 
joint programs expose the DoD to the potentially greater costs of managing the relationship, 
and more importantly, to the risks of opportunistic behavior on the part of contracting 
partners—a critical “transaction cost.” Given the multiple competing stakeholders in a joint 
SoS acquisition, the principle of self-interest suggests all sides have incentives to behave 
opportunistically and may not necessarily have the motivation to cooperate to make cost-
saving investments—particularly when specific assets are involved, and information is 
imperfect (incomplete or uncertain) and asymmetric.48 Clarification of the risks of 
“opportunism” (i.e., motivation costs) is one of the key advantages of TCE.  
If it turns out that joint Service SoS programs require a significantly greater ratio of 
specific assets to total investments, then this increases the risk of bilateral dependency and 
“hold-up.” Moreover, given the difficulty of writing complete contracts for joint SoS programs 
that will cover every contingency, with incomplete contracts the hold-up problem poses 
                                                
46 In terms of “frequency,” past experience with similar programs appears to have a 
significant impact on a supplier’s costs and capabilities. So, if source selection and strategic 
partnership decisions recognize this and clearly favor past performance, the acquisition 
process will be converted from a one-shot game into a repeated game, allowing suppliers to 
earn a return on their investment in reputation. In this way, increasing frequency through 
strategic partnerships and recurrent transactions can mitigate opportunistic behavior and 
build trust in the contracting relationship. By identifying key characteristics of transactions 
such as frequency, and fully understanding their implications, decision-makers could 
mitigate cost, schedule and performance breaches.  
47 Scope for opportunistic behavior may lead to adverse selection, choice of an (ex ante) inferior 
option (or technology), or moral hazard.  Such scope increases risks that if a relationship-specific 
investment is made, the other party will exploit the terms of the contract to “hold them up.” For 
example, changes in specifications are frequently used by contractors as a reason to raise prices and 
profits under government contracts—especially when those investments by the contractor create 
barriers to the entry of competitors. 
48 In order to combat this tendency, and in the spirit of resolving the principal-agent problem, an 
interesting incentive clause is included by the US Air Force in its “National Polar-Orbiting Operational 
Environmental Satellite System.” When establishing top executives’ salaries and bonuses, the 
contract requires TRW’s corporate board to consider contract performance. By tying senior executive 
pay directly to contract performance, decision-makers can help align incentives, increase 
accountability and reduce cost overruns (Graham, 2003). 
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additional risks for the government—such as contractors charging excessively high prices 
for change orders, and strategic renegotiations.  
5. Governance Issues 
TCE suggests the degree of completeness of a contract is an optimizing decision by 
the parties involved, one that reflects tradeoffs between ex-ante investments in contract 
design and the risk of ex-post costs of opportunistic renegotiation. In reality, contracting 
offers an imperfect solution to opportunism. What may be required are additional 
governance mechanisms (rules and regulations, reputation mechanisms, termination 
agreements, government-furnished equipment, Government-owned, Contractor-operated 
(GOCO) facilities, warranties, etc.) to shift risks to safeguard and protect transaction-specific 
investments, settle disputes, and adapt to new conditions. Ex-ante efforts may also be 
necessary to screen for reliability and reputation (e.g., pre-award contract surveys of 
potential venders). These structures can include anything from agreements to share and 
verify cost and performance information through incentive contracts, to the careful crafting of 
dispute-settlement mechanisms (e.g., alternate dispute resolution, proactive management 
councils, etc.). Among government entities in joint acquisition programs, memoranda of 
understanding or agreement (MOUs or MOAs)49 reflect a “quasi contractual” relationship 
among ostensibly sovereign entities. The enforceability of these is always questionable, but 
they nevertheless serve to make the particulars of agreements among the parties explicit 
and provide both implicit and explicit dispute-resolution mechanisms to reduce the risk of 
hold-up. 
In general, the less complex and uncertain a transaction, and the lower the 
requirement for specific assets, the easier it is to write an explicit contract that covers all 
contingencies. Also, the lower the administrative and enforcement costs of that contract, the 
lower the risk of hold-up. These favorable characteristics are more likely to exist in 
established, traditional (single Service), single system acquisition programs, and contribute 
to lower costs (or cost overruns), and better performance and schedules. 50 
                                                
49 The Air Force F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program featured elaborate memoranda of agreement 
among domestic and international partners to reduce the risk of hold-up.  Despite these structures, 
the sovereignty of partner governments limited the enforceability of these instruments, and hold-ups 
did occur—notably when the legislatures of the partner governments imposed changes to the 
agreements articulated in the MOAs, upon which program plans were based.  The consequential 
impact of program cost, schedule, and performance outcomes have not been fully characterized, but 
would be a worthwhile subject of future TCE research. 
50 If a transaction requires little in the way of specific assets (no hold-up problem), and involves a 
product or service that is: a) well-defined and homogeneous, b) easy to measure (limited complexity 
and mild information asymmetry), c) routinely used (recurring/frequent purchases), d) not subject to 
change (limited demand uncertainty), and e) is offered by competing suppliers, then there is little 
room for negotiation (price and performance are market-driven), and the marginal benefit of 
unproductive bargaining is near zero. With little room for bargaining over such routine and 
uncomplicated transactions, substantial production and transaction cost stability can be expected in 
the acquisition. Moreover, since administrative, incentive, and enforcement costs tend to be low for 
acquisitions in more contestable (competitive) markets, the marginal cost of engaging in the 
transaction is relatively smaller for the military, and there exists an incentive for the supplier to invest 
in the transaction that generates opportunities for cost savings. International competition for standard 
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Evidence uncovered by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) in construction contracts reveals 
that in cases in which a transaction is easy to define and measure (i.e., there is little 
complexity), and only a few minor changes are expected (i.e., there is little uncertainty), 
fixed-price type contracts tend to dominate. However, the more complex the transaction—
the more difficult/costly it is to define and measure performance, and the more uncertain—
the more likely it is that a change in the contract will be required, and the more severe the 
adversarial relationships experienced ex-post when fixed-price contracts are chosen. In the 
latter case, fixed-price type construction contracts often end in costly renegotiations—in 
which any surplus generated was dissipated in the course of those negotiations through 
unproductive bargaining and influence activities. Thus, complexity and uncertainty can force 
parties to turn away from fixed-price type contracts and towards cost-reimbursement type 
contracts (e.g., costs plus a award/incentive fee), and to rely heavily on reputation and other 
enforcement mechanisms to avoid ex-post opportunistic behavior that threatens to dissipate 
the gains generated by a transaction. 
In reality, joint Service acquisition programs often involve highly interdependent, 
complex system-of-systems (SoS) that usually end up in a bilateral monopoly contractual 
setting.51 In this case, assuming no specific assets are required, the outcome depends on 
the degree of contractual ambiguity governing the transaction, as well as on any 
administrative and enforcement costs involved. However, as complexity, uncertainty, and 
opportunism due to specific investments increase, so does the risk of hold-up and so do the 
coordination and motivation (transaction) costs required to measure, monitor, and govern 
both the internal relationships among the Components and the external relationship with the 
contractor. These less-favorable characteristics of joint SoS programs can discourage 
productive efforts and investments in both internal Component relationships and external 
contractor relationships, and thus contribute to more serious cost overruns, schedule 
breaches, and performance shortfalls. 
6. Coordination Costs: Interdependency yields Complexity and 
Uncertainty  
Interdependency is typically defined as the degree to which the performance of one 
activity (or system) relies on an external activity (or system) for its success (Thompson, 
1967). Under conditions in which organizations are allowed to seek the most efficient path to 
                                                                                                                                                    
(off-the-shelf) commercial components of weapon systems might be an example. By unbundling 
large, complex weapons systems into sub-systems, decision-makers might reveal opportunities to 
enjoy the benefits of lower transaction costs and greater competition, leading to lower production 
costs. These favorable characteristics generally lend themselves to more accurate cost estimating. 
51 Many factors conspire to create this bi-lateral monopoly. On the buyer side, monopsony power 
partly derives from the fact the military value of most systems depends solely on their performance 
relative to the systems of adversaries. This is specific to a country and the defense environment it 
faces at a particular point in time, effectively making it the sole buyer of a highly differentiated 
product. The appearance of a superior alternative results in what might be termed military 
obsolescence. Response to new threats can require redesign during development, and modifications 
during the system’s operational life. This cause-and-effect relationship conspires to reduce the 
number of buyers of a particular weapon system, since these weapon systems are often evolving 
products (spiral acquisition). Thus, in addition to technical uncertainty, there is a significant degree of 
demand uncertainty.  
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task accomplishment, interdependent relationships will be established as long as the 
benefits exceed the costs. Private entities typically make technology investments and seek 
interdependencies to achieve the benefits of synergy and economies of scale based on 
measurable effects on the “bottom line.” In contrast, government agencies are often guided 
and constrained by legislative requirements for cross-organizational integration to establish 
interdependent relationships. Consider, for example, the increased emphasis on “jointness” 
since the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The intent 
of this legislation was clearly to increase interoperability, and hence interdependency, in the 
DoD. Combined with recent reforms that reinforce joint solutions to defense capability needs 
(such as JCIDS) and that simultaneously encourage SoS, the result is increased 
interdependency reflected in increased complexity and uncertainty, and correspondingly 
higher coordination costs.52 
For most systems, interoperability is pursued as a means to leverage the collective 
assets of various organizations located at different points along the value chain. For 
example, in the command and control (C2) process, military operations benefit when 
commanders can seek, synthesize, and disseminate several types of information derived 
from different organizations. Experts in a variety of areas must collaborate during the C2 
process to effectively create and execute battle plans. These experts may come from 
different disciplines (or specialties), different branches of the military, or even different 
countries. In short, interoperable systems promote interdependent actions. In turn, 
increased interdependency is reflected in increased complexity and uncertainty and higher 
coordination costs. 
Complexity is a key component of transaction costs. When advanced (immature) 
technologies are combined with systems integration challenges across diverse 
organizations in the scale of joint Service SoS programs, the resulting complexity leads to 
higher coordination costs. Marshall and Meckling (1962) were among the first to discover 
that variability in the size of cost-estimating errors in defense contracts could at least partly 
                                                
52 Interdependent activities are not new to the DoD or to government in general.  However, what is 
new is the scale in which interdependent actions are applied. Prior to the information technology 
revolution of the 1990s, spatial and temporal distances tended to impede communication and the 
sharing of information among partners.  Hence, tightly coupled activities were generally restricted to 
small groups of geographically co-located groups where coordination costs could be minimized. The 
advent of advanced information and communication technologies eroded many of the spatial and 
temporal barriers that once thwarted collaboration. The potential benefits of information-sharing 
enabled by interoperability were then quickly realized and became a major thrust for many 
organizations, the DoD included. Network externalities were increasingly recognized—the value of 
the network to individual participants increased with the number of participants connected to the 
network. This refers to “Metcalfe’s Law,” which proposes that the value of a network varies as the 
square of the number of users or “nodes.”  The foundation of Metcalfe’s law is the observation that in 
a communications network with n members, each can make (n–1) connections with other 
participants. If all those connections are equally valuable, the total value of the network is proportional 
to n(n–1), that is, roughly, n 2.  The law was named in 1993 by George Gilder, publisher of the 
influential Gilder Technology Report. Like Moore's Law, which states that the number of transistors on 
a chip will double every 18 to 20 months, Metcalfe's Law is a rough empirical description, not an 
immutable physical law (information derived from Briscoe, Odlyzko & Tilly, 2006). 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 347 - 
=
=
be attributed to technological complexity, with larger errors associated with greater 
technological advances sought in different systems.53 
Uncertainty is another key component of transaction costs. The reconciliation of 
competing requirements of different players in joint programs can lead to design changes 
and implementation challenges (demand uncertainty). Similarly, the “free rider problem” (in 
which none of the players want to sacrifice their budgets to cover costs that might benefit 
others), combined with changes in Congressional priorities (political uncertainty), can lead to 
funding instability (budget uncertainty). Besides demand, political, and budget uncertainty, 
joint programs face measurement uncertainty, technological uncertainty, supplier 
performance uncertainty, etc.54 
An interesting avenue for future research would be to investigate if increased 
emphasis on “jointness” since the Goldwater Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization 
Act of 1986 or the advent of the JCIDS in 2003 has increased the complexity and 
uncertainty of joint programs relative to others and, consequently, raised coordination and 
motivation costs. The possibility exists that other characteristics inherent in many joint 
programs might offset these higher transaction costs.  
On the one hand, a joint program manager that manages a program that is 
technologically mature, that does not require strict military specifications, in which funding 
and requirements are relatively stable, and where a contestable market exists for the 
product or service, may in fact experience lower transaction costs. On the other hand, if the 
program is facing immature technologies, rigid specifications, funding and requirements 
instability, and monopolistic suppliers, joint program managers and other key decision-
makers should recognize the potential for high transaction costs and opportunistic behavior.  
                                                
53 Adler (1995) examines the complex and interdependent relationship between product design and 
manufacturing, describing four possible governance mechanisms to improve coordination (standards, 
schedules, mutual adaptation and teams). McNaugher (1989) provides evidence that costs rise 
rapidly with system complexity, as does the variance of costs around expected costs (p. 128). 
Consider the increase in complexity in the US Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) class, which 
has experienced a 128% cost growth and which was designed to avoid costs through smaller crews 
(substituting capital for labor). It is unclear whether the substantial increase in transaction costs and 
scope for opportunism introduced with the increased complexity (capital investment in complex 
onboard systems) justifies the anticipated labor-cost savings. 
54 A dynamic programming model by Womer & Terasawa (1989) finds that under demand uncertainty, 
a rational defense contractor must prepare for various contingencies, and will, for example, restrict 
investments in specific assets, which drives costs higher than they would be if demand were certain. 
This tends to increase information and contracting costs, and as the authors demonstrate, threatens 
investments in specific assets. The authors show that the higher the probability the contract will be 
canceled, the less the contractor will invest in capital equipment (relation-specific investments), which 
results in relatively more labor-intensive production, raising costs. Thus, demand uncertainty 
increases contracting costs and also raises issues related to asset specificity. Under demand 
uncertainty, the rational contractor will restrict investments in specific assets (such as capital tooling 
or specialized expertise), unless they are reasonably sure to recover these costs via overhead.  The 
allowability of “Facilities Capital Cost of Money” as an expense is a mechanism by which the 
Government reduces the risk to the contractor by allowing recovery of costs associated with specific 
capital assets (buildings, tooling, etc.) through overhead.  Critics argue this encourages Defense 
contractors to over-capitalize, which increases costs DoD-wide. 
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Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) suggests investigating the specific 
characteristics of transactions that make up joint Service programs (like SoS) could help 
anticipate (and perhaps mitigate) cost and schedule breaches. Since increases in 
interoperability/interdependence tend to increase complexity and uncertainty, and 
complexity and uncertainty increase coordination and motivation costs, it is likely that cost 
and schedule breaches partly depend on decisions regarding the extent of bundling or 
unbundling of the many interdependent parts of joint systems,55 and on the particular phase 
of development or production of those weapon systems.  
Historically, fixed-price contracts are usually prescribed in later stages of product 
development when complexity and uncertainty have been resolved, and the contract is 
complete. In contrast, cost-reimbursement contracts are usually prescribed in earlier stages 
of product development when complexity and uncertainty have not been resolved, and the 
contract is incomplete.56 Today cost-reimbursement contracts are phased out, and fixed-
price contracts phased in, as complexity and uncertainty issues are resolved. However, 
complexity and uncertainty must be characterized in the context of TCE for this strategy to 
succeed. Note that while these prescribed contracts focus on the characteristics of 
complexity and uncertainty, often overlooked is the vital role of asset specificity—a key 
component reflected in the motivation cost component of transaction costs. 
The main strategy of reducing cost and schedule breaches is employed to identify 
ways to cut coordination and motivation costs. Specific recommendations include: a) 
reducing complexity by investing in a more complete contract—e.g., setting realistic 
baselines (entailing higher search and information costs) or using more mature technologies 
(recently emergent in acquisition policies); b) reducing uncertainty through multi-year 
contracts (reducing demand uncertainty) or investing in a more complete contract (reducing 
relationship uncertainty); c) increasing measurement (CAIG) and monitoring (GAO) of 
performance and both production and transaction costs to reduce information asymmetries 
and the associated risks of moral hazard and adverse selection; d) placing credible 
deterrents to bad behavior in place—such as penalty clauses, warranties and bonding; e) 
                                                
55 For instance, an extremely complex interoperable system is envisioned for the Coast Guard’s new 
“integrated deepwater system program.” The system is intended to include cutters and small boats, a 
new fleet of fixed-wing aircraft, a combination of new and upgraded helicopters, and land- and cutter-
based unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)—all linked with Command, Control, Communications and 
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and supported by 
integrated logistics. According to a recent Coast Guard press release (2007, June 25), “Deepwater is 
a 25-year, $24 billion effort that will produce more than 91 new cutters; 195 new aircraft” and C4ISR 
equipment. The lead systems integrator is a joint venture between Lockheed Martin and Northrop 
Grumman that has recently been in the news for major cost overruns, schedule slippages, and quality 
issues—the latter involving several modified ships that were determined un-seaworthy.  
56“Complexity” and “technological uncertainty” (as opposed to “demand uncertainty”) are usually 
correlated. Ignorance about what buyers want and what contractors can do result in large up-front 
search and information or Research and Development (R&D) costs. R&D is similar to a real option in 
the sense that real options models are learning models (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2001). The problem that 
gives rise to high transaction costs in the case of complex weapon systems is that this characteristic 
of the transaction leads to market failure (missing markets). From a TCE perspective, the classic 
market failures—natural monopoly, negative externalities, public goods, etc.—have information 
analogues: missing markets, adverse selection, and moral hazard. 
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using multi-year contracts to gather information and to reward good reputations (Kelman, 
1990); f) mitigating opportunistic behavior introduced by asset specificity through careful use 
of incentives, proper bundling (or task-partitioning) of joint programs, and strategic 
investments in government-furnished equipment or government-owned and contractor-
operated assets; and finally g) increasing market contestability through investments in real 
options (e.g., government-controlled standby capacity—credible threat of vertical integration, 
or second sourcing—credible threat of entry).57  
We believe any evaluation of joint Service—and particularly SoS—acquisition 
programs would benefit from an analysis of the characteristics of the corresponding bundles 
of transactions through the lens of TCE. An inspired effort to collect and analyze data guided 
by TCE (as described in this paper) could help DoD decision-makers to anticipate and 
mitigate cost and schedule breaches and to avoid future performance shortfalls. 
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APPENDIX I 
The 84 DoD weapon system programs first divided into “Single Service” and “Joint 
Service” programs by Brown, Flowe & Hamel (2007b) were further divided into either “single 
system” or “system-of-systems” (SoS) programs. (Data available upon request.) The SoS 
designator was used as a proxy for complexity. Of course, SoS programs are not 
necessarily joint Service programs. For example, an aircraft carrier qualifies as SoS, but is 
managed by a single service. Another example is the F-22 managed exclusively by the Air 
Force. Of course, “single systems” can also qualify as joint programs if they are either 
managed or procured by more than one service. The tests below focused on four categories 
of breaches: Schedule, RDT&E, Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC), and Average 
Procurement Unit Cost (APUC).  
Because the subdivided samples were not normally distributed, we ran a Kruskal-
Wallis (H) test to determine if there was a significant difference in the mean ranks of the 
groups, testing Single Service vs. Joint Service and Single Systems vs. System-of-Systems 
(SoS). The H test is particularly robust as it does not make any assumptions about the 
underlying distribution of the samples. 
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breaches 34.36 49.56 0.0039 38.56 51.31 0.0246 
RDT&E 
breaches 32.44 51.22 0.0002 39.34 49.56 0.0631 
PAUC 
breaches 39.14 45.41 0.2244 41.70 44.29 0.6418 
APUC 
breaches 39.60 45.01 0.2633 42.09 43.42 0.7977 
Variables and Definitions 
 
The results reported in Table 1 suggest significantly greater schedule breaches and 
RDT&E cost breaches in SoS than in Single Systems, with a weaker result for Joint Service 
vs. Single Service. The null hypothesis is that there is no significant difference. 
The results overall are consistent, but somewhat weaker considering the difference 
in the average number of breaches between development and production programs using a 
Mann-Whitney (U) test (which also makes no assumptions about the underlying distribution 
of the samples). We examined the difference in mean ranks for schedule breaches, cost 
breaches (including RDT&E, procurement, PAUC and APUC) and total breaches.  The 
results are shown in Table 2.
Variable   Variable Definition 
Schedule Breach When schedule exceeds most recent APB schedule estimate 
by six months. 
RDT&E Breach When the program’s research, development, test, and 
evaluation costs exceed 15%. 
PAUC Breach When the Program Acquisition Unit Cost exceeds the most 
recent Acquisition Program Baseline threshold by 15%. This 
is a congressionally reportable breach. 
APUC Breach When the Average Procurement Unit Cost exceeds the most 
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 Development Production Development Production 
 n=48 n=36 n=48 n=36 
Schedule breaches 0.0104 0.1558 0.0624 0.2126 
Cost breaches 0.0414 0.0225 0.2603 0.5703 
Total 0.0276 0.0289 0.1632 0.4497 
These findings should be interpreted with a note of caution. For example, the limited 
sample, the method for categorizing the degree of interdependence or “jointness” and SoS, 
and the failure to include and control for other important factors may be significant. Though 
preliminary, these results offer evidence to support further investigations on the role of 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 355 - 
=
=
Panel 18 - International Perspectives on Acquisition 
 
Thursday, 
May 15, 2008 
Panel 18 - International Perspectives on Acquisition 
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair:  
John F. Schank, Senior Operations Research Analyst, RAND Corporation 
Papers:  
Summary of Echo’s Across the Pond: Understanding EU-US Defense 
Industrial Relationships 
Dr. Raymond (Chip) Franck, , Senior Lecturer, Dr. Ira Lewis, 
Associate Professor, Naval Postgraduate School and Dr. Bernard 
Udis, Professor Emeritus, University of Colorado (Boulder)  
Australian Naval Procurement Cycles: Lessons for Other Small Countries 
Dr. Stefan Markowski, Associate Professor, School of Business, 
University of New South Wales, Australian Defence Force  Academy  
Defense Acquisition Policy and Defense Industrial Base Reinforcement 
Strategy—Enhancing the International Competitiveness of the Korean 
National Defense Industry 
Dr. Dae Ok Lee, Principal Researcher, Head of Administration 
Management Division, Agency for Defense Development in Korea 
 
Chair:  John F. Schank is a senior operations research analyst at RAND.  He has been involved in a 
wide range of research issues, including shipbuilding acquisition and industrial base analyses, cost 
analyses, manpower, personnel, and training issues, and logistics.  He holds a BS in Electrical 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 356 - 
=
=
Summary of Echoes Across the Pond: Understanding EU-US 
Defense Industrial Relationships 
Presenter: Raymond (Chip) Franck, PhD, Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Business & 
Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, retired from the Air Force in 2000 in the grade of 
Brigadier General after 33 years commissioned service.  He served in a number of 
operational tours as a bomber pilot; staff positions—which included the Office of Secretary 
of Defense and Headquarters, Strategic Air Command; and was Professor and Head, 
Department of Economics and Geography at the US Air Force Academy.  His institutional 
responsibilities at NPS have included the interim chairmanship of the newly formed Systems 
Engineering Department from July 2002 to September 2004, teaching a variety of 
economics courses and serving on a number of committees to revise curricula for both the 
Management and Systems Engineering disciplines.  His research agenda focuses on 
defense acquisition practices and military innovation. 
Raymond (Chip) Franck 
Senior Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-3614 
E-mail: refranck@nps.edu  
Author: Ira Lewis, PhD, is Associate Professor of Logistics, Graduate School of Business 
and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.  His interests include 
transportation, public policy, and the impact of information technology on logistics. 
Ira A. Lewis 
Associate Professor 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-2464 
E-mail: ialewis@nps.edu   
Author: Bernard Udis, PhD, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of 
Colorado at Boulder and Visiting Research Professor at the US Naval Postgraduate School 
at Monterey.  He has also served as Distinguished Visiting Professor of Economics at the 
US Air Force Academy, and as William C. Foster Fellow at the US Arms Control & 
Disarmament Agency.  His NATO Research Fellowship examined the costs and benefits of 
offsets in defense trade.   
Professor Udis' published work includes three books: The Economic Consequences of 
Reduced Military Spending (editor, 1973), From Guns to Butter: Technology Organizations 
and Reduced Military Spending in Western Europe (1978), and The Challenge To European 
Industrial Policy: Impacts of Redirected Military Spending (1987).  In addition, he has 
published numerous articles in scholarly journals on defense industries and military power.  
These include "Offsets as Industrial Policy: Lessons from Aerospace" (with Keith Maskus, 
1992), and "New Challenges to Arms Export Control: Whither Wassenaar?" (with Ron 
Smith, 2001).  A number of his works are considered classics in defense economics and 
have been reprinted in collections such as The Economics of Defence (Todd Sandler & 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 357 - 
=
=
Keith Hartley, 2001) and ARMS TRADE, SECURITY AND CONFLICT (Paul Levine & Ron 
Smith, 2003). 
Professor Udis' current research focuses upon competition and cooperation in the 
aerospace industries of the US and the EU.   
Bernard Udis 
Professor Emeritus 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
13 Camino Real 
Sandia Park, NM 87047 
(505)286-2789 
E-mail: Bernard.Udis@colorado.edu  
Abstract 
This report represents the authors’ efforts to provide a useful, albeit partial, 
understanding of the international defense marketplace—which we view as growing 
increasingly complex.  In pursuit of that objective, we provide a brief overview of 
international defense markets in the context of both changes in military affairs and the 
various defense industrial bases.   
In analyzing the defense market, we essay multiple analytical frameworks (along the 
lines of Essence of Decision).  Our analytical models are: (a) a sophisticated view of offsets 
in a public policy context with market imperfections, (b) transaction cost economics, with our 
unit of analysis being the nation-state instead of the firm, and (c) two standard corporate 
strategy models. 
To test the models’ explanatory powers, we consider three ongoing “cases”: F-35 
Joint Strike Fighter, the UK Defense Industrial Strategy, and the Northrop-Grumman-EADS 
KC-30 proposal.  Interestingly, we find all three hypotheses have some explanatory power, 
but none of the three is demonstrably better than the others (in this small sample). 
Summary 
This is a summary of the report cited above for inclusion in the Proceedings of the 
Fifth Naval Postgraduate School’s Annual Acquisition Symposium (2008, May).  (The report 
itself greatly exceeds the length guidelines for the Proceedings.  The topics raised here are 
discussed in greater detail within the body of that report.) 
The motivation for this particular project was our conviction that standard explanatory 
paradigms for understanding global defense trade, e.g., offsets and related subjects, have 
been strained—perhaps to the breaking point.  Accordingly, we hypothesized that analysis 
of this increasingly complex market system would be improved by the application of multiple 
models (as was done by Graham Allison in Essence of Decision). 
Section I is a brief introduction. 
Section II is an interpretative discussion of ongoing developments in the international 
defense market place.  In this section, we discuss the following. 
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 A. Military Affairs.  There are two ongoing Revolutions in Military Affairs—one lead by 
the US DoD, the other by contemporary terrorist and insurgency movements.  
Accordingly, the international defense market has been significantly affected by the 
ongoing competition between between two groups that are deliberately engaged in 
processes of rapid military innovation (both underpinned by contemporary 
information technology). 
 B. Developments in the Global Defense Marketplace (in general)—including acquisition 
reform and the globalization of defense industrial production.  We noted in particular 
the systemic tension between globalization and national sovereignty—an issue that’s 
especially acute for defense-related goods. 
 C. US and EU Defense Industrial Developments (in particular).  These include the role 
of US and European defense firms in the world market, recent trends in defense 
budgets, and patterns of reorganization (generally consolidation).  We noted the 
dangers of relying solely on detailed quantitative analysis to analyze a complex and 
changing system in the absence of well-defined analytic paradigms. 
Section III presents multiple analytical frameworks as a basis for the analysis of 
complex systems.  We then present our three paradigms. 
 A. We first summarize Allison’s use of multiple analytical frameworks. 
 B.  Offsets and International Industrial Participation.  We hypothesize that although 
the offsets perspective was not able to offer comprehensive understanding of the 
international defense market, we believe it still has explanatory power (and are, 
in any case, obliged to assess its usefulness).   
 C. Transaction Cost Economics (TCE): TCE was originally developed to study 
vertical boundaries of firms (the make-or-buy decision in particular).  We 
summarize the relevant considerations for that decision.  We expand the 
standard TCE model somewhat and consider the nation-state as a military 
enterprise.  (One would then view a decision to buy military equipment as a 
decision to import—as opposed to a decision to rely on domestic sources.) 
 D. Corporate Strategy: Finally, we introduce two standard models of corporate 
strategy: Five Forces (Porter, 1980) and “Co-opetition” (Brandenburger & 
Nalebuff, 1996).   
Section IV provides narratives of three ongoing “cases”: the Joint Strike Fighter 
(JSF), the  UK Defense Industrial Strategy, and the KC-30 Proposal.  For all three cases, we 
provide an interpretive narrative (up to report publication) and then provide explanations 
based on the three frameworks (from Section III). 
Joint Strike Fighter  
Offsets: The JSF seems structured to operate in an offsets-free model.  Among other 
things, the JSF consortium is intended to change foreign military sales customers to 
stakeholders (who share both in risks and rewards).  This arrangement, in turn, is 
intended to drive the consortium’s focus toward productive efficiency rather than the 
side payments negotiated in offset agreements.  The viewpoints of the JSF 
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stakeholders (expressed in anonymous interviews) is not fully consistent with that 
objective. 
Transaction Cost Economics: From the prime contracting firm’s perspective, 
international trade in defense goods frequently involves the formation of long-term 
relations—the consequences of which are one of the main concerns of the TCE 
literature.  The JSF strategy is, in a very real sense, intended to delay the 
“fundamental transformation” from competitive market to something similar to 
bilateral monopoly. 
Corporate Strategy: The JSF model addresses every defense industrial firm’s 
concern with buyer power—sovereign entities in this case.  The aim is to mitigate this 
threat to profits by recruiting stakeholders who are well placed to influence the 
sovereign buyers’ behavior—in this case, domestic defense firms in a number of 
countries. 
UK Defense Industrial Strategy (DIS) 
Offsets: Taken at face value, the DIS is intended for a post-offsets trading regime.  
However, a more in-depth reading reveals a careful preparation for negotiations over 
industrial participation (as tacit offsets).  For example, the DIS identifies core 
industries in which there must be domestic defense participation. 
Transaction Cost Economics: One of the major purposes of the DIS is protection 
from the costs and risks associated with outsourcing (importing) major portions of the 
UK’s defense equipment.  From this perspective, there are many serious areas of 
concern associated with importing modern defense systems.  The DIS’ insistence 
upon “appropriate sovereignty” in the lifecycle management (and operational use) of 
this imported equipment is a serious effort to manage and mitigate those risks. 
Corporate Strategy: The contemporary defense marketplace poses significant 
threats to the profits (and, therefore, viability) of the British defense industrial base.  
The DIS first reserves certain categories of defense products to domestic firms.  It 
also insists upon the ability to upgrade, modify and generally manage defense 
systems throughout their operational life.  This is well understood as a strategy for 
mitigating (foreign) supplier power. 
KC-30 Proposal 
Stealthy Offsets: The details of the KC-30 proposal, which included provisions for 
extensive US industrial participation, were really intended to insert offsets into a 
proposal to a customer who ostensibly did not engage in offset agreements.  The 
evolution of the KC-30’s industrial participation component is best understood as a 
tacit negotiation over offsets. 
Corporate Strategy: Standard models of corporate strategy clearly reveal the 
rationale for EADS’ entry to the US defense market—with a view to changing its 
environment by redefining its market niche.  The USAF’s KC-X project provided 
EADS with a high degree of market power relative to both its rival and its prospective 
buyer.  The buyer (the US government) insisted upon competition, with EADS being 
the only reasonable competitor other than Boeing.  Hence, the success of the KC-30 
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in the initial Air Force source-selection process is the result of a very well-crafted 
corporate strategy (regardless of final outcome). 
Transaction Cost Economics: The risks the US would assume in choosing the KC-30 
include an international politics of a “holdup”—denying support to KC-30s in US 
military operations because of source-country disapproval.  Hence, the partnership 
with Northrop-Grumman and extensive KC-30 production work located in the US are 
readily understandable as means to assure the US government that such risks are 
not serious.   
Some Conclusions 
Basically, we found support for our hypothesis about the international defense 
market being an increasingly complex system, the study of which usefully involves the 
application of multiple analytical frameworks.   
We conclude, first, that all three of our perspectives have explanatory power in all 
three cases considered.  Second, and also interesting, is that relative explanatory power 
varied over this small sample.  We concluded that the offsets paradigm was best for 
understanding the Joint Strike Fighter project; that TCE did best for the UK’s DIS; and 
corporate strategy models provided especially good insights into the KC-30 proposal. 
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Abstract 
Defence procurement agencies in smaller countries, such as Australia, face a difficult 
challenge when seeking to acquire new weapons systems that are either intrinsically 
complex or idiosyncratically tailored to local needs. If they seek to rely on production in-
country, they must draw on domestic infrastructure almost certainly too limited in its 
technological breadth and depth for the task of efficiently producing a wide range of 
sophisticated military products, which are likely to be internationally uncompetitive, into the 
bargain. If they “leave it to the market” and award contracts on the basis of a competitive 
process and set up arms-length relationships to pursue compliance, they may find 
themselves hostage to suppliers that cannot be replaced once the contract is under way. If, 
instead, they seek supplies from government-owned arsenals and shipyards, they may find 
it difficult to resit political pressures to preserve legacy sectors, facilities and products. And, 
if they look to overseas suppliers to meet their requirements, they usually lack the market 
power to negotiate favourable terms and sometimes to have their requirements met at all.  
These challenges, and the related issue of whether to use defence acquisitions to 
support domestic industry, are discussed in the context of procurement of naval vessels and 
support services in Australia. The country has long had domestic warship building and 
maintenance capabilities, and its shipbuilding sector “is the jewel in the defence industry 
crown. Naval vessels are the only major platforms built in Australia, and firms that build them 
are the highest profile and most prestigious element of defence industry” (ASPI, 2002, p. 8). 
In this paper, we consider Australia’s three post-WWII shipbuilding cycles to illustrate how 
successive federal governments have grappled with these perennial procurement 
challenges. We draw lessons from the first two cycles to explain why and how the 
government has been driven to increase its responsibility for managing key shipbuilding 
projects following a period of seeking to rely more heavily on the forces of competitive 
industrial supply and after nearly a decade of “smart procurement” rhetoric.  
Many lessons apparent in the context of Australian naval shipbuilding and repair are 
relevant to other defence industry sectors. They illustrate a range of problems typical of 
many Defence-Industry relationships in small countries: local production vs. imports, political 
and economic vs. strategic aspects of in-country sourcing of materiel, the role of 
competition, the management of procurement risks, and business models used to engage 
suppliers and mitigate the risks of inadequate supplier performance. 
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Naval shipbuilding has consistently captured the attention of the Australian public 
more than any other area of defence procurement—from the troubled government shipyards 
of the 1950s and 1960s through to the Collins submarine project of the 1990s (ASPI, 2002). 
This is partly because naval vessels are the only major platforms built in Australia. And, 
partly, because the procurement of naval assets and the disposition of industry facilities 
have long been highly politicised, with the federal government balancing the competing 
interests of different states, services and industries. As a result, the Australian naval 
shipbuilding and repair sector has consistently presented governments of the day “with a 
series of interwoven (procurement) challenges” (p. 1). The response to such challenges has 
been embedded for 20 years or more in economic and institutional reforms applying to 
Australian defence industry overall, and the sector has benefited particularly from reforms to 
the defence supply chain. However, while considerable improvements have been achieved, 
accounts of project delays and cost overruns still attract media attention and embarrass 
successive governments. 
By the standards of older maritime nations, the industry may not have a long history 
but it has had its share of both failure and success. Within the former, arguably the most 
publicised has been the procurement of the Collins Class submarines in the 1980s and 
1990s. No other Australian defence acquisition in recent years has had a more profound 
impact on how the government goes about the acquisition of major strategic capabilities and 
on the mechanics of the defence acquisition process. As the latest cycle of naval 
acquisitions has started to unfold, the key question is what lessons have been learned and 
with what implications for new process.  
This would become clear as the Australian government seeks to handle two forms of 
competition. On the one hand, prime contractors, main systems integrators and some 
original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) compete for a market—the market in new 
capability elements—by offering alternative specifications of weapons systems sought by 
Defence (i.e., different platform designs and combat systems). On the other hand, lower-tier 
contractors compete in a market, the market for work subcontracted by primes and higher-
tier contractors. In each case, local content requirements and defence procurement policy 
have a role to play. 
This paper is structured as follows. First, we briefly review the history of naval 
shipbuilding and repair in Australia. We discuss the three post-World War II ship acquisition 
cycles, which are critical to the understanding of how successive Australian governments 
have approached naval acquisitions and defence procurement in general. Second, we 
consider the in-country maritime industry (i.e., shipbuilders and maintainers, facilities and 
industry disposition, the changing division of labour and the associated supply chains). 
Finally, we draw some lessons from the Australian naval shipbuilding experience. 
Naval Shipbuilding in Australia 
Post-war shipbuilding cycles 
During World War II, Australia became a significant builder and repairer of naval 
vessels. In total, 113 naval ships were built for the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) at ten 
Australian dockyards. Also, 4,000 ship repairs were completed for the RAN, 500 for the US 
Navy (USN) and nearly 400 for the Royal Navy (Parliament of Australia, 2006, p. 41). The 
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scale of activity declined significantly during the post-war period. Since 1945, Australia has 
experienced two major naval building cycles separated by a 15-year period of low activity 
and a third was under way by 2008 (ASPI, 2002).  
In the 1950s and 1960s, the first cycle saw nine destroyers built at the government-
owned dockyards. The cycle also included an afloat support ship, hydro vessels and patrol 
boats. In the 1970s and early 1980s, no surface combatants were built in Australia; 
although, four large naval support and hydrographic vessels were completed, as well as 
eight heavy landing craft (LCH) craft and 14 patrol boats.  
The second naval combatant building cycle began in 1984 with an order for two 
guided missile frigates (FFGs). This was followed by orders for six Collins Class 
submarines, ten ANZAC Class frigates (involving workshare arrangements with New 
Zealand), six minehunters and other ships (e.g., patrol boats and two hydrographic ships). 
The second cycle will end with the commissioning into service of the last Armidale Class 
patrol boats in the early 2000s.  
The third cycle (much smaller by volume) began in the late 2000s, with tenders for 
the construction of three air warfare destroyers (AWD), two large landing helicopter dock 
(LHD) ships, afloat support ships and the watercraft element of the amphibious deployment 
and sustainment (ADAS) project. This cycle of naval shipbuilding is expected to end around 
2016-17, with the next cycle expected to start around 2018. 
The first cycle: The troubled years 
The construction of destroyers in the 1950s and 1960s was notorious for its cost 
overruns, schedule slippages and industrial disputes. As noted by the Australian Senate 
inquiry into naval shipbuilding, “Australia’s increasing resort over the 1960s and 1970s to 
purchasing foreign naval vessels for the RAN reflected the poor performance of domestic 
naval shipbuilding projects” (Parliament of Australia, 2006. p. 41). Apart from two 
oceanographic ships, the government-owned dockyard at Williamstown in Melbourne did not 
commission a naval vessel between 1971 and 1991 (p. 42). And, after launching HMAS 
Torrens in 1968, the other major government-owned dockyard at Cockatoo Island in Sydney 
did not commission another naval vessel until 1986. Thus, no warships were launched in 
Australia for over 20 years. This preference for imports left Australian naval shipyards with 
mostly repair and (limited) refit work (p. 42). 
An example of local construction problems in the 1970s was the ill-fated DDL (light) 
destroyer project approved in 1972. Starting in 1975, three locally designed ships were to be 
built at the Williamstown dockyard. While it was accepted that cost premia for local build 
were to be incurred, they were justified on the grounds that local shipyards would later be 
best positioned to provide logistic through-life support and battle damage repairs. Also, 
investments needed to pump-prime local shipbuilding capabilities were aimed at enhancing 
the in-country skill base and technological know-how. The project was cancelled in 1973 as 
the Navy and the Department of Defence found the initial cost estimates to be grossly over-
optimistic and a Joint Parliamentary Committee took the position that risks inherent in a local 
design were excessive (p. 43). A lesson drawn from this experience was “the need for 
tighter controls on Navy’s design requirements. Part of the problem was that those involved 
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Following the cancellation of the DDL project, the government turned to overseas 
shipyards to initiate the acquisition of guided missile frigates. In 1974, the purchase of two 
imported FFGs was approved by the government. The vessels were to be built in the USA 
and acquired under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements managed by USN. The 
purchase of a third FFG was approved in 1977 and a fourth in 1980. The ships were 
delivered between 1980 and 1984, mostly on schedule, but the cost of acquisition ballooned 
(Parliament of Australia, 2006, pp. 43-44). In part, the cost overrun was due to higher-than-
anticipated inflation and exchange rate re-alignment. But the purchase also revealed 
systemic problems in Australian defence procurement. As new technologies emerged, the 
first three frigates had to be retrofitted with long-range sonar systems and more capable 
helicopters. The design of the fourth FFG was altered to incorporate several modifications 
requested by the RAN. It was argued that some cost overruns might have been avoided 
“had the RAN seized opportunities to incorporate modifications during the construction 
phase” (p. 44). The procurement process was thus, apparently, neither sufficiently flexible 
nor agile to cope with changes in the technical specification of the deliverables.  
There were also problems with the use of FMS arrangements. A 1974 Memorandum 
of Agreement with the US allowed Australia to withdraw from the project if the ships failed to 
meet the RAN’s requirements or turned out to be “unacceptably costly.” However, the USN 
and the US Department of Defense resisted changes requested by Australia (p. 44). The 
Agreement also included a limited “offset-type” provision to make Australian industry 
manufacture and supply components for the RAN and the USN FFGs. The actual FMS 
arrangement, as opposed to what was initially envisaged, frustrated all such local content 
initiatives and restricted the scope for Australian industry participation. A lesson drawn from 
this experience was that “in future, it was necessary to sign deeds of agreement with the 
prime contractors before negotiating a Letter of Offer and Acceptance with the US 
government” (p. 44).  Another lesson drawn was that Australian industry was not competitive 
enough to win work on its own merit and that earlier participation of potential suppliers was 
needed at the project planning stages if any in-project import substitution was to be 
achieved (p. 45). 
By the end of the 1970s, it was apparent that the naval shipbuilding sector in 
Australia was suffering from deeply ingrained systemic problems. Industrial relations were 
particularly bad as naval shipyards were seen by both the unions and the shipyard 
management as Defence-funded sheltered workshops (Parliament of Australia, 2006). The 
Department of Defence lacked the ability to specify its needs precisely enough to prevent 
endemic requirements creep. It also lacked effective contracting skills. This was an 
important limitation as changing technologies, especially the growing use of electronics and 
information technology, made naval vessels increasingly complex and knowledge-intensive. 
Project management skills were also lacking in defence and there were shortages of critical 
shipbuilding skills at naval yards.  
Fresh start 
The 1976 Defence White Paper foreshadowed aspirations to develop local defence 
industry capabilities to enhance Australia’s defence self-reliance. In line with this aim, the 
Australian Frigate Project (AFP) was initiated in 1978. The FFG-7 Class frigate would be 
constructed locally to an imported design that was seen as flexible enough to accommodate 
high local content requirements. In 1980, the government decided to build two FFG-7 
frigates at the Williamstown dockyard, providing that the shipyard “demonstrated its capacity 
to build the ships to the RAN’s requirements” (pp. 46-47).  
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The arrival of a new Labor government in 1983 brought with it the re-affirmation of 
the self-reliance objectives, accompanied by a commitment to microeconomic reform aimed 
at increasing the competitiveness of Australian manufacturing industry. The government 
was keen to build warships in-country providing that significant improvements in shipyard 
productivity could be negotiated and delivered. Preferably, this was to be achieved through 
transferring ownership to the private sector. Privatisation of government factories and 
shipyards, including naval shipbuilding facilities, was seen by the government as an 
essential part of its broader package of “microeconomic” reform. The new government was 
also ready to confront unions by resisting their demands to build a tanker at Cockatoo Island 
“ultimately condemning the yard to extinction” (p. 47). 
The two FFGs were to be built at the Williamstown dockyard providing that its 
productivity could be lifted, cost and schedule discipline imposed, and a series of 
enforceable agreements concluded to tighten work practices and restrict the drift of product 
specifications. A contract between the Department of Defence (customer) and the 
Department of Defence Support (contractor) was signed in 1983 for the two ships to be 
delivered between 1992 and 1994. The contract was to facilitate extensive local industry 
involvement to enhance national defence self-reliance and navy preparedness. As revealed 
by the 1986 review of the project by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts, the project 
budget included a cost premium for the local build of about 30% (p. 48). In 1987, the 
government sold the Williamstown naval dockyard, with the FFG arrangement, to the 
Australian Marine Engineering Corporation (AMEC). The privatisation of the yard turned out 
to be a very successful initiative. Both ships were launched by AMEC ahead of their initially 
agreed schedule and within the original cost estimates (in real terms). The only real cost 
increase was attributed to the privatisation process per se. Further, local industry content 
accounted for 90% of the AMEC-borne cost and 75% of the total project cost (Parliament of 
Australia, 2006). 
The second cycle: Back on track 
While the beginning of the second shipbuilding cycle may be associated with the 
FFG project, it really unfolded in the late-1980s. The 1987 Defence White Paper reaffirmed 
the Labor government’s commitment to the development of competitive local defence 
industry capabilities, particularly in the shipbuilding sector, and to the policy of defence self-
reliance. The second cycle got under way following the government’s decision to build six 
Collins Class submarines, awarding the contract to the Australian Submarine Corporation in 
1987; and ten ANZAC (Meko 200 Class) frigates, the contract going to the AMEC-
Blohm+Voss consortium in 1989. In 1994, another major contract was awarded to the then 
Australian Defence Industries (ADI)—now Thales—this time to build, to an Italian design, six 
Huon Class coastal minehunters. The final contract in the second cycle was signed in 2003 
with Defence Maritime Services Pty (DMS), a joint venture between P&O Maritime Services 
and Serco Australia for the delivery of 14 Armidale Class patrol boats. The fleet was built by 
Austal Ships Ltd., Australia’s largest commercial shipbuilder, and is to be fully supported by 
DMS throughout its service life (Kerr, 2008a). The second cycle also included some minor 
naval construction (e.g., Freedom Class patrol boats and hydrographic ships). In contrast to 
previous periods, nearly all ships required by the RAN during the second cycle were built in-
country. The main projects of the second cycle are discussed below. 
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Collins Class submarine project 
To facilitate building submarines in Australia, the Australian Submarine Corporation 
(ASC) was established in 1985 as a joint venture between Sweden’s Kockums (as 
shipbuilder and designer holding 49% of the company’s shares), the Australian government-
owned Australian Industry Development Corporation (49%) and Wormalds International and 
Chicago Bridge and Iron (holding the 2% balance of shares). In 1987, ASC was chosen as 
the prime contractor for the fixed cost Aus$3.9 billion (1986 prices) project to deliver six 
submarines. With over 73% local content for the six platforms, at least 3,500 suppliers, and 
1,600 individual contracts (Parliament of Australia,2006, p. 56), the project was “Australia’s 
most ambitious and technically advanced defence project ever” (McIntosh & Prescott, 1999, 
p. 5). 
The submarines experienced much publicised teething problems but were eventually 
acclaimed as “world class” (Parliament of Australia, op. cit.). The main early problem was 
attributed to a decision to acquire a sophisticated combat data system (CDS) independently 
of the platform design when the most straightforward approach would have been to select a 
design with the CDS fitted as standard (Woolner, 2006, p. 72). This was compounded by 
Navy’s preference for the CDS to be developed in order to meet its unique requirements 
rather than purchased as a military-off-the-shelf (MOTS) system (Woolner, 2001, p. 9). “By 
including the combat system with the platform in the single prime contract, with a unique 
military specification, Defence left itself widen open to […] technological problems” 
(McIntosh & Prescott, 1999). By 1993, it had become apparent that Rockwell, the CDS sub-
contractor and designer, was not able to meet Navy’s specifications. Nevertheless, Defence 
did not authorise a replacement MOTS system. The first submarine was provisionally 
accepted into service in 1996 with the combat system incomplete and, by the late 1990s, the 
Collins Class project had become a major embarrassment for Defence and the government. 
In 1999, the government terminated the failed CDS sub-contract and sought another 
CDS contractor through open competition. In 2001, however, the government decided to 
scrap the tender process and awarded the contract to the US firm Raytheon. Later that year, 
the RAN and the USN signed an agreement to cooperate in equipment-sourcing and logistic 
support and to enhance Collins Class interoperability with US ships. The German STN Atlas 
was also awarded a contract for sonar and navigation equipment (Parliament of Australia, 
2006, pp. 59-60). 
The sequence in which the six hulls were constructed allowed for little learning by 
doing. As a former high-ranking naval officer argued during a 2006 parliamentary inquiry, 
“there is a need to have an increased gap between the lead ship of a class and its 
successor. The lead ship needs to be evaluated and give the all clear before the successor 
is completed” (Parliament of Australia, 2006, footnote 31, p 59). Instead, the ships were 
largely batch-manufactured and batch-constructed. While economies of scale and scope are 
unavoidably lost through fragmenting the sequence of ship construction, there is more 
opportunity to alter the specifications of successor ships by learning from the in-service 
performance of their predecessors. This principle of “spiral” or incremental new capability 
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formation was well understood and practiced in Sweden where the Collins Class design 
originated.58 
Criticism has also been directed towards how the project was commissioned and 
managed by Defence. A fixed-price contract was used to avoid cost overruns associated 
with traditional cost-plus contracts, and to shift most product- and (construction) process-
related risks from the Commonwealth to the contractor. However, the use of a fixed-price 
contract for that reason was flawed on three accounts: 
 for a country lacking experience as the builder of modern, sophisticated weapons 
systems, the magnitude of the technological challenge inherent in this project was 
grossly underestimated by both by the ASC as a contractor and by Defence as a 
customer. There was too much reliance on Kockums’ expertise as a builder of 
submarine platforms and a rather poor understanding of technological challenges 
posed by the development of the bespoke CDS. In such circumstances, the 
Commonwealth (Defence) might have realised the limitations of risk-shifting between 
the parties and, instead, relied on risk-sharing mechanisms such as those provided 
by incentive contracts and risk mitigation through more collaborative management of 
the project; 
 given the developmental nature of the project, the use of a fixed  price contract 
provides little effective protection for the buyer (Defence) since contract variations 
are inevitable. An ex-ante fixed-price contract may in reality, become an ex-post, 
cost-plus arrangement. If contract variations are regularly approved, there is no 
incentive for the contractor to seek cost efficiencies. It would have been preferable to 
use a flexible form of contract to allow for learning, to provide incentives to improve 
and share risks rather than to end up with the de facto cost-plus arrangement 
dressed up as a fixed-price contract; and 
 a belief that project risk could be shifted to the contractor to reduce the 
Commonwealth’s exposure was naïve, given the ASC equity structure. With its 49% 
share of equity, the Commonwealth was both the sole buyer of the ships and a key 
shareholder on the supply side. In 2000, when Kockums was acquired by the 
German submarine builder HDW, the Australian government stepped in to buy the 
Kockums’ share of ASC equity.  
This contractual debacle was summarised by an Australian parliamentary researcher 
thus: 
The most compelling lesson that can be learnt from the Collins submarine program is 
the importance of selecting the procurement strategy to suit the nature of the project. 
In hindsight, the point where it was decided to develop a unique design for the new 
submarines was the time to change the procurement strategy. (Woolner, 2001, p. 47) 
The nationalisation of ASC was an embarrassment for a government overtly 
committed to the privatisation process: “There was more than a touch of irony in the fact that 
                                                
58 Sweden has traditionally ordered its submarines in very small batches to allow for benefits of 
learning-by-doing and technological change to be continuously absorbed into subsequent designs—
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after decades of effort to transfer all defence production capability to commercial industry, 
the Government finds itself the owner of ASC” (ASPI, 2002, p. 24). But, the nationalisation 
of ASC also exposed a more serious flaw in the procurement philosophy that was inherent 
in the Collins Class acquisition. Under the original contract, Kockums retained much IP in 
the vessel’s design. The ASC shareholding arrangement made it difficult to determine the 
ownership of various IP changes to the original design, new IP elements and the associated 
body of design data that were critical to access if ASC was to carry on as the ship’s 
maintainer and modifier. The resultant legal dispute took until 2004 to resolve. Under the 
new arrangement, Kockums owns the legacy IP but ASC has full access to it (Parliament of 
Australia, 2006, p. 55).  
The introduction of sensitive US technology into the vessels and the involvement of 
the US firm Electric Boat as a capability partner with ASC added another degree of 
complexity to the IP dispute. The inadequacies of the Collins Class technology management 
highlight the critical importance of access to proprietary technological know-how and IP in all 
knowledge-intensive projects. This is often poorly understood in large, technologically 
complex, developmental projects in which a detailed design does not exist at the time a 
contract to proceed with the project is signed. Thus, a classic “hold-up” relationship may 
emerge between the parties as the buyer belatedly realises that its ownership of an asset is 
incomplete without the transfer of all IP. The incompleteness of ownership rights imposes 
severe limitations on who is allowed to maintain the asset and who has the right to modify it. 
By the time the buyer becomes aware of such problems, the cost of contract re-negotiation 
may be prohibitive and opportunities for switching suppliers limited. This problem is 
compounded when the product design incorporates “black boxes,” which can only be 
accessed by the original supplier or its agent and which are subject to technology 
restrictions imposed by the supplier’s home government.     
In sum, the Collins Class project “exposed serious flaws in defence’s procurement 
processes” (Parliament of Australia, 2006, p. 57). Its well-publicised difficulties were not only 
embarrassing for the government but also made the government determined to change the 
nature of its principal-agent relationship with Defence. Following yet another review of new 
capability formation and procurement management by Defence (Kinnaird Report), the 
government decided to restructure the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO—its 
procurement agency) into a “prescribed agency” (partially detached from Defence and 
reporting directly to the government) to handle defence procurement and through-life 
capability support. In particular, DMO was to foster the kind of professional project 
management expertise required to bring rigour and experience into the procurement 
process and to end the long tradition of well-intended and energetic but sometimes 
amateurish project management. 
ANZAC frigate project 
At Aus$7 billion (2006 prices), the ANZAC Frigate project, was the largest single 
Defence design and construction contract awarded in Australia in the closing decades of the 
20th century. It was also the only European-style naval “workshare” contract.  There were 
two customers, the navies of Australia (eight ships) and New Zealand (two ships) and the 
industry workload was shared between the two countries. It was expected that neither navy 
would cross-subsidise the shipbuilding costs of the other; sub-contractors were to be 
selected competitively; and the achieved workshare between the two countries was to 
reflect the overall cost shares. The frigates were assembled at the recently privatised AMEC 
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shipyard at Williamstown with modules built at this and other shipyards in Australia and New 
Zealand. During the contract life, the shipbuilder changed its name twice to finally become 
Tenix Marine Division of Tenix Defence Pty Ltd. (Parliament of Australia, 2006). By the early 
2000s, Tenix Defence—incorporating the marine division—had become one of Australia’s 
largest defence contractors. 
Despite its initially limited experience as a shipbuilder, Tenix completed the project 
on schedule and on budget. This outcome was helped by the modular ship construction and 
by a collaborative and highly synergistic arrangement with SAAB, the combat system 
supplier, to test the combat system prior to installation (Tasman Asia Pacific, 2000, p 9). A 
requirement for the project was to achieve high levels of local content (the then government 
policy of Australian Industry Involvement, AII). This was in part accomplished through 
effective sub-contracting with the help of the Industrial Supplies Office (ISO), an agency set 
up to assist small and medium sized enterprises (SME) in broadening their customer base. 
The search for subcontractors to meet the AII target sometimes involved what a Tenix 
manager described59 as “reverse garage sales,” i.e., components were put on display and 
SMEs were invited to decide which of these products could be made locally. This approach 
to sub-contracting has been acclaimed as a factor contributing to the project’s cost and 
schedule discipline and copied by other projects (Tasman Asia Pacific, 2000).  
In 2001, Tenix, SAAB and the DMO (Defence) signed a tripartite long-term alliance 
agreement (the first of its kind) to provide in-service support for the ANZACs and to 
collaborate in future modifications and capability enhancements of the class (Parliament of 
Australia, 2006). This agreement concluded Tenix’ involvement in the second shipbuilding 
cycle and positioned the company favourably as a bidder for construction work in the third 
cycle (see below). 
Minehunter coastal project  
In 1989, Australian Defence Industries (ADI) was formed as a corporatised, 
government-owned entity set up to consolidate major defence industry facilities still in 
government ownership. This included naval engineering at the Garden Island dockyard in 
Sydney. ADI was awarded the prime contract for the Huon Class minehunters, based on an 
Italian design but with ADI as the designated design authority to modify and Australianise 
the design. The Aus$ 917 million (1994 prices) project was the first Australian-sourced naval 
project in which the local prime contractor was given design authority (p. 67). The six ships 
were built on schedule at a greenfield site facility employing new, ‘greenfield’ labour force 
(Parliament of Australia, 2006). The first composite hull was made in Italy and the remaining 
five in Australia. The key to tight schedule success was an onshore facility that integrated 
and tested the combat system prior to installation (Tasman Economics, 2002, p. 9). As with 
ANZAC frigates, the Huon Class also complied with a high local content target of nearly 
70%. 
In 1999, the French Thales and Australian company Transfield bought ADI from the 
Federal Government as a 50-50 venture (Parliament of Australia, 2006. p. 71). In 2006, 
Thales Australia was granted government permission to acquire the Transfield’s share and 
consolidate it with its other Australian assets. This acquisition has turned Thales into one of 
                                                
59 During one of the authors’ visit to the Williamstown shipyard in the mid-1990s. 
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Australia’s largest defence contractors and a key naval repair, maintenance and upgrade 
contractor. 
FFG upgrade project  
In contrast with the very successful minehunter project, ADI’s Aus$1 billion upgrade 
of four FFGs has been plagued with problems. This project, commissioned in 1999, involves 
the upgrade of ships’ combat systems. Initially, it was to cover six ships but as the first ship 
was delivered three years late (in 2006) and over budget, the project scope was reduced to 
four vessels. The upgrade is very extensive and has required advanced design and 
engineering work, including the ADI-designed and developed Australian Distributed 
Architecture Combat System (Parliament of Australia, 2006, p. 69). However, “the 
Department of Defence noted that while ADI is viable in the ship repair and upgrade activity, 
it is having problems in meeting schedule and performance specifications” (p. 69). 
Comments such as this cast doubt on Thales’ chances of success in the next shipbuilding 
cycle, even though in 2007, it was Australia’s largest defence contractor (Hinz, 2007-2008). 
Armidale patrol boats and multihulls  
In Australia, there are two relatively small but internationally competitive commercial 
builders of aluminium multi-hulls: Austal Ships Ltd (Austal) and Incat. While they have no 
experience building large steel vessels, both companies have established market niches in 
wave piercing multi-hulls, fast multi-hull ferries and luxury motor yachts. Both companies 
have also been successful exporters and are well regarded internationally for their 
innovative designs.  
In 2003, Austal won an Aus$553 million project to build 14 Armidale Class patrol 
boats—the last major contract of the second shipbuilding cycle. This contract was innovative 
in that Defence’s requirements were framed in terms of operational performance 
specifications (e.g., operational availability) rather than set as detailed technical guidelines 
for ship designers.  
In 2001, Austal also opened a US shipbuilding facility in Mobile, Alabama. From this 
foothold in the US shipbuilding market Austal operates as part of the General Dynamics 
team building prototype littoral combat ships (LCS) for the US Navy. Austal’s role is to 
design and build the LCS platform for USN.60 Austal is the only Australian naval shipbuilder 
to be involved in foreign direct investment in offshore construction facility while retaining its 
core design team in Australia.  
In the early 2000s, Incat sold and leased out high-speed catamarans to naval users, 
including the Australian Defence and the US Department of Defense. However, while the 
adaptability of these civil ship designs to military uses provides an example of dual-
technology opportunities inherent in civilian designs, the company has no intention to 
expand its operations into naval shipbuilding (Parliament of Australia, 2006, p. 74). Other 
small shipbuilders and repairers include Forgacs with its facilities in Newcastle and 
Brisbane, and NQEA based in Cairns. 
                                                
60 If the LCS program proceeds, the US LCS trimaran project may involve the building of 60 vessels 
at a cost of US$15 billion (Parliament of Australia, 2006, p. 72). 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 371 - 
=
=
Third post-war cycle 
Based on the 2006 Defence Capability Plan (DCP) and anticipated upgrades and 
maintenance, Defence intends to spend about Aus$30.5 billion (2006 prices) on naval 
construction and sustainment programs between 2006 and 2025 (ADO, 2006b, para. 3.4). 
While the proportion of local content differs from project to project, about Aus$19 billion 
(63%) could be spent in Australia. 
At the start of the third construction cycle in 2007, much Defence demand for naval 
construction and through-life support work over the subsequent period was committed under 
supply arrangements already in place or soon to be finalised. These included: 
 the sustainment contracts for ANZAC frigates (Tenix Marine with SAAB as the 
combat systems integrator), Collins Class submarines (ASC with Raytheon as the 
combat systems integrator), and Armidale Class patrol boats (Defence Maritime 
Services); 
 a construction contract for three air warfare destroyers (AWD) awarded to ASC, 
based on the Spanish Navantia design (see below), and a contract with Raytheon for 
the AWD combat system, which is likely to be followed by a future contract for 
through-life support with the two companies; and 
 a contract for two landing helicopter dock (LHD) ships awarded to Tenix Marine, 
again based on Navantia design, which is also well positioned to win a future 
contract for the LHD sustainment support. 
The early commitment of such a large proportion of the 2006-2018 spend limits the 
scope available to Defence to attract new competition into the domestically located market 
before the onset of the fourth shipbuilding cycle around 2018. Although the support 
arrangements for the AWDs and LHDs are yet to be decided when their construction phase 
draws to a close (the first ships are expected to be delivered in 2012-2013), the logic of 
Defence sustainment requirements favours the existing supplier consortia. 
Also, with the resource export boom in the late 2000s and, thus, tight labour markets, 
Defence has an incentive to build non-combatant vessels overseas. At an international level, 
competition is already strong and the competitiveness of the market could be reinforced by 
the availability of second-hand civil ships that could be adapted locally or overseas for 
Australian use.   
Defence continues to source overseas designs for its major platforms (e.g., AWDs 
and LHDs). However, past schedule slippages and cost overruns have reduced its appetite 
for extensive Australianisation. As the success of the Spanish Navantia in winning the AWD 
and LHD contracts has demonstrated, overseas shipbuilders with successful designs 
adopted by a foreign parent navy will be able to compete for work in Australia by teaming 
with Australian prime contractors. Over the past 20 years, this preference for imported 
designs has produced competition between design-based consortia of shipbuilders, 
integrators and OEMs, fronted by domestic prime contractors but also including overseas 
designers and suppliers. This form of competition, and the increased market contestability 
resulting from the threat of foreign entry, has benefited Defence in that it has produced 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 372 - 
=
=
Naval Maritime Industry 
Shipbuilders and ship repairers 
The traditional concept of “naval maritime industry” focuses essentially on shipyard-
based shipbuilding and ship repair/maintenance activities. In this narrowly focused approach 
to defining the industry, ship assembly and module manufacturing are included as long as 
module building and component manufacture are undertaken by specialised shipbuilders. 
Second-tier suppliers of major maritime equipment such as power plants or navionics, 
normally OEMs, and maritime service providers such as naval architects and surveyors are 
also included. However, jobbing firms supplying components made-to-order are likely to be 
excluded as are most third-tier subcontractors.  
Another distinction has traditionally been drawn between shipbuilding, including 
capability upgrades and ship sustainment (maintenance and repair, including battle damage 
rectification). These two sub-sectors are essentially shipyard-based, using specialised 
infrastructure such as dry docks and sea lifts. In Australia, these two sectors have tended to 
operate in parallel, with the yards involved in ship repair and maintenance separated from 
those used in shipbuilding (e.g., the Garden Island dockyard specialising in ship repair while 
the Williamstown dockyard is used to integrate new vessels). This division of labour has 
evolved to allow platforms, once constructed by specialised and often overseas-based 
shipbuilders, to be maintained and repaired by “jobbing” repair yards with on-board 
equipment supported by OEMs and jobbing contractors. This division of labour often 
required long supply chains linking OEMs to maintenance shipyards and led to delays in the 
availability of parts and long repair turnaround times. 
Changes to the traditional division of labour between shipbuilding and ship 
repair/maintenance were driven by the growing complexity of platforms: ships were 
becoming increasingly automated, requiring the integration of on-board equipment into 
larger, network-based and knowledge-intensive systems. Sophisticated ships such as 
modern submarines and AWDs are increasingly maintained by their builders, companies 
that retain the IP they have created in platform design and/or work closely with the design 
authority to protect and support the integrity of ship design. The retention of or access to 
design IP, the use of dedicated facilities and the tacitness of ship-specific knowledge gained 
during the construction phase underpin the shipbuilders’ competitive advantage in through-
life upgrade and maintenance work. Thus, strong synergies (economies of scope) have 
come to exist between the construction and sustainment phases of naval capability. Also, 
when ships are built in small batches with long gaps between shipbuilding cycles, resources 
used in construction (e.g., specialised labour, docking facilities) may subsequently be 
redeployed in fleet sustainment.  
In Australia, this synergistic relationship between ship construction and sustainment 
phases was first exploited in the Collins Class submarine project: the Osborne construction 
facility in South Australia is dedicated to the production and deep maintenance (full docking) 
cycles of the class. However, routine maintenance work is undertaken in Western Australia, 
where the ships are home-ported. This model of “construction-enabled” ship maintenance 
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has now been adopted in the sustainment of other vessels (e.g., the ANZACs) and is also 
likely to be used in support of future additions to the fleet (e.g., AWDs and LHDs).61  
Australia’s naval shipbuilding activity is largely confined to four main shipbuilders: 
ASC, Tenix Marine, Thales (ADI) and Austal. Of these, ASC and Austal are currently 
Australian-owned while Thales is a fully owned subsidiary of the French parent company 
and, in 2008, BAE Systems was finalising the acquisition of Tenix Marine.62 As the third 
post-war building cycle began to unfold, three of these companies were involved in the 
construction of the AWDs, LHDs, and afloat support ships; the progressive upgrades of 
ANZAC and FFG frigates, the Collins Class submarines, minehunters and other minor war 
vessels; and maintenance of the fleet-in-being. Defence Maritime Services (DMS) are 
responsible for the maintenance of Armidale Class patrol boats built by Austal. (Some 
module building and consolidation work and maintenance activity has been undertaken by 
smaller maritime suppliers such as Forgacs, with facilities in Newcastle and Brisbane, and 
NQEA in Cairns.) The three shipbuilders and DMS are also the main providers of naval 
sustainment support the submarine deep and intermediate maintenance cycles, ANZAC and 
FFG frigate sustainment, support for minehunters, patrol boats, and other minor war 
vessels. 
Facility disposition and ownership 
In the 2000s, Defence’s preferred industry disposition reflects the RAN’s fleet basing 
strategy, which envisages the maintenance and home-porting of major surface ships on the 
east coast of Australia (Sydney) at Fleet Base East (FBE) and on the west coast (near 
Perth) at Fleet Base West (FBW). The submarines are home ported and maintained at FBW 
but all full-cycle dockings (deep maintenance) are carried out in South Australia. Minor war 
vessels are mostly home-ported and supported in Darwin and Cairns. 
The home-porting of naval vessels at FBW has spawned the development of navy-
preparedness-related industries in close proximity to the ships they support. Thus, in 
addition to major shipbuilders and repairers (e.g., Tenix Marine, ASC, Austal), other 
designers and builders of aluminium boats and ships and engineering firms supporting 
resource projects have clustered in Western Australia, in particular at the Australian Marine 
Complex (AMC) in Henderson. There appear to be strong agglomeration economies that 
naval firms can gain by locating at AMC. There is also more scope for forging direct 
business links between firms that operate in close proximity.  
In the previous naval shipbuilding cycle, ownership of capital-intensive facilities (e.g., 
shiplifts and dry docks) was a key characteristic of naval shipbuilders. This is still largely the 
case; however, the high cost of establishing and maintaining such facilities constitutes a 
formidable barrier to entry into the Australian market for naval shipbuilding and repair. The 
                                                
61 Under this model of construction-enabled ship maintenance, two major contracts were let. In 2001, 
Defence signed a long-term alliance agreement, underpinned by a through-life support contract, with 
Tenix Marine (shipbuilder) and SAAB (system integrator) covering the development of all future 
capability change packages for the ANZAC ships. In 2003, it signed another long-term contract with 
ASC for the 25-year, through-life support for the Collins Class submarines. 
62 However, in 2007, Tenix Defence, including its Tenix Marine Division, was offered for sale and BAE 
Systems Australia was rumored to be the most probable buyer. Also, as ASC is likely to be offered for 
sale in the late 2000s, Australian subsidiaries of major foreign companies may be invited to bid for it. 
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provision of these facilities involves high-fixed costs, which can only be recouped over the 
long term and which even the largest marine companies have difficulty absorbing in the 
relatively small Australian market. An example of such a facility is the shiplift/transfer system 
operated by Tenix Marine’s facility also located at Henderson, WA. This facility was initially 
funded by Defence and the WA State Government but subsequently sold to Tenix Marine 
(Tenix, 2001). Apparently dissatisfied with this arrangement, the West Australian (state) 
government developed, adjacent to the Tenix facility, a protected deepwater harbour—a 
15,000 tonne service and heavy lift wharf, and several other facilities, including offices, 
workshops and other amenities. This investment, completed in mid-2003, is owned by the 
State Government and operated by AMC Management (WA) Pty Ltd as a common user 
facility (CUF). While Tenix’ Henderson facility is maintained by the company for its own use, 
the CUF is deliberately designed for multiple users, including the oil and gas, resources, 
marine and defence industries and is sufficiently large to accommodate several projects 
simultaneously. Parties using the facility provide their own management and workforce and 
accept normal project accountabilities. They use the CUF only when their projects require it 
and are charged only for the specific facilities they use for a particular period. This 
arrangement greatly reduces project set-up costs and company overheads, thereby 
enhancing CUF-users’ potential ability to win contracts. 
Initial infrastructural investments in the Henderson CUF attracted complementary 
private investment on land adjacent to the marine complex (e.g., ASC is establishing its 
submarine maintenance facility there). In response to these developments, the West 
Australian government invested an additional Aus$81.5 million in a floating dock to launch 
and dock large ships and a rail transfer system to allow construction and repair within the 
CUF’s undercover facilities; an extension and upgrade of the existing wharves to 
accommodate all types of naval and commercial vessels; and the installation of marine 
services such as power, seawater fire main, wharf communications and sewerage off-take. 
The South Australian government followed suit with plans to invest Aus$300 million 
in Techport Australia, including a CUF adjacent to ASC in Osborne (Kerr, 2008b, p. 2).  The 
SA CUF is scheduled for completion in 2010 and, like its WA counterpart, is intended to 
support multiple projects concurrently. The nearest equivalents to such infrastructure on the 
east coast are the Captain Cook Dock (leased by the Commonwealth to Thales at Garden 
Island, Sydney).  
The introduction of CUFs funded by state governments and, subject to leasing 
arrangements, on-going Commonwealth ownership of the Captain Cook Dock combine to 
reduce the significance of facilities ownership as a barrier to entry, particularly in the market 
for naval ship repair. As an indicator of policy trends, they also suggest a reappraisal of the 
value of public ownership of assets which governments were so determined to privatise in 
the late 1980s and 1990s. 
Changing division of labour 
The impact of defence procurement on industry was traditionally viewed in terms of 
the relationship between an agency responsible for defence procurement and the prime 
contractors with which it negotiated. These days, however, it is recognised that effective 
procurement depends on the activities and performance of a much wider range of industry 
players, domestically and overseas.  
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Defence considers the naval maritime industry in broad terms that embrace not only 
shipbuilders and maintainers but also a myriad of second- and third-tier SME suppliers 
(ADO, 2006a, paras. 1.18-1.20). The latter reportedly account for some 70% of the total cost 
of a shipbuilding project.63 As noted in the Defence submission to the 2006 Senate Inquiry, a 
typical frigate comprises some 170,000 parts and components provided by 600 suppliers 
and sub-contractors and takes 1.2 million person-hours, spread over 22 months, to 
construct. A large conventional submarine may consist of some 500,000 parts provided by 
1,600 suppliers and takes 2.5 million person-hours and 60 months to construct (ADO, 
2006a, Figure 1).  
Table 1 shows the stylized breakdown of typical warship production costs that 
includes all on-board combat systems but excludes capability elements that are shore, 
rather than ship-based. In the table, the platform element of capability accounts for 33% of 
the total production cost for a more technologically complex naval combatant: a 3,500 tonne 
frigate costs about Aus$600 million to build, while on-board combat systems account for 
42% of the cost. The other two cost items are largely platform-related and represent the cost 
of logistic support acquired during the construction phase and the cost of project (delivery 
process) management. By way of comparison, for a large naval support ship constructed 
closer to commercial standards, on-board combat systems account for only 15% of all costs 
and the platform for 47% of the total. For a naval combatant capability, therefore, the 
combat systems component of the overall system is the most important element, both in 
cost and functional terms. This is reversed in the case of the naval support capability. For a 
typical combatant ship, imported combat systems and other major equipment account for 
50% of the construction cost (para. 2.5). For technologically complex vessels, such as the 
submarines and the AWDs, the proportion is likely to be much higher. 
Table 1 Percentage Cost Breakdown in Warship Production 
(Based on ADP, 2006a, Table 1, para. 2.2)   








Platform design, hull, machinery and equipment               3 47  
Combat systems 41 15  
Logistics support and training (mostly platform-related) 17 25  
Project management                9                            13 
Total                                                              100             100 
 
In Australia, combat systems integrators (e.g., Raytheon, Thales, BAE Systems) and 
OEMs (e.g., STN Atlas) are either subsidiaries or agents of major overseas companies (with 
                                                
63 These suppliers are said to contribute “70% by value of a project” (ADO, 2006a, para. 1.18). 
However, the third-tier contractors, as well as other tiers of suppliers, should not be seen as a 
reflection of a hierarchical industry structure. These relationships are project-specific. Thus, a large 
firm that is engaged as a prime contractor in one project may be a third-tier, sub-contractor in 
another.   
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 376 - 
=
=
the notable exception of CEA Technologies). In the early 2000s, the Australian industrial 
footprint of these multinational companies varied from significant (Raytheon, Thales) to 
small (Lockheed Martin). The footprint could, in most cases, be flexibly expanded or shrunk, 
depending on the quantity of in-country work in hand. Much has been claimed by these 
subsidiaries for their direct access to the parent company’s global network and technology. 
However, Defence has at times observed, “experience indicates that they have difficulty 
obtaining suitable licensing and intellectual property rights which in turn may have time and 
cost implications particularly in providing sustainment” (ADO, 2006a, para. 2.9). For this 
reason, the Commonwealth sometimes facilitates technology transfers using government-to-
government arrangements (e.g., the US FMS framework) to secure access to sensitive 
foreign equipment, military technologies and IP (e.g., the direct purchase of the US Aegis 
combat system for the AWDs by Defence from the US Navy under the FMS arrangement). 
Such Commonwealth action has direct implications for the role of prime contractors, an 
issue we address below.   
Critical to the provision of through-life support is access to the IP behind the ship 
design. At the smaller-vessel end of the naval market, Austal is, arguably, the only 
Australian shipbuilder offering world competitive naval design expertise for multi-hull 
aluminium vessels.64 For larger and/or more complex ships, Australia has been an importer 
of ship design, usually from parent navy ship designers such as the German Blohm+Voss 
for Meko 200 Class frigates (ANZAC ships) and the Swedish Kockums for the Collins Class 
submarines. However, design adaptation to meet the Australian Navy’s unique requirements 
and political pressures to increase local content have resulted in considerable 
Australianisation of original designs. In the Collins Class case, this was further complicated 
by the transfer of ASC ownership to the Commonwealth. It was only when the 
Commonwealth negotiated full access to the Kockums-owned IP that ASC became the de 
facto design authority for the class of which the RAN is the parent navy. Similarly, Tenix 
Defence is the de facto design authority for ANZAC ships. The Huon Class minehunter was 
“the first Australian-sourced naval defence project in which the prime contractor (ADI now 
Thales) was given design authority” (para. 4.39, our italics). This is in marked contrast to the 
ANZAC ship and Collins Class projects, in which Tenix and ASC effectively became design 
authorities by default. 
Defence appears to be determined to avoid excessive Australianisation in ship 
design in the next generation of vessels to be constructed in Australia: the AWDs, LHDs and 
afloat support ships. For example, in the case of AWDs, the government overruled Navy’s 
reported preference for the unproven Gibbs & Cox adaptation of the Arleigh Burke destroyer 
in favour of the already-operational Spanish design based on the Navantia-built F100 
destroyer (Walters, 2007, 1 March, p. 8). 
Marine Industry Supply Chains 
Defence’s broader approach to what constitutes the naval marine industry has also 
shifted the emphasis from functionally based naval industry sectors, such as shipbuilders, 
OEMs and ship repairers, to capability-centered supply chains that include combat systems 
integrators and the plethora of second- and third-tier suppliers, many straddling sectoral 
                                                
64 This is reflected in its aforementioned involvement as a ship designer and potential builder in the 
General Dynamics-led bid for the US Navy Littoral Combat Ship. 
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divisions and serving different customers in different industries. While the functional 
representation is helpful in identifying firms largely dedicated to shipbuilding and fleet 
sustainment, the supply chain framework sheds more light on the competitive dynamics of 
defence capability supply.  
Two types of prime contractor arrangements and, thus, supply chain structures, have 
dominated the interface between Defence and Australian naval shipbuilders: 
 a traditional single channel model, under which a single prime contractor is engaged 
by Defence to lead and manage the supply chain and to orchestrate all the back-to-
back contracts with upstream suppliers of systems, equipment, components and 
services; and 
 a complex multi-channel model, in which two or more prime contractors are engaged 
by Defence to lead and manage parallel supply channels that jointly produce the 
required capability element. 
 These two models are used both in shipbuilding and through-life fleet sustainment. 
To illustrate, consider Figure 1, in which two stylized traditional supply chain 
management (SCM) models are shown: one for the construction of a support ship and 
another for a major weapons upgrade.65 In the shipbuilding case, the shipbuilder is also a 
prime contractor who engages a system integrator and OEMs as well as a large number of 
small second- and third-tier subcontractors to produce the end product: a platform with all 
systems and equipment integrated into it or on it. Although the ship design is likely to be 
imported and Australianised, it is a relatively simple design. Given its role in the process, the 
prime contractor, as the project’s manager, accounts for about 13% of the total project cost. 
In the weapons upgrade case, much greater weight (and cost share) is assigned to combat 
system integration but project management by the prime contractor still accounts for about 
12% of the total project cost.    
                                                
65 The figure has been stylized using total project cost breakdown by project elements shown in ADO 
(2006a, Table 1, p. 8). Thus, the cost of “platform design” is imputed to Platform Designer; the cost of 
“combat systems” is imputed to Combat System Integrator; and the cost of “project management” to 
Prime Contractor. The cost of “hull, machinery, equipment” and “logistics support, including training” 
is attributed to Shipyard (operator) and OEMs. Other second- and third-tier suppliers are included in 
OEM, Shipyard and Combat Integration cost elements. 
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Figure 1  Conventional Value Chains for Support Ship and Weapons Upgrade: 
Total Project Cost Breakdown by Supplier Category 
(Based on ADO, 2006a, Table 1, p. 8) 
 
The conventional prime contracting model has traditionally been used by Defence as 
a risk management arrangement under which the prime contractor is expected to manage 
and mitigate risks associated with the operation of the supply chain. This model was used 
by Defence during the second building cycle in all major shipbuilding projects, initially 
including the Collins Class submarines. But the conventional model failed the test when the 
Collins Class project ran into problems with combat system integration. By 1993, Rockwell, 
the combat systems integrator, was not able to comply with Navy’s specifications and “ASC 
effectively lost control of the Rockwell sub-contract” (Parliament of Australia, 2006, para. 
4.18). As noted earlier, the solution involved replacing the original combat system integrator 
and Defence awarding the contract to Raytheon in 2001 (Parliament of Australia, 2006). 
Under this arrangement, Raytheon became a parallel prime contractor for system 
integration. To complicate the model further, “Defence itself has essentially primed” the 
subsequent Aus$500 million combat data system replacement program by purchasing the 
FMS-mediated software and working with ASC, Raytheon, Atlas Electronics and Thales 
Underwater Systems to integrate all combat systems (para. 4.20, our italics). 
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Figure 2 Complex Supply Chain for a Naval Combatant: Total Project Cost 
Breakdown by Supplier Category 
(Based on ADO, 2006a, Table 1, p. 8) 
 
The resulting structure is represented in Figure 2, which shows a complex, multi-
channel supply chain (say, for a frigate-type naval combatant). In the figure, the stylized 
supply chain involves two parallel channels of progressive value-adding activity: platform 
construction and systems integration. The figure highlights downstream activities (close to 
the end customer) such as project management, design, and platform integration along the 
platform construction supply channel and combat system integration along the systems 
integration channel. Further upstream are OEMs that provide equipment and subsystems for 
downstream platform and systems integrators and other second- and third-tier 
subcontractors who provide inputs for OEMs and downstream integration activities. Some of 
these smaller second- and third-tier contractors are specialised naval suppliers but most 
tend to be broadly based manufacturers and service providers. Also, some apparently small 
subcontractors (in terms of quantities and dollar value of supplies) are subsidiaries or agents 
of large producers of generic products. As we move from right to left along each supply 
channel, from downstream to upstream activities, suppliers are less likely to be dedicated to 
the production of naval systems. The reduced role of the prime contractor for the platform is 
indicated by the smaller proportion of the total project cost (9%). 
This representation of the naval construction supply chain for complex projects 
emphasises the changing concept of the prime contractor. In this case, there are two prime 
contractors operating in parallel, the shipbuilder (prime contractor for the platforms) and the 
systems integrator (prime contractor for the combat system). Shipbuilding activity accounts 
for nearly 60% of the total project cost and systems acquisition and integration for over 40%. 
The figure highlights an important aspect of complex naval ship construction: the 
management of the multi-channel supply chain is distributed between two or more prime 
contractors, each responsible for the orchestration/management of construction/integration 
activities along its particular supply channel. This at once raises a higher-level coordination 
problem: Defence, through its procurement agency DMO (shown in Figure 2 as a “capability 
prime”), is now responsible for coordinating the activities of the two (channel-specific) prime 
contractors. This necessarily implies that Defence cannot (as it has often sought to) adopt 
and maintain an arms-length relationship with its suppliers. The new model has already 
been applied in the acquisition of the AWDs via an alliance-based contracting strategy 
(Australian DoD, 2008). This strategy is given practical effect through an Alliance-based 
Target Incentive Agreement signed in October 2007 by the Defence Materiel Organisation, 
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ASC as the designated builder and prime contractor for the Navantia-designed AWD 
platform and Raytheon Australia as the combat system integrator.66 Defence is also directly 
involved in the supply chain management as it purchased directly from the US Navy the 
Aus$1 billion US Lockheed Martin Aegis combat system, which Raytheon is to integrate with 
the platform and other on-board systems. 
Competition for Large, Complex Projects   
During the second shipbuilding cycle, the competitive conduct of defence naval 
suppliers was assigned a pivotal role in achieving “value for money” for the Commonwealth 
and became a mantra of Defence procurement. Competition to take on the role of prime 
contractor for larger, complex naval projects took the form of rivalry among consortia formed 
between Australian shipbuilders, overseas designers, and Australian subsidiaries of 
overseas systems houses. The competitive process led to the award of contracts to 
successful consortia (e.g., AMEC-Blohm+Voss for the ANZAC Ships) using the conventional 
model of engagement between the prime contractor and Defence. This mode of 
engagement had worked reasonably well for projects involving less complex deliverables 
(e.g., the ANZAC ships). However, as the experience of the Collins project demonstrated, 
the conventional model based on the arm’s-length relationship between Defence and prime 
was not suitable for procuring complex capabilities such as submarines or technologically 
challenging systems upgrades (re: the troubled FFG upgrade). A key reason for the difficulty 
lies in elements of hold-up present in the relationship between the incumbent prime 
contractor and Defence.  
While competition is normally used to engage prime contractors fronting competing 
overseas designs, competitive pressure on prime contractors, combat systems integrators 
and often key OEMs tends to fall away once the prime contract is signed. If the prime 
contractor fails to deliver contracted performance, slips behind schedule, or runs over the 
budget, Defence is heavily constrained in its option for remedial action. Switching prime 
contractors and/or main sub-contractors is often technologically infeasible, financially 
prohibitive or politically embarrassing. Even for a medium size naval project, such as the 
FFG upgrade, the prime contractor was allowed to continue with the project, despite public 
expressions of dissatisfaction from the client and an adverse national audit report. Despite 
tough rhetoric in public, Defence has only limited scope to bring a contractor into line. A 
financial penalty for contractual default, for example, may be no more than a slap with the 
business equivalent of a feather. And, when the worst comes to the worst—as in the case of 
Rockwell’s failure to deliver the CDS system for the Collins Class submarines—Defence 
decided against re-competing the requirement and, instead, appointed a substitute, 
Raytheon, to take over as system integrator. 
                                                
66 The arrangement takes the form of Alliance-based Target Incentive Agreement (ABTIA) between 
the Commonwealth, represented by the Defence Materiel Organisation, ASC, as the shipbuilder and 
Raytheon Australia as the mission systems integrator. “The broad AWD procurement principles 
articulated by the Alliance comprise value for money, efficient and effective process, ethics and 
probity, accountability and transparency, good faith and fair dealing and competition” (Kerr, 2008b, 
pp. 2-3; our italics). Under this arrangement, major equipment is already specified by Navantia SA—
the Spanish designer—and the Alliance will utilise Navantia’s established supply chain. Navantia will 
perform all the required design modifications and will maintain design configuration control. Raytheon 
will undertake the Australianisation of the combat system around the fully imported Aegis core 
sourced by the Commonwealth via the US FMS (2008b, pp. 2-3). 
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In the third naval procurement cycle, much of the competitive process for major naval 
projects was completed early on, with winning consortia announced for AWDs and LHDs 
and large, long-term support contracts for ANZACs and Collins submarines given to Tenix 
and ASC. It seemed unlikely that any prime contractor would subsequently be dumped and 
replaced by another contractor. However, there was a key difference between the second 
and the third shipbuilding cycles. Defence had become aware that lack of effective 
competitive pressure, following contract award had deprived it of effective market power vis-
a-vis its larger prime contractors. The complex, multi-channel procurement model described 
above can be viewed as an evolutionary adaptation responding to Defence’s recognition 
that, to maximise the likelihood of success for its projects, it would have to embrace fully its 
ultimate responsibility as “prime contractor of the last resort.” It had been obliged to accept 
that the prospects for shifting project risk to primes in large, strategically important projects 
were at best limited and, realistically, often unachievable. For successful outcomes, Defence 
would have to manage projects more proactively and build close, synergistic relationships 
with primes rather than relying on contract specifications, impracticable penalties for non-
performance and arm’s-length dealings with contractors. 
Lessons Learnt 
In a microcosm of naval shipbuilding activity, this case study shows in detail how 
various defence industry policies and procurement initiatives have worked in Australia over 
the past 30 years. By focusing on naval shipbuilding and repair, we have not only selected a 
sector that is seen in Australia as the jewel in the defence industry crown but also one that 
comprises a wide variety of business entities—from diversified large contractors to highly 
specialised small firms, including new forms of government shipyards such as CUFs and 
technologies such as mechanical (platforms), IT (combat systems, specialised equipment). 
We conclude this paper by highlighting what are, in our view, key lessons to be drawn from 
Australian naval shipbuilding experience. These concluding comments focus, respectively, 
on the demand and supply sides of the market and the demand-supply interface. 
Demand 
Lumpiness of demand 
For reasons associated with durability, cost and changes in military technology, most 
defence systems, including those embedded in naval capabilities, tend to be replaced at 
relatively widely spaced intervals rather than continuously. This applies to simple weapons 
systems, such as small arms, but particularly to large and chunky elements of capability 
such as naval ships that tend to be replaced as fleets. This batching of demands can be 
smoothed by Defence to the extent that fleet replacements can be staggered, but some 
lumpiness of demand seems unavoidable. Long-term forward plans, such as the Australian 
DCP, make it easier for industry to anticipate forthcoming demand and ramp up for future 
tenders. But the scope for demand smoothing is limited as Defence has to be flexible 
enough in its forward commitments to respond to changing strategic and economic 
circumstances, sometimes at very short notice. 
Asset ownership 
The complete control of “use rights” is necessary for key combat assets such as 
naval combatants. This can be achieved through the conventional full ownership of ships, or 
through leasing arrangements, particularly the leasing of vessels from foreign governments. 
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However, more flexible arrangements can be used to procure the services of secondary 
assets such as patrol boats, which tend to operate in peacetime in more stable roles and 
predictable circumstances. As demonstrated by the Armidale patrol boat arrangement, the 
procurement of ship services from a private consortium of maritime service providers rather 
than the full ownership of vessels is feasible and attractive. And, in the event of war, the 
nature of the relationship can be changed by placing the vessels under complete naval 
control. 
Local content requirements 
The history of Australian naval shipbuilding and repair highlights often-encountered 
trade-offs between local and overseas sources of supply and naval preparedness. In 
Australia, as in other small countries, it is increasingly accepted that building ships in 
country is politically as much as strategically driven. In modern warfare, there is no time to 
replace combat assets, such as ships, and nations are unlikely to engage in wars of 
equipment attrition. It is thus perceived as more important to have domestic industry 
capability on hand to undertake ship repair and modification, including battle damage 
rectification. The LHDs project, incorporating hull construction at Navantia’s Ferrol shipyard 
in Spain and superstructure by Tenix in Australia, departs from the recent tradition of 
building ships in-country to an imported design. However, the procurement of the AWDs 
follows the conventional path, with expectations that substantial premia will be paid for the 
political decision to construct them in South Australia (Dodd, 2008). 
Australia continues to import naval ship designs and the recent tendency is to 
minimise design Australianisation (Kerr, 2008a; 2008b). To reduce risks of “design 
parentage,” the approach is to incorporate MOTS components in imported systems and 
make considerable use of the design authority’s established supply chain (e.g., the AWD 
and LHD arrangements with Navantia). Political pressures are likely to support ongoing high 
levels of local content in platform construction, but strategic issues may be more important in 
influencing levels of local content in combat systems maintenance and modification. 
Defence may be worried about the risk of relying on local supply for developmental 
components. For example, the locally developed CEAFAR active phased array radar for the 
AWDs has not been included in the baseline specification as it is still under development by 
its maker—a small but high profile Australian firm CEA. But, the new technology is likely to 
be incorporated as it matures (Kerr, 2008b). 
Business models 
A range of new business models has evolved in Defence to engage suppliers in the 
most effective way. These models tend to be tailored to the nature of the product and the 
characteristics of the supplier. When mature products are supplied by established 
contractors, the inherent risks of performance degradation and schedule slippages are low 
and traditional fixed/firm price models can be used. An evolved model of this kind has been 
used to acquire the services of the Armidale Class patrol boats. When the developmental 
content of the product increases and if the supplier’s track record also inspires less 
confidence, various forms of incentive and incremental contracting are more likely to be 
used (e.g., the acquisition of the electronic warfare system for the AWDs—Kerr, 2008b, p. 
6). And, for technologically sophisticated, complex and politically high-profile acquisitions, 
such as the AWDs, it is now accepted that the Commonwealth cannot divest itself of its 
ultimate responsibility for strategic capability formation. In the emergence of the multi-prime 
contractor model (in which DMO has entered a “prime alliance” with shipbuilder and systems 
supplier), it has been recognised that the buyer’s procurement agency must engage in 
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relationship management and that even a very detailed contract cannot shift all risks away 
from the Commonwealth to commercial prime contractors. 
Supply 
Facility ownership 
It was widely claimed in the 1980s and 1990s that privatising government shipyards 
and factories, and related ‘private finance initiatives’, was a necessary precondition for their 
improved productivity and dependability. In 2000s, however, it became increasingly 
apparent that the private sector would not invest in capital intensive assets such as 
shipyards unless it could reasonably expect an adequate return on its investment. 
Commercial owners would only invest in new shipbuilding facilities if their order books 
justified the heavy capital commitment. This in turn depended on owners’ confidence in a 
continuing flow of potentially profitable orders - hard to create in the face of a history of long 
intermissions in demand and the competitive processes for allocating work. It has, thus, 
been recognised that competitive sourcing might have to be abandoned in favour of sole or 
dual sourcing if local platform builders and maintainers are to be encouraged to invest in 
capital-intensive facilities. But, it also seems increasingly accepted that lack of competition 
and not the public ownership per se was the main cause of poor performance of government 
shipyards and factories. The designation of a private contractor as sole source provider to 
Defence is likely to lead to many problems previously experienced with government-owned 
enterprise.  
As the third post-war building cycle unfolded, the competition between the States for 
defence orders has resulted in renewed public investment in capital infrastructure in 
shipbuilding and repair (re: the CUF model was pioneered by Western Australia and 
adopted by South Australia). And, the Commonwealth of Australia (federal government) has 
retained its ownership of the Garden Island dock leased to Thales. Under CUF 
arrangements, governments attract and sustain private naval investment by investing in 
complementary infrastructure and engaging in a form of quasi-vertical integration under 
which the publicly owned asset is then leased to a private contractor for the period it 
requires to supply goods and services to Defence.  
The 1990s and 2000s have also witnessed increased penetration of the Australian 
shipbuilding sector by overseas capital. Of the three largest naval shipbuilders, two (ADI and 
Tenix) have become subsidiaries of foreign companies (Thales and, subject to satisfactory 
negotiations, BAE Systems, respectively). The third, ASC, is to be sold in the late 2000s, 
and may yet end up in overseas ownership. All systems integrators and nearly all major 
OEMs (except CEA) are subsidiaries of overseas companies. And P&O Maritime Services 
and Serco Australia have pioneered the provision of fully supported services for minor naval 
vessels (the Armidales). This trend is very much in keeping with global developments in 
defence industry. Few small countries can support indigenous systems integrators and 
OEMs while exporting of defence-related products from small countries poses well-known 
difficulties. 
Structure 
The 1990s and 2000s have also seen the increased consolidation of ship assembly 
in fewer hands and, in a clear break with the past, a growing integration between 
shipbuilding and repair. In part, the latter trend reflects the changing global division of labour 
as systems houses and OEMs become increasingly involved in the provision of through-life 
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support for their products. In part, it also reflects the shift of emphasis in Australian industry 
policy from a focus on platform construction to through-life capability support. The three 
large projects of the second shipbuilding cycle have also had implications for the size 
distribution of firms in the sector. The building of the ANZACs, Collins submarines and Huon 
minehunters attracted a large number of firms to third-tier naval subcontracting. As a result, 
the size distribution takes a Pareto form with a small number of large naval firms operating 
in the first and second tiers, downstream in the supply chain; a large number of third-tier 
sub-contractors are engaged in the upstream segments of the chain. 
Conduct 
In the 1990s and 2000s, firms have increasingly made efforts to collaborate along 
the supply chain rather than to do business with each other at arm’s length. On the other 
hand, firms also appear to have been competing with increasing frequency and intensity for 
markets opening up for all segments of the naval supply chain. Firms’ awareness of their 
mutual dependence in the network of supply arrangements appears to be driving a tendency 
to greater collaboration once the principal contract has been awarded.  
Performance 
The second shipbuilding cycle saw a marked increase in shipyard productivity and 
less severe budget overruns and schedule slippages. The Collins Class project was the 
most troublesome acquisition of the period but by no means because of problems restricted 
to the supply side. The FFG upgrade project appears to have suffered from the classic 
syndrome of supplier overconfidence: ADI seems to have lacked awareness of its capability 
limitations and underestimated the importance of technical challenges that were likely to 
arise in a project of such complexity. As the third shipbuilding cycle unfolded, Defence (and 
indirectly the government) appeared reluctant to risk quality-budget-schedule outcomes by 
trying to over-Australianise designs and aiming at high, local-content targets. “Buying 
MOTS” and minimising the local developmental content characterised its strategy to head 
off poor performance. 
Demand-supply interface: Competition for and in the market 
Arguably the most striking development since the end of the second shipbuilding 
cycle, particularly in the aftermath of the Collins project, has been much better 
understanding by Defence of competitive processes, especially the difference between for- 
and in-the market competition. This reflects the growing maturity of Defence as an investor 
in new capability elements and buyer of military materiel. It is increasingly accepted that 
different competitive processes operate for different segments of the naval supply chain.  
Creating a competitive environment in downstream segments of the chain in a small country 
calls for opening the market to overseas participants. When this is done, the range of 
competing designs and combat systems is broadened as overseas consortia of platform 
builders, system integrators and OEMs (sometimes combining with local firms) come to 
contest the market. Once a preferred package has been selected, competition in the market 
follows, and sub-contractors vying for various elements of the package emerge. Domestic 
subcontractors can be assured a major role in this part of the process if local content 
requirements are in force. 
Finally, it appears that Defence has become more aware of the difference between 
the pre- and post-contract opportunities open to it in sourcing supplies. That is, it is better 
understood that, once the contract is signed, switching suppliers and supplies may be 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 385 - 
=
=
impossible for technological, budgetary or political reasons. As a project progresses through 
the tendering process, the scope for product and supplier substitution decreases and, for 
major projects, there may be no realistic way of returning to status quo ante. Post contract, 
competition in the market is largely restricted to upstream segments of the supply chain in 
which third-tier suppliers are easier to replace if their contractual performance is inadequate.  
Also, applying a one-size-fits-all business model can often be a recipe for failure in 
defence procurement. But, to tailor different models to different acquisitions, it is necessary 
to acquire good understanding of supply conditions and commercial business processes. 
Following its designation as a prescribed agency, the DMO has become increasingly 
professionalised as a procurement agency and as a hands-on equity partner in major 
acquisition projects. 
Conclusion 
Faced with the challenge of efficiently procuring naval vessels of increasing 
technological sophistication, the Australian government has learned over recent decades 
that contract arrangements alone are often insufficient to allow it to address and remedy 
problems, especially when developmental issues are at stake. While fixed-cost contracts, for 
example, apparently offer the Defence customer the prospect of shifting all risk to its 
industry suppliers, the experience of the Collins Class submarine clearly showed that when 
the success of the project was seriously threatened, the government felt it had little option 
but to intervene directly to re-organise supply-side production arrangements. As the nature 
of the naval warship has changed with technological innovation, it has also become clear 
that government must take on an overarching prime responsibility if the production tasks 
involved are to be effectively coordinated. A warship is a sea-borne platform carrying 
weapons. But the business of designing and building sea-worthy and battle-ready vessels is 
altogether different from the enterprise of designing and producing the highly sophisticated, 
often network-integrated weapons systems that the warship must support. We have shown 
that the Australian government has recognised the force of this reality by creating different 
industry primes for platform-building and weapons production and adopting the coordinating 
role for itself. Despite past rhetoric to the contrary, innovation and complexity in design and 
production appear to create conditions in which governments find themselves obliged to 
form close and durable relationships with suppliers if they wish to maximise the likelihood of 
project success. It may neither be realistic, given the industry structure, nor wise, given the 
alternatives available to suppliers, for governments to threaten competitive recontracting as 
their sole, or even principal, means of discipline and performance control. 
For political reasons familiar in most countries (smaller ones being no exception), 
governments routinely find themselves under pressure to favour domestically located 
supply. If the depth and breadth of expertise and capabilities in local defence industry is 
limited, there is the potential of conflict with the goals of successfully procuring increasingly 
sophisticated systems, especially if tailored idiosyncratically to national requirements. As this 
paper has shown, Australia has at times focused heavily on local content requirements in 
naval shipbuilding and, whatever the benefits, has sometimes paid a high cost premium for 
doing so. The issues around such requirements are not likely to disappear in Australia or in 
other countries in the foreseeable future. 
In relation to naval ships, it may appear eminently sensible and potentially efficient to 
provide sustainment, repair and maintenance for warships domestically but more 
problematic to justify actually building the vessels in-country. On the other hand, it can be 
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argued that such a large fraction of through-life costs relate to post-delivery support that any 
cost premium on domestic construction can be discounted as relatively unimportant. If local 
through-life support is more efficient when ships are also built locally in the first place, the 
argument is reinforced. Analogous arguments may also be applied to other sorts of platform 
and weapons system. No simple generic solution indicates when make domestically should 
be preferred to buy overseas in such cases. But the historic experience of substantial cost 
premia on local content in small country environments suggests that a critical eye should 
always be applied to ex ante predictions of large expected net benefits from locally 
producing the more innovative and idiosyncratic weapons systems. 
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Abstract 
With the rapid evolution of the global defense management environment, an 
innovative strategy to reinforce the international competitiveness of the National Defense 
Industry (NDI) through competitiveness analysis is required. Thus, it is necessary to develop 
appropriate models for analyzing the Korean NDI and to conduct competitiveness analysis 
by using the developed model. 
For the purpose of analyzing the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI, 
the researcher reviews the characteristics and problems for various existing models and the 
competitiveness analysis results for other civil industries. He then compares the attributes of 
the NDI with civil industries and analyzes the critical technology competitiveness of the NDI 
for major nations. In addition, he examines the defense policies under the worldwide reform 
of the defense management environment and the global change of the international defense 
market. 
The researcher develops the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors (P-D8F) model, a 
proposed optimum analysis model for the NDI, by applying the results of the analysis for 
various existing models while considering the unique characteristics of the NDI. He then 
analyzes the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI by using the P-D8F model, 
and derives the reinforcement strategy to enhance the global competitiveness for the 
Korean NDI. Finally, he suggests a possible defense acquisition policy to promote the 
desired technological innovation and to improve the management environment effectively. 
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Introduction 
Since the cessation of the Cold War, most nations have focused their energies on 
enhancing their economic and technological powers instead of on reinforcing their military 
power. In particular, the powerful military nations—such as the US, France and Russia—
steadily carry out various projects, transforming military companies into civil companies. 
They have also effectively accomplished the military transformation based on the Effect-
based Operation (EBO) to transform the defense industrial base (DoD, 2003).  
With the rapid transition of the global defense management environment, along with 
the reinforcement of the WTO system and the increase of global competition, the NDI can't 
be maintained by the long-sustained government control and support anymore. Many 
defense companies try to make a good profit and survive in the global environment. For the 
past 40 years, the government in Korea has played a leading role in producing and 
supplying military materiel. The NDI has been promoted strongly by government initiatives, 
but the most advanced military materiel hasn't been researched or developed with domestic 
technology, capabilities and resources. The critical military technologies haven't been 
acquired yet, and the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI is very low in 
comparison with that of developed countries. Therefore, Korean companies don't have the 
capabilities to research and develop the most advanced weapons to be competitive 
internationally (Lee, 2007). 
For these reasons, a great deal of extensive research must be conducted in an effort 
to discover the proper strategy to strengthen the international competitiveness of the NDI. 
However, due to the lack of a competitiveness analysis model, there haven't been any 
considerable efforts to research or to develop the systematic improvement methodologies to 
solve the above-mentioned problems. To overcome these problems effectively, an original 
analysis model, which fully takes into account the defense characteristics based on the civil 
industries model, is required. Thus, the researcher has developed an innovative analytic 
strategy for promoting the international competitiveness of the NDI. 
The purposes of this study are as follows. The first purpose is to develop and 
validate the optimum analysis model for the Korean NDI, based on the analytic results for 
various existing models and the consideration of the NDI’s unique characteristics. The 
second purpose is to analyze and review the international competitiveness of the Korean 
NDI and to compare it with the competitiveness of the NDIs in other major nations by 
applying the proposed model. The final objective is to suggest the reinforcement strategy 
that may enhance the global competitiveness of the Korean NDI. 
Development of International Competitiveness Analysis Model 
for the Korean National Defense Industry 
1. Characteristics of the Korean National Defense Industry 
The Korean NDI has several different characteristics than do other civil industries or 
the NDIs of developed countries. First, the NDI is a government-dependant industry 
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contributing to national security and showing monopolistic and oligopolistic characteristics 
under government control and support. Second, the NDI is an industry that contributes and 
enhances the national military power and fosters the national economy. Therefore, its 
economical efficiency isn’t considered, and one-sided investment is mandated by 
government policy. As a result of this policy, high national economic growth is unintentionally 
achieved in the confined fields of the shipbuilding, aviation, and automobile industries. Third, 
the military authorities require the military materiel with the best quality rather than at the 
lowest cost. And the government controls the demand and supply within the scope of the 
defense budget and the quantity of each service’s request. The law of supply and demand 
does not work in the NDI. There is always a balance of supply and demand in the market. 
Finally, excessive plant investment and the long-term diversion of capital from the defense 
industry are required. Thus, the operating rate is very low, and the quantity is unstable and 
limited depending upon the government policy and the surrounding environment. It's hard to 
estimate demand for just 5-plus years. 
2. Korean Acquisition Process of Defense Materiel 
In 2006, the restructuring of the entire acquisition system in Korea was completed. 
One of the goals of this was to redirect the government acquisition policy to Defense Reform 
2020 (MND, 2005), stressing self-reliant defense based on the Korea-US alliance. Other 
goals were to pursue the transformation for Technological Forces and to effectively increase 
the investment in the defense R&D (research and development) budget (6.5% average). 
The guidelines for this key acquisition reform were to: require transparency, increase 
efficiency, secure expertise and professionals, enhance competitiveness, and strengthen 
international cooperation. 
Acquisition flow has been reorganized, as shown in Figure 1. Formerly, requirement 
and procurement were driven by the services (JCS, Army, Navy, and Air Force). The 
acquisition organizations such as MND (Ministry of national Defense), DPA (Defense 
Procurement Agency), PMOs (Army-Navy-Air Force Project Management Office), T&EO 
(Test and Evaluation Office), DQAA (Defense Quality Assurance Agency), and ADD 
(Agency for Defense Development) weren’t well connected organically. The PPBEES 
(planning, programming, budgeting, execution, and evaluation system) did not work 
continuously and systematically during the lifecycle of materiel acquisition. The ADD, along 
with other organizations, used to be at the center of acquisition. Presently, requirements 
come from services. But the DAPA (Defense Acquisition Program Administration)—into 
which 8 organizations related to defense acquisition have merged—is now at the center of 
acquisition, while the ADD has remained at the center of R&D activities.  
Figure 2 shows the acquisition process—including the system development flow, 
which is somewhat similar to that in the US. Requirements come from the services and the 
MND. After preliminary studies, the DAPA decides the mode of development. Figure 2 also 
shows the flow of system development from S&T to deployment. Preliminary studies are 
dedicated to concept development, alternative analysis and interoperability analysis to 
establish acquisition trade-offs. The exploratory development phase is composed of concept 
exploration and technology development stages; engineering efforts are dedicated to 
authorizing the operational concepts and required capabilities and to eliminating technical 
risks before a program enters the system development phase. The system development 
phase is composed of system integration and system demonstration stages. Constructive 
and virtual simulation models are utilized for design and system verification. System and 
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subsystem performance analysis tools are used for verifying that designs are compliant with 
the requirements (DAPA, 2007). 
The DAPA organization is shown in Figure 3. The Commissioner (at the Vice 
Minister level) is the head of DAPA. At the next lower level, the Vice Commissioner 
oversees Acquisition Planning, Defense Industry Promotion, Analysis/T&E, and Policy & 
Public Relation Management Bureaus. There is also the Program Management Agency, 
which controls several programs with the help of IPTs.  
 
Figure 1. Key Thrusts for Acquisition Reform (Reorganization) 
 








Figure 3. Organization of Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) 
3. International Competitiveness Analysis Model for the Korean National 
Defense Industry 
The existing civil competitiveness models (Porter, 1998) are insufficient for analyzing 
the Korean NDI because of its different characteristics. The rule of market economy doesn't 
work, as the operations of most firms are under the government’s control. In the NDI, the 
economy system is governed rather by the government-initiated economy than the private-
initiated economy. The sole consumer is the government, and the NDI’s supply and the 
government’s demand always meet in the market. Government programs, instead of the 
mechanisms of market economy, decide demand. 
As for Korea, all competitiveness factors in the NDI are dictated by the government's 
intention and policy. The foreign policy and international relations of the major powerful 
nations, such as the US, China, and other surrounding nations, are also important factors 
with which to analyze the competitiveness of the NDI. And chance is important because it 
creates discontinuities and plays its role partly by altering conditions in the competitiveness 
models. These characteristics must be considered as the optimized models are built (Lee, 
2000). 
By applying the analysis results for various existing models and considering the 
unique characteristics of the Korean NDI, the researcher was able to develop the optimum 
analysis model for the Korean NDI. In case of the Korean NDI, 5 determinants to achieve 
the national competitive advantages among the nations exist: factor conditions, the strategy 
and rivalry among the firms, related and supporting industries, demand conditions, and the 
government defense policy. And 3 influencers of true competitiveness are: the industrial 
cluster, the defense policy and the relations of foreign nations, and chance. 
Figure 4 shows the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model (P-D8F)—with 5 
determinants and 3 influencers for competitiveness of the Korean NDI. The factors of the 








Figure 4. The Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model for the Korean NDI 
Table 1. Determinants and Influencers of Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model for the 
Korean NDI 
Determinants and 
Influencers Factors for National Competitiveness Advantage 
Factor 
Conditions 
· Human, physical, knowledge, and capital resources 
· Infrastructure 
· Mechanisms creating competitive advantage 
Demand 
Conditions 
· Demand size and pattern of growth 
· Internationalization of domestic demand 




· Presence of internationally competitive supplier 
and related industry 
· Competitive advantage of supplier and related industry 
Firms Strategy 
and Rivalry 
· Management strategy and structure of domestic firms 
· Vision, goals, and leadership  






· Policies toward defense acquisition and capital market 
· Product standard and regulation 





· Presence of industrial park and complex, high-technology park, 
and evolutional process of cluster 
· Existence of cluster for several industries 
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· Political decision by foreign government 
· Variations of international defense environment 
 and military expenditure 
· Regulations of arms export and technology transfer 
Chance 
· Invention, technology innovation, and oil shock 
· Significant shift in world financial market 
· International dispute and regional war 
 
International Competitiveness Analysis of the Korean National 
Defense Industry Using the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model 
1. Factor Conditions 
In 2007, the Korean NDI was composed of 88 companies producing diverse systems 
and components of 10 fields of defense materiel. Yet, they show very low operating rates of 
50% to 60%, low profit margins of 8.1%, and very low revenue per capita of $240 million 
(KDIA, 2007). All data hardly come up to those of Korean civil industries and foreign 
countries. The international competitiveness of the Korean NDI in the world market is very 
weak. The continuous-growth strategy must be propelled by defense reform and self-reliant 
cooperation.  
Table 2. Variations of Operating Rate for the Korean NDI 
Year 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Operating Rate 
(%) 58.2 59.8 56.1 55.7 57.4 54.5 57.3 56.1 57.8 60.6 
 
Table 3. Productivity & Technology Capability for the Korean NDI in 2005 







Figures 8.1 240 57.8 67 
Remarks 
(civil industries)  12.2 500 79.8 80 
 
Table 4 shows the variations of full-time employees of the Korean NDI. Since 2000, 
the number of total employees of the NDI has been decreasing gradually due to factory 
automation and reduction in demand for conventional weapons. Furthermore, expert 
research engineers are no more than 2,000, 10% of full-time NDI employees. In addition, the 
number of Korean defense R&D employees in the government—including the associated 
Institutes and Agency—is just 4,000, quite small compared to 200,000 of the US, 25,000 of 
Germany, and 18,000 of Taiwan. Lacking expert manpower, the technical level of the NDI 
can’t improve and is still far from that of developed countries.  
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Table 4. Variations of Full-time Employees for the Korean NDI 
Year 1988 1991 1996 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Number 23,418 27,794 29,640 23,179 23,184 23,007 22,226 20,912 
 
According to the US Military Critical Technologies List (MTCL), which shows country-
by-country estimates of the general status of technological capabilities, Korea doesn't retain 
the critical technologies of Aeronautics Systems, Energy Systems, Sensor and Laser, and 
Space Systems. One the other hand, Korea’s technology levels of Information Systems, 
Materials, and Nuclear Systems come more or less close to those of the developed 
countries (DoD, 2004). In this regard, the Korean government tries to enhance its defense 
technology competitiveness through technology interactions (spin-off and spin-on) with 
commercial sectors, and lay-out schemes fostering the high technology areas strategically. 
The defense R&D budget is about $1,060 million. That was 4.7% of the defense 
budget of $22,513 million and 14.1% of the defense materiel improvement budget of $7,499 
million in 2006 (MND, 2007). It is gradually increasing every year, but the defense R&D 
budget in 2005 ($740 million) was quite small compared to major nations—$82,250 million in 
the US, $4,690 million in the UK, and $4,850 million in France (SIPRI, 2006). The Defense 
budget in 2006 national GDP is still low; just 2.6% compared with the US, 3.7%, China, 
3.9%, and Russia, 4.9% (Hackett, 2007). The defense budget versus the GDP and the 
defense R&D budget versus thte defense budget have to be increased gradually up to 
developed countries’ levels. 
 
Table 5. Variations of Defense Budget and Defense R&D Budget 
Year 1990 1992 1996 1998 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Defense 
Budget ($M) 6,608 8,309 12,243 13,800 16,364 17,515 18,941 20,823 22,513
Defense R&D 
Budget ($M) 143 235 374 479 723 739 797 929 1,060
Rate (%) 2.1 2.8 3.1 3.5 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.5 4.7 
 
Table 6. Defense R&D Budget for Major Nations (2005) 
                                                                                                (at constant 2003 prices) 
Country US UK France Italy Japan Russia Korea 
Defense Budget 
($100M) 4,782 483 462 272 421 210 162 
Defense R&D 
Budget ($100M) 822.5 46.9 48.5 6.8 15.2 23.7 7.4 
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2. Demand Conditions 
Demand is decided within the scope of requirements of the services and the defense 
budget. It is difficult for the NDI to estimate the demand for even 5 years. The materiel 
improvement programs of the Armed Forces are established by the MND and the DAPA 
through a 5-year, mid-term plan. However, the procurement budget is finally set with the 
adjustment and deliberation of the government (Ministry of Strategy and Finance) and the 
National Assembly annually. Therefore, it quite restricts the NDI from establishing a mid- 
and long-term management plan. 
Recently, Korean domestic demand for defense materiel has been limited because 
services want the cutting-edge weapon systems, yet the NDI lacks critical technologies. 
Industry promotion is restricted due to the insufficient domestic demand, and the creation of 
a new market is ineffective. The core technology level compared to that in leading countries 
is 67% in 2004; most areas of cutting-edge technology are even more vulnerable. 
Table 7 shows the variations of gross sales of the Korean NDI. Total sales in 2006 
reached $5,452 million—45 times greater than the total sales in 1988, $120 million. But, the 
growth rate of total sales (2.5%) is very low compared with the 6.3% of civil industries in 
2006. The operating income increases to $267 million—4 times greater than the $61 million 
in 1988. On the other hand, the operating profit margin of 4.9% reaches 5.3% of civil 
industries, while the ordinary profit margin of 3.0% is lower than 5.7% of civil industries. 
Table 7. Variations of Gross Sales for the Korean NDI 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total Sales ($M) 3,705 4,366 4,269 4,644 5,317 5,452 
Growth Rate (%) 11.1 17.8 -2.3 8.8 14.5 2.5 
Operating Income ($M) 221 151 154 141 250 267 
Ordinary Income ($M) -115 25 56 86 149 163 
The export of defense materiel by the NDI alone is difficult. To make it possible, the 
cooperation of the government, military, and the NDI is required. As for the exports of 
defense materiel, the training and education programs and logistics are transferred to the 
purchasing country. The establishment of the export marketing strategy by the NDI is 
restricted because customers are foreign governments. 
The number of major conventional weapons being exported and imported is 
decreasing steadily, whereas the demand for advanced materiel systems is increasing 
gradually. In 2006, Korea’s arms imports amounted to about $600 million (the 9th largest in 
the world market), while Korean arms exports were numbered at about $255 (the 20th 
largest, taking just 0.2% in the world market) (KDIA, 2007). In the period 2001 through 2005, 
Korean arms exports ranked the 17th largest ($337 million), and arms import ranked the 9th 
largest ($2,561 million) (SIPRI, 2006). Thus, this severe imbalance of the trade leads to the 
shrinking of the Korean NDI. Domestic development of advanced weapons must increase if 
the defense economy is to improve. 
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Table 8. Variations of Arms Export Sales for the Korean NDI 
Year 1991 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Export Sales ($M) 90.6 77.0 196.6 237.2 143.9 240.6 417.8 262.3 255.2 
3. Related and Supporting Industries 
The Korean NDI is composed of 88 main companies, producing the 373 kinds of 
defense materiel. And 20 to 100 subcontractors work with these main contractors. There are 
also some defense-related organizations and civil-related industries that interconnect to 
develop and produce the defense materiel. The Korean NDI is classified into two structures 
with vertically and horizontally specialized relations. The pyramidal configuration of the 
Korean NDI is constructed with the vertical relations among main contractors, 
subcontractors, and components suppliers, and the horizontal relations among weapon 
industries producing particular weapons such as fire power, automobiles, aeronautics, 
warship, and missile systems, etc. 
Figure 5 shows the pyramidal configurations of related and supporting industries for 
the Korean NDI. Generally, the vertical and horizontal structure of pyramidal configurations 
is the best solution to optimizing the effectiveness of the NDI. That is, when the lower 
members (such as material and component suppliers) are strong and solid, raw materials 
and components are supplied quickly and inexpensively. This structure has the advantage of 
maximizing technology development through competitive activities. Furthermore, 
interactions and exchanges among weapon systems industries in the horizontal structure 
can foster the competition of other weapon systems industries; likewise, interaction with civil 
industries can bring out critical technology innovation in civil industries. 
 
Figure 5. Pyramidal Configuration of Related and Supporting Industries  
for the Korean NDI 
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4. Firms Strategy and Rivalry 
Most Korean defense firms lack competitiveness due to the monopolistic and 
oligopolistic systems of the Korean NDI. Most defense acquisition programs are still 
classified, and much information is still limited to the public. The firms have difficulty 
establishing mid- and long-term management plans due to this limited access to detailed 
information. The entry barrier of newcomers is very high, and most firms make few efforts to 
develop the advanced critical technologies. 
Defense revenue was only 7.8% of the defense industry’s total sales in 2005, and 
the low productivity of most firms impedes the progress of the defense industry. Firms are 
faced with excessive financial cost due to their lack of budget compared to initial investment 
in large-scale R&D projects. Every year, the investment of firms decreases—by $7.6 million 
in 2000, $5.1 million in 2002, and $4.5 million in 2004. 
In this environment, the aggressive management strategy of industries isn't 
established enough. Entrepreneurs and employers don't formulate great visions and goals 
for their companies because there is almost no rivalry among existing competitors or threat 
of new entrants.  
5. Government Defense Policy 
Despite numerous attempts to improve the Korean acquisition system, the issues of 
inefficiency and noncompetitiveness within the defense industry are not yet resolved. In 
recent years, the government has tried to initiate drastic improvement in defense acquisition 
policy. The domestic R&D of advanced military materiel takes precedence over overseas 
acquisition. In addition, the government has tried to establish acquisition plans that ensure 
the balanced development of advanced military materiel, in accordance with the 
requirements of the Joint Military Strategy and within the limits of the national budget. 
The government has also discontinued the current specialization and grouping 
system of the defense companies to improve industry competitiveness. Thus, technology 
innovations among associated companies will be induced. And the technology level of 
defense companies can be raised up to the level of the developed countries.  
The government has endeavored to work in close cooperation with defense 
companies to enhance exports, and has reinforced the export administration to support 
them. To help establish vision and goals within defense companies, the government has 
expanded its disclosure of information on defense investment projects to the public.  
6. Industrial Cluster 
National competitive advantage is generally more remarkable in industrial clusters 
than in individual industries. Industrial clusters often emerge and begin to grow naturally, 
such as Silicon Valley in the US. But, in Korea, governmental policy initiated many industrial 
clusters, such as industrial parks, complexes, and high-technology parks in several areas. 
The government has established some special industrial and R&D regions by providing 
specialized infrastructures and technical centers. 
Figure 6 shows one of industrial clusters of the Korean NDI in Changwon City. 
Related and supporting industries, agencies, institutes, academia, research centers, society 
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and associations, and suppliers are interconnected to research, develop, produce, and 
operate the defense materiel. Another type of cluster, the defense R&D industrial cluster in 
Daejeon City and Chungcheong Province, is shown in Figure 7. It is a unique one in Korea 
in the respect that most institutes, agencies, and universities related with R&D—in military, 
government, and civil fields—are centralized in this region. Nevertheless, the Industrial 
Clusters are not yet complete, as they are not creating the necessary high value-added 
products due to the lack of the proper establishment of knowledge-based networks. 
 
Figure 6. Defense Industrial Cluster for the Korean NDI in Changwon City 
 
 








Chances unexpectedly appear that have little to do with specific circumstances in a 
nation. They are important because they incur discontinuities that allow shifts in the 
competitive position. In the history of modern Korean economy, chances that have been 
particularly important in influencing competitive advantage are as follows: technology 
innovation, oil shocks, world financial crises, high volatility of exchange rate, international 
disputes and regional wars. Chances play a role partly by altering the determinants in the 
Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors Model.  
Korea, like other nations, is facing significant changes in its defense outlook. Since 
the 2000 Joint Declaration (Pyeongyang in North Korea, June 15), South Korea and North 
Korea have promised proactive exchanges and cooperation. However, the Cold War 
structure is still lingering, with factors of potential regional friction (such as the North Korean 
nuclear issue). Countries in Northeast Asia are engaged in constant competition to expand 
their influence in this region while continuing to make efforts to modernize and transform 
their military forces. 
In recent years, as a result of dramatic development in science and technology, the 
Korean defense companies have been subject to sweeping changes. There has been also a 
significant qualitative change in the nature of technology because civil technology has 
become increasingly important for weapon systems. The technological cooperation of the 
Korean NDI with civil industries is underway, and it presents the NDI with a chance to 
enhance its technological competitiveness. The oil shocks greatly reduce the defense 
budget in energy-dependent nations such as Korea, and downscale the size of the 
worldwide defense market. However, the US’s Global War on Terror and the local wars in 
the Middle East and Asia have shown the sudden increase in demand. 
8. Defense Policy and Relation (Foreign Government) 
During the post-Cold War period, developed countries have gained military 
superiority by protecting their national critical technological capabilities. They have 
significantly increased their defense R&D budget to develop new technologies 
independently, and have reinforced their control over and prohibit the divulgement of critical 
military technologies and products to foreign countries. In addition, they have expanded the 
development of dual-use technology, a spin-on of civil technology and spin-off of military 
technology. 
Most nations control and monitor the transfer of sensitive technologies to other 
nations while improving thte export-control processes to promote and protect their domestic 
defense companies. With armaments cooperation programs to strengthen their military and 
industrial relationships, they bind other nations as their partners in strong security coalitions. 
In recent years, the restrictions of arms export and military technology transfer to competing 
countries are much more stringent.  
To cope with the international defense environment, Korea has increased military 
expenditures to develop critical technologies independently, and has participated in 
cooperative programs with foreign advanced companies to introduce and co-develop 
advanced technology and to foster its arms exports. Korean has even tried to increase its 
arms exports in order to improve demand conditions within the NDI. 
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Defense Acquisition Policy and Defense Industrial Base 
Reinforcement Strategy 
1. Enlargement of Defense Budget 
Korea’s defense budget in its GDP is still low compared to other countries. In 2006, 
the ratio of the defense budget to the GDP was just 2.6%, obviously quite low compared to 
other nations’ ratios: 3.7% of US, 3.9% of China, and 4.9% of Russia. Most nations engaged 
in inner- and outer-conflicts usually allocate an average of 5-6% of their GDP to the defense 
budget. The annual growth rate of Korea’s defense budget is expected to increase up to 
about 9% through 2015, making the budget share out of GDP go up gradually to 3% in 2015 
(MND, 2005). However, the budget share has to increase gradually up to the level of 
developed countries. 
In addition, R&D financial resources must be expanded in order to support the 
acquisition policy. The defense R&D budget has to increase to 10% of the defense budget 
to enhance the international competitiveness of the NDI in 2015 from just 4.7% in 2007. The 
dual-use technology programs are reinforced to share effectively the limited defense R&D 
budget with the civil sectors.  
2. Reinforcement of Factor Conditions 
In planning its acquisition strategy, Korea must give the utmost priority to domestic 
R&D of Arms if it is to both enhance the critical technology capabilities of the NDI to the level 
of developed countries, and to raise the operating rate of the NDI to the level of civil 
industries. The NDI must participate more in R&D if it is to lead advanced arms development 
and to enlarge its technological capabilities. The ADD also has to be transformed into a core 
technology and system-of-systems-centric institute, and the NDI's role in developing general 
weapon systems has to be expanded. 
As mentioned previously, the number of expert research engineers within the NDI is 
just about 2,000. Furthermore, the number of Korean defense R&D manpower under the 
government side is just 4,000, which is far less than the 200,000 in the US. Due to 
insufficient expert manpower, the technical level of the NDI cannot be as good as other 
developed countries. To ensure comparative advantages over developed countries, more 
expert researchers and engineers are necessary. 
3. Innovation of Defense Technology 
In the US, revolutionary innovations in military technology traditionally come from 
subcontractors or niche firms, and these firms frequently go on to dominate the markets. 
These monumental leaps are infrequently developed by the prime firms of their time. This 
paradigm has been observed frequently in many other industries as well. 
In Korea, the ADD has taken the lead in developing innovative defense technology. 
But, it is difficult for the ADD to play a leading role anymore. The ADD has to cooperate with 
academia, institutes, research centers, and industries, and to transfer acquired technologies 
and support them steadily to innovate defense technologies. If necessary, the government 
has to change the acquisition strategy to ensure a competition-driven innovation. Also, the 
government must stimulate competitions through incentives, and designate multiple sources 
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to produce the desired technology. Probably the most important thing for improving and 
developing innovative technologies is to ensure robust funding. 
4. Establishment of Competitive Environment 
The Specialization and Affiliation System that the companies are designated to 
participate in the acquisition (R&D or purchase) programs was introduced to stimulate 
technology development and to save financial resources by preventing excessive 
competition. On account of the excessive preferential authority of designated companies, 
strong barriers are formed that block new entries and obstruct technological innovation. 
To enhance the NID’s industrial competitiveness and to induce technological 
innovation, the above system is expected to be abolished by the end of 2008. On the other 
hand, in order to promote technological development and efficiency, Korean decision-
makers must prepare some criteria and processes to prevent excessive competition and to 
institutionally ensure the entrances of small- and medium-sized companies. 
In addition, reasonable designation and management of defense materiel and 
companies have to be established; likewise, to promote competition efficiency, appropriate 
criteria for timing, scope and items in designating the defense materiel have to be set. The 
government has to prevent inefficiency by reviewing requirements periodically, and must 
consider appropriate measures to designate and manage the defense materiel and 
companies for the competitive system. 
5. Improvement of Management Condition 
The government should cover some key expenses to help the companies reform 
themselves and actively carry out additional activities. The supporting funds to promote the 
competitiveness of the NDI have to be secured, and enough subsidies to develop critical 
technologies and construct infrastructures of the NDI have to be granted. The cost-based-
contract system of defense materiel should be improved to enhance competitiveness for 
exports by reflecting more expenses. 
The government has to establish mid- and long-term strategies to reinforce the 
industrial base through regular investigation; it must also induce the rational supply system 
and promote the efficiency of resources through continuous analysis of the defense 
industry's demand and supply status. The government also has to expand industrial stratum 
by fostering defense-specialized small and medium-sized business. Small and medium-
sized defense firms have to participate in defense R&D. In addition, the government must 
establish technology-innovation support programs for the small and medium-sized defense 
firms. 
6. Reinforcement of Arms Export Sales 
The establishment of an improved export marketing strategy by the NDI is restricted 
because customers are foreign governments. Thus, the government-wide networks to 
support defense exports must be strengthened. Potential and promising items have to be 
selected and developed to ensure competitive advantages over other countries, and the 
basis of cooperation among governments has to be strengthened by additional agreements. 
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 Korea’s defense imports ranked the 7th to the 9th largest in the world, while Korea’s 
export market share was just 0.2% (the 20th largest) in recent years. In the period of 2001 
through 2005, Korea’s arms exports ranked the 17th largest ($337 million), while Korea’s 
arms imports ranked the 9th largest ($2,561 million). This severe unbalance of the trade has 
led the Korean NDI to shrink. Operational support systems have to be established with 
trustworthy, importing countries, and measures have to be prepared to enhance price 
competitiveness—such as financial and tax support. Active cooperation with leading 
countries also has to be pursued aggressively in order to acquire their advanced systems 
and technologies. 
Conclusions 
This study was conducted to investigate the international competitiveness of the 
Korean National Defense Industry. The characteristics and problems of various existing 
competitive models for other civil industries were reviewed and analyzed to develop a new 
optimized analysis model. 
The new analysis model, the Pentagon-Defense 8 Factors model, fully takes into 
account the defense characteristics that have been derived to suggest the innovative 
strategy enhancing the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI. As for the Korean 
NDI, this model is composed of 5 determinants (factor conditions, demand conditions, firms 
strategy and rivalry, related and supporting industries, and government defense policy) and 
3 influencers (defense industrial cluster, defense policy of foreign nation and mutual relation, 
and chance). 
The researcher studied the international competitiveness of the Korean NDI by 
applying the P-D8F model. He then suggested a possible reinforcement strategy and 
defense acquisition policy to enhance the global competitiveness for the Korean NDI and to 
effectively achieve the desired technological advancement. 
From this study, the researcher concluded that the proposed analysis model is a 
useful and practical one for analyzing and enhancing the international competitiveness of 
the Korean NDI. 
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Panel 19 - Exploring the Boundaries of Outsourcing 
 
Thursday, 
May 15, 2008 Panel 19 - Exploring the Boundaries of Outsourcing 
3:30 p.m. – 
5:00 p.m. 
Chair: 
Lenn Vincent, RADM USN (ret.), Industry Chair, Defense Acquisition 
University 
Papers:  
Contracting Out Government Procurement Functions: An Analysis  
Dr. David V. Lamm, Associate Professor Emeritus and E. Cory Yoder, 
Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School 
The Design Agent Phenomenon: A Post Acquisition Reform Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 
Kathlyn H. Loudin, Cost & Affordability Group, Naval Surface Warfare 
Center, Dahlgren Division 
The Evolving Private Military Sector: A Survey 
Dr. Nicholas Dew, Assistant Professor, and LT COL Bryan Hudgens, 
USAF, Lecturer, Naval Postgraduate School 
 
Chair: Lenn Vincent, RADM USN (ret.) is the Industry Chair at the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU). He uses his Defense and Industry experience, expertise and perspective 
to advise the DAU management team, OSD, and the uniformed services on matters relative 
to contracting and program management issues. As a professor at DAU, he presents views 
to foster a more viable and effective defense acquisition management system. He serves 
on various DAU advisory councils and its academic review committee. Additionally, he 
provides independent consulting services to a variety of industry clients relative to 
procurement, contract management, logistics and supply chain management.  
As a Vice President at CACI International, Vincent was responsible for working with senior 
Department of Defense and Industry leaders to build long-term CACI relationships and to 
help identify solutions to acquisition, logistics, and financial management challenges. His 
strategic focus was an initiative to create an integrated digital environment that will extend 
the DoD’s automated procurement system into industry and into the DoD program 
management offices, in addition to implementation and training strategies for new products 
and services.  
As a Vice President at American Management Systems, he led a 130-member business 
unit responsible for the deployment and launch of government and industry procurement and 
contract management software solutions. His acquisition business solutions profit center was 
responsible for implementing the DoD’s Standard Procurement System currently being 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 406 - 
=
=
used by over 23,000 procurement personnel and for launching of a commercial contract 
management system for industry, which was purchased by The Boeing Company.  
Prior to entering civilian life, Vincent completed a distinguished career in the United States 
Navy, serving at both sea and ashore. He has over 30 years of broad-based and in-depth 
leadership and management experience in acquisition, supply chain management, logistics 
and financial management.  
When he retired on August 1, 1999, at the rank of Rear Admiral, he was the Commandant, 
Defense Systems Management College (DSMC), where he led a graduate-level DoD 
College with a faculty and staff of 300 people and an annual budget of $25 million. While in 
this position, he began an overhaul of acquisition education to include reform principles and 
technology-based distance learning. 
Prior to leading DSMC, Vincent had served as the Logistics, Ordnance and Fleet Supply 
Officer for Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, where he established policy and coordinated 
logistics requirements to support supply chain operations in the Pacific Fleet and Indian 
Ocean. 
Vincent was the Commander of the Defense Contracts Management Agency (DCMA), a 
diverse worldwide organization of 19,000 people responsible for administration and 
oversight of over 400,000 contracts valued at $800 billion. Concurrently, he also served as 
the senior acquisition executive responsible for procurement policy within the Defense 
Logistics Agency (DLA).  
His afloat tours included Supply Officer on both USS Pensacola (LSD 38) and USS Dixon 
(AS 37). Some of his other shore-based assignments included: Assistant Commander for 
Contracts at the Naval Air Systems Command; Commander, Defense Contract 
Management Command International; Commander, Defense Contract Administration 
Services Region, Los Angeles; Director, Contracts Director at Navy Inventory Control Point, 
Mechanicsburg; Contracting Officer, SUPSHIP Bath, Maine; and Director, Contracts Navy 
Supply Center, Puget Sound.  
Vincent holds a Master’s in Business Administration from George Washington University. 
He also is a Certified Navy Material and Acquisition Professional, and is DAWIA Level III 
certified in both Contracting and Logistics. 
He is President-elect of the National Contract Management Association and serves on its 
Board of Directors and Board of Advisors. He also serves on the Board of Directors, Navy 
League National Capital Council; Board of Directors, NDIA Washington, DC, Chapter; 
Board of Visitors, Defense Acquisition University; Board of Directors, Procurement Round 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 407 - 
=
=
Contracting Out Government Procurement Functions:  
An Analysis 
Presenter: Dr. David Lamm, Professor Emeritus from the Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy (GSBPP), served at NPS as both a military and civilian professor from 1978 through his 
retirement in January 2004, teaching a number of acquisition and contracting courses, as well as 
advising thesis and MBA project students.  During his tenure, he served as the Academic Associate 
for the Acquisition & Contracting Management (815) MBA Curriculum, the Systems Acquisition 
Management (816) MBA Curriculum, the Master of Science in Contract Management (835) distance-
learning degree, and the Master of Science in Program Management (836) distance-learning degree.  
He created the latter three programs.  He also created the International Defense Acquisition 
Resources Management (IDARM) program for the civilian acquisition workforce throughout the 
country.  Finally, in collaboration with the GSBPP Acquisition Chair, he established and served as (PI) 
for the Acquisition Research Program, including inauguration of an annual Acquisition Research 
Symposium.  He also developed the Master of Science in Procurement & Contracting degree 
program at St. Mary’s College in Moraga, CA, and served as a Professor in both the St. Mary’s and 
The George Washington University’s graduate programs. 
He has researched and published numerous articles and wrote an acquisition text entitled Contract 
Negotiation Cases: Government and Industry, 1993.  He served on the editorial board for the National 
Contract Management Journal and was a founding member of the editorial board for the Acquisition 
Review Quarterly now known as the Defense Acquisition Review Journal.  He served as the NPS 
member of the Defense Acquisition Research Element (DARE) from 1983-1990. 
Prior to NPS, he served as the Supply Officer aboard the USS Virgo (AE-30) and the USS Hector 
(AR-7).  He also had acquisition tours of duty at the Defense Logistics Agency in Contract 
Administration and the Naval Air Systems Command, where he was the Deputy Director of the 
Missile Procurement Division. 
He holds a BA from the University of Minnesota and a MBA and DBA both from The George 
Washington University.  He is Fellow of the National Contract Management Association and received 
that association’s Charles A. Dana Distinguished Service Award and the Blanche Witte Award for 
Contracting Excellence.  He created the NCMA’s Certified Professional Contracts Manager (CPCM) 
Examination Board and served as its Director from 1975-1990.  He is the 1988 NPS winner of the 
RADM John J. Schieffelin Award for Teaching Excellence. 
Author: Commander (Ret) Cory Yoder is a faculty member of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy (GSBPP).  Assigned to NPS in July 2000, he 
accepted an appointment as Academic Associate (Program Manager) for the 815 (MBA) and 835 
(MSCM) programs in December 2002.  Commander Yoder has accepted a civilian position at 
NPS/GSBPP as Lecturer and Academic Associate (Program Manager).  Yoder has strong acquisition 
and contracting experience, combined with several challenging acquisition, logistics, industrial, 
headquarter, and combat support operations. 
Commander (Ret) Yoder entered the United States Naval Service in 1984.   Since his commission, he 
has performed in numerous assignments, including, but not limited to: 
 Director and Chief of Logistics, Headquarters, Allied Forces Southern Command 
(AFSOUTH), Naples, Italy (logistics, contracting, finance within NATO) 
 Post Commander and Support Group Commander, Kosovo Verification Coordination Center 
(KVCC), Kumanovo (Skopje), Macedonia 
 Officer-in-Charge, Fleet and Industrial Supply Detachment, Long Beach, California 
 Stock Control Officer, USS TARAWA (LHA-1) 
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 Aviation and Surface Stores Officer, USS TARAWA (LHA-1) 
 Naval Acquisition and Contracting Officer (NACO) internship, Naval Regional Contracting 
Center (NRCC), Washington, DC 
 Supply Officer, USS FANNING (FF-1076) 
CDR (Ret) Yoder holds the following degrees and certifications: 
 MA in National Security and Strategic Studies, Naval War College (NWC), Newport, Rhode 
Island, 1997 
 MS in Management, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 1993 
 BS in Business Management, Indiana University “Kelly” School of Business, 1983 
CDR (Ret) Yoder is professionally certified and/or a member of: 
 DAWIA Contract Level III certified 
 Institute for Supply Management (ISM), Direct National Member 
 Beta Gamma Sigma international honor society for graduate degree holders 
Cory Yoder 
Lecturer 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 93943-5197 
Tel: (831) 656-3619 
E-mail: ecyoder@nps.edu 
Abstract 
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development & 
Acquisition (DASN (RDA) (Acquisition Management)), asked the Naval Postgraduate School 
(NPS) to analyze the contracting out of procurement functions currently being accomplished 
by Navy, Marine Corps, and other Department of Defense (DOD) Activities.  The request 
specifically focused on assessing the degree of effectiveness and shortcomings of such 
contracting out efforts.  This research sought to answer these questions:  Which contracting 
functions are now being contracted out by Navy and other DOD organizations?  How 
effectively have contractors performed on these contracts? What metrics are being used 
and could be used to assess the quality of contractor performance?  Although the primary 
focus of this study is the effectiveness of contracts used to procure contracting services, 
several interrelated subjects have been explored. Aspects of inherently governmental 
functions, personal service relationships, conflicts of interest, and legal/ethical issues were 
included.  Further, questions regarding the impact on the contracting system, the 
development of Contracting Officers, the participation of competing companies in the 
marketplace, training and experience qualifications, and agency procurement decision-
making and policies were also examined. 
Introduction 
Several factors have led to an increased reliance upon the private sector to provide 
services.  One of the most critical factors has been the lack of adequate numbers of civil 
servants to perform the functions required of buying organizations.  The number of  DOD 
employees has been significantly reduced due to retirements or transfers to other agencies 
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and, in certain metropolitan areas, the number of qualified applicants available to fill vacant 
positions has fallen to a seriously low level.  Another of the principal factors has been to 
reduce the cost of providing services.  With competition and a more efficient process of 
producing services, it is widely believed that significant savings have accrued.  Another 
factor has been the ability to obtain certain skills which the Government does not possess. 
This has become more critical as agencies have reduced the size of their workforce. Yet 
another factor is to obtain services on an emergency or surge basis.  DOD has come to rely 
more and more extensively on service contractors during military conflicts.  For these 
reasons, some organizations have begun to contract out selected contracting functions 
associated with the acquisition process.  Further, some have actively promoted contracting 
out efforts and see this as an integral part of their corporate strategy.  But, for various 
reasons explored herein, some organizations have taken no action to contract out 
procurement functions.   
Methodology 
Sources involved in acquisition research were consulted, including the following: 
reports issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO); theses and master’s degree 
projects from students at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and the Air Force Institute of 
Technology (AFIT); student reports from the Naval War College, Army War College, and Air 
War College; reports and studies from the RAND Corp., the Project on Government 
Oversight (POGO), the Defense Science Board (DSB), the Contract Management Institute 
(CMI), the Professional Services Council (PSC) and the Logistics Management Institute 
(LMI); papers presented at the NPS Annual Acquisition Research Symposium; and student 
and faculty reports from the Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and the University of 
Maryland.  Various periodicals were examined, including the Defense Acquisition Review 
Journal, Contract Management, Defense AT&L, and the Journal of the National Contract 
Management Association. 
Two survey questionnaires were used.  The first focused on participants at the policy 
and senior management levels and asked questions about the broader issues involved in 
contracted procurement services.  The second survey focused on management and 
operating level personnel and, although some of the same questions on the first survey 
were also posed, it mainly asked questions regarding the effectiveness of contracts that are 
being or had been used to procure contracting support services.  Surveys were completed 
by a total of one hundred contracting professionals and thirty-two program management and 
technical personnel.  A comparison of organizational affiliation and category of survey 
participants is presented in Table 1.  All thirty-two program management and technical 
personnel are from the Air Force located at Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma.  In some 
instances, the senior managers of a major acquisition organization provided collective 
views.  Thus, the number of individuals participating in the survey are greater than the 
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Table 1. Survey Participants 








Army 5 11 16 
Navy/Marine Corps 18 17 35 
Air Force 5 2 7 
Defense Agencies 13 25 38 
Non-Federal Agencies 4 0 4 
Air Force Prgm Mgmt & 
Tech Personnel 
0 32 32 
Totals 45 87 132 
 
Personal (face-to-face) interviews were conducted with nineteen senior contracting 
personnel (over 80% of whom are from the Navy Department) many of whom also 
completed a survey.  Phone interviews were conducted with fifteen individuals and generally 
included those who had indicated willingness on their survey responses to clarify or expand 
upon their answers.  Throughout the study, the terms “procurement” and “contracting” are 
used interchangeably, as are the terms “function,” “task” and “duty.”  The terms “contracted 
services,” “contracted support services” and “procurement services” refer to those 
contracting functions or tasks that are typically performed by civil servants and are now, or 
could be, performed by contractor employees.  “Outsourcing” refers to accomplishment by 
contractors and does not include other Federal Agencies.  This research work was 
undertaken with the intent of exploring and evaluating only those actions and efforts taken 
by the Government in the buyer-seller relationship.  Although there are a significant number 
of companies that provide contracted support services as well as industry and professional 
associations that have intimate knowledge and understanding of the process, the present 
research was limited to the issues and problems experienced only by Government 
personnel.   
A few situations arose which impeded the numbers of surveys and interviews that 
might otherwise have been obtained.  One situation was the impression that this study was 
looking for those contracting functions which could be prime targets for contractor 
performance, which in turn could lead to a reduction in contracting workforce personnel.  A 
second situation occurred in which agencies are contracting out some functions that other 
agencies consider to be inherently governmental, and those agencies’ officials felt that they 
would be criticized for having placed these functions on contract.  A third situation involved a 
general feeling that top agency management was against placing contracting functions on 
contract, which made our study a moot point.  Lastly, some organizations simply said they 
were too busy to participate in the research. 
Discussion 
Inherently Governmental Functions 
Survey questions concerning inherently governmental functions (IGF) focused on 
whether respondents were aware of any functions considered to be inherently governmental 
or exempt from competition that are, in fact, being contracted out and the extent to which 
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capability deficiencies forced organizations to identify their interpretation of inherently 
governmental.  Also, from a very limited list of functions, survey participants were asked to 
distinguish those they felt were inherently governmental as opposed to those that were not.  
Forty percent of the respondents stated that a capability deficiency had caused their 
organization to assess whether or not a contracting function was inherently governmental.  
The shortage of Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) due to various forms of attrition has been 
exacerbated in recent years.  Retirements and personnel transfers with the resultant loss of 
corporate knowledge and expertise have forced organizations to rethink their position 
regarding tasks contractors can perform.  The 60% that said they had not made this 
assessment are from organizations that long ago decided that certain contracting tasks were 
non-IGF and were placed on contract, had decided the entire function is off limits to 
contracts, or had sufficient resources to meet workload demands.  When asked if they knew 
about inherently governmental functions being contracted out, slightly fewer than 20% 
acknowledged that this is happening.  Although this may seem like a small number, it points 
out that there are functions being acquired on contract that some view as violating the rules.  
A large part of this could be due to the disparity between those who believe that some 
contracting tasks are IGFs and those who do not. 
Policy survey respondents were presented with a limited list of contracting functions 
and asked to classify them as either IGF or non-IGF.  From the replies, three categories 
were established: (1) “unanimously” or predominantly IGF, (2) predominantly non-IGF, and 
(3) “middle ground.”  Table 2 displays the three categories. 
Table 2. Senior Contracting Personnel Views of 




“Middle Ground” Predominantly Non-
Inherently Governmental 
Requirements determination   
 Developing Statements of Work  
 Structuring market research  
  Conducting market research 
 Performing acquisition planning  
 Developing solicitation documents  
 Issuing solicitation documents  
 Developing and applying evaluation criteria  
 Member of  Source Selection Evaluation 
Board 
 
 Evaluation of proposals/offers  
 Performing cost and price analysis  
Negotiating contract prices, terms 
& conditions 
  
Structuring & approving incentive 
plans 
  
 Preparing price negotiation memoranda  
Awarding contracts   
Negotiating contract modifications   
Determining cost allowability   
Exercising options   
 Assessing contractor performance  
Implementing action based on   
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Accepting or rejecting goods & 
services 
  
Terminating contracts   
  Preparing contracts for closeout 
If no more than 75% or no fewer than 25% selected a function as either IGF or non-
IGF, the function was placed in the “middle ground” and open to interpretation.  All of the 
IGFs involve some type of Contracting Officer determination and/or decision which are 
considered by almost everyone to be within the Government’s purview.  The two functions 
identified as essentially non-IGF have been performed by contractors for several years and 
now seem to be the accepted norm.  The “middle ground” functions are basically the area of 
debate.  Functions listed close to the left of the box received the majority of IGF responses, 
while those functions close to the right received the majority of non-IGF responses.  
Structuring market research is closely related to conducting market research and developing 
solicitation documents is often distinguished as a support effort.  These two functions could 
have easily slipped into the non-IGF category.   Performing cost and price analysis is the 
function that seems to generate the most heated debate.  Many believe it to be integrally 
involved in either the negotiation process or a Contracting Officer’s determination of price 
reasonableness, or both, and should not be contracted out.  Further, considered by several 
to be a core capability, it is also judged to be one of the weakest skills held by the 
Government and badly in need of significant training and hands-on experience.  Although 
tending toward the IGF side, acquisition planning, evaluation of offers and preparing price 
negotiation memoranda are just as easily viewed by many as non-IGF. 
Personal Services Relationships 
Over 85% of the respondents felt that there are potential problems with personal 
services relationships when contracting for procurement services.  On the one hand, there is 
an overwhelming feeling that contractor employees need to be co-located with Government 
contracting personnel in order to effectively accomplish their work.  On the other, this close 
proximity presents the very ingredients that lead to personal services situations.  Many of 
the respondents felt that because Government and contractor specialists had to work 
together so intimately, such a relationship was inevitable.  Not directly causing a personal 
services dilemma but linked to the close working relationship are the circumstances 
involving “acceptance” of the service or work product performed by contractors.  Products or 
goods have a very definitive acceptance or rejection process that requires specific 
Government action.  Services do not have similar acceptance procedures.  In the case of 
contracting functions, who accepts the contractor’s work product and how formal is the 
process?  If the Government proceeds to use work packages submitted by contractors, de 
facto acceptance has probably occurred without an overt action.  At this point, the 
Government could certainly be liable for the decisions made based on the contractor input 
that might later prove to be faulty and damaging.  None of the respondents voiced an 
opinion that the prohibition on personal services contracts should be eliminated; however, if 
asked, it is suspected that a majority would willingly agree with the removal of certain 
aspects of the personal services restriction.  
Conflicts of Interest 
Survey participants responded with numerous conflict of interest situations they 
believed could easily occur unless precautionary measures were instituted.  Access to 
company proprietary and business sensitive information, competing in cases where firms 
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participated in developing requirements, an actual or perceived ability to influence 
procurement actions, biases against certain companies for obvious or even unknown 
reasons, insight into the Government’s requirements process, mergers and acquisitions that 
cause questionable affiliations, and other similar opportunities to inappropriately affect 
Government procurement were cited as potential problems with contractors.  Some 
respondents remarked that conflicts of interest could also easily occur with civil servants 
working so closely with contractor employees.  Differences in compensation, future 
employment opportunities, and personal friendships with contractor employees that may 
even have originated when both worked for the Government were observed as some of the 
conflict of interest situations in which civil servants could easily become embroiled. A recent 
Government Accountability Office (GAO, 2008) report concluded that when contractors are 
performing duties closely supporting inherently governmental functions, risks exist that could 
result in loss of Government control and decision-making.  The Government and contractors 
are both responsible for ensuring that measures are in place to prevent conflicts of interest. 
Legal and Ethical Issues 
This research asked if there are any legal issues or impediments to which over 85% 
responded in the affirmative.  Respondents are concerned about three primary areas: (1) 
violating the prohibition against placing inherently governmental functions on contract, (2) 
averting personal services relationships, and (3) avoiding conflicts of interest.  They state 
that proper non-disclosure agreements, financial disclosure statements, and vigorous 
application of safeguards and security mechanisms are critical to prevention.  It is well 
known that civil and criminal penalties await Federal employees if they violate statutes 
prohibiting unethical and improper behavior in the execution of their responsibilities.  This is 
generally not true if contractor employees performing procurement functions for the 
Government act in this manner.  Several situations concerning contractor personnel 
involved with financial conflicts of interest, impaired impartiality, misuse of information, 
misuse of authority and misuse of Government property have transpired.  There has been 
some discussion about the suitability of changing the laws to make them applicable to 
contracted employees when they are working on behalf of the Government.  Some suggest 
that instead, contract clauses should incorporate such requirements.  At the very least, 
contractor personnel should be held liable and accountable for actions taken in their 
capacity as “Government agents.”  Whether this is accomplished statutorily or through 
contractual clauses, some action in this direction is absolutely crucial. 
Ethics was brought up on the Policy and Senior Management questionnaire and a 
significant majority of the respondents believe that ethical issues are associated with 
contracting for procurement services.  To some, this took the form of organizational conflicts 
of interest while to others it involved contractor access to procurement sensitive information 
and the opportunity to take unfair advantage of the system.  Most of the respondents 
expressed concern about contractor loyalties and motivations which might impair their 
objectivity and impartiality when acting as an “agent” for the Government.  The judgment 
and interpretation of the laws and regulations by Government employees should not be 
replaced by contractor personnel.   The best interests of the Government should be 
foremost in any action taken by someone in the contracting process.  Misgivings can easily 
arise when contractor employees take these actions. Trust in the system can be easily and 
seriously jeopardized.   
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Procurement Functions Contracted Out 
Over recent years, the numbers and types of functions contracted out has greatly 
increased.  Some organizations have become concerned that too great a percentage of 
workforce positions are filled with contractor employees and have begun to develop plans to 
reduce that percentage.  Close to 60% of survey participants indicated that at least some 
procurement functions are being contracted out.  Policy and Senior personnel have fewer 
situations of contracting out while Management and Operating Level Personnel are 
predominantly from organizations that are contracting out procurement functions.  When 
isolating the Defense Agencies from the Services and others, however, that number 
exceeded 85%.  When looking only at Navy and Marine Corps organizations, that number 
dropped slightly below 35%.  These findings are consistent with other studies, which found 
the Defense Agencies with the highest ratio of contracted support services and the Navy 
and Marine Corps with the lowest.  When asked which functions are involved, contract 
closeout was identified with the greatest frequency.  This was true for all Services and the 
Defense Agencies.  Policy and Senior Management personnel tended to cite market 
research, acquisition planning, drafting policy, developing evaluation criteria, evaluation of 
offers, and requirements development as the predominant functions contracted out.  Some 
policy/senior personnel did state, however, that all functions performed by 1102s, except for 
inherently governmental functions, are placed on contract.  The percentage of Management 
and Operating Personnel who reported functions contracted out in their organizations was 
much higher and included all contract specialist functions in support of the Contracting 
Officer in both pre-award and post-award phases.  Most were careful to explain that the 
approvals, determinations and decisions made by Contracting Officers were not included. 
The most prevalent reasons cited for contracting out are the lack of organic 
resources to meet workload demands and the lack of needed skills or expertise in certain 
areas.  The continual downsizing and freezes on hiring new personnel over the last several 
years, together with an increase in the workload, has severely strained the contracting 
community.  In certain geographical areas, there is constant turnover and an inability to fill 
1102 vacancies with qualified applicants.  In some cases, contractors are used to obtain 
exposure to business concepts and insight into commercial practices and technology.  
Some stated that hiring contractors is generally easier and faster than trying to obtain 
Federal employees through the cumbersome civil service personnel process.  Contractors 
provide greater flexibility in adjusting to workload fluctuations, particularly due to surge 
situations.  They can also provide continuity to those cases in which organizations are 
experiencing a very high turnover of contract specialists.   
The most common reason for not contracting out procurement functions is that the 
organization believes all aspects of contracting are inherently governmental.  Even if the 
organization did not consider contracting inherently governmental, there was a preference 
against contracting out, especially if interchangeability of personnel or adaptability was 
threatened.  In smaller offices, Contracting Officers are performing most contract specialist 
functions that would be difficult to untangle from their decision-making functions.  In some 
cases, the organization claimed that sufficient resources existed to meet workload 
requirements or that outsourcing the functions did not provide any additional advantages.  A 
few organizations indicated that the potential for conflicts of interest or other ethical 
problems had steered them away from using contractors.  In a couple of cases, respondents 
felt that contractors were more expensive than Government employees.  One scenario that 
has been cause for concern is contractor default.  Buying offices that have turned over 
contract specialist workload to contractor employees may be in a difficult situation if the 
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contractor is terminated for default.  It would be arduous to explain to the buying office’s 
customers that procurement actions are delayed because the contractor(s) defaulted.  If a 
significant portion of that office’s workforce consisted of contractor employees, the added 
burden may be too overwhelming for the civil servants in the office. 
Effectiveness of Contracted Services 
Management and Operating Level Personnel expressed overwhelmingly that 
contracts for procuring contracting functions were highly effective or somewhat effective.  A 
deeper analysis of the results, however, shows that most of the respondents indicating a 
positive effectiveness of contracts based their evaluation on a simple objective set of 
metrics. First, did contractor performance allow the command to meet its mission, and 
second, was overall performance good enough to consider the contractor for future work.  
The heart of the rudimentary metric gets at the most basic rationale for contracting out any 
function, getting the job done and doing it satisfactorily. Responses are based primarily on 
criteria that find their basis in whether the contractor allowed the activity or business unit to 
achieve its mission or productivity goals, and additionally, whether the contractor had any 
significant performance problems that would preclude them from being considered as a 
candidate for future award of similar work.  No other criteria for measuring effectiveness 
were being systemically applied.  What is challenging for contract managers is that metrics 
are difficult to capture in any detailed objective format.  The subjective nature of this type of 
assessment by the population surveyed is very common.  It is, however, a measure that can 
be captured by Past Performance Information (PPI) systems, and the Contractor 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS) currently in use within DOD. 
Limitations on Effort Contracted Out 
Three aspects of limitations on contractors performing procurement functions were 
explored: (1) the duration of contracted support effort, (2) whether contractors should be 
physically located with Government personnel performing the same tasks, and (3) 
percentage limitations on the amount of procurement effort that could be contracted out.  
The first area was presented on the policy survey while the latter two areas were presented 
on the management/operating level personnel surveys. 
 Duration 
Over 60% of the respondents believed these contracts should be of a temporary 
nature.  Organizations which tended to currently have more procurement functions 
contracted out were split over the idea of temporary versus permanent.  The proponents for 
temporary contracts felt it should only be used for surge or emergent requirements while the 
Government recruits and trains organic resources.  Those advocating a more permanent 
duration felt it will be several years, if ever, before Government resource requirements are 
met, thus a lasting contractual relationship should be established.  Some feel that certain 
tasks, such as contract closeout, have such a low priority they might never be appropriately 
completed without contractor support and should be made permanent regardless of in-
house resource levels.  It appears to the researchers that almost all the reasons cited in the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) as valid alternatives for the use of advisory and 
assistance services (A&AS) contracts seem to imply temporary situations.  Obtaining advice, 
points of view, opinions, special knowledge, alternative solutions, support to improve 
operations, and assistance with more efficient and effective operation of managerial or 
hardware systems all give the impression that agency management would acquire these 
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“consultant” services on an as-needed basis. Further, the language does not give the 
impression that the performance of routine tasks on a day-to-day basis is the intent of 
employing this capability.  If management policy is to utilize contracted support only if we 
must, then certainly all contracts for this support should be viewed as temporary until no 
longer required.  If management policy is to leave this up to each individual organization to 
decide, then the types of functions they perform and their overall view of the procurement 
responsibility will drive their choice. 
 Co-location 
Closely related to the matter of personal services relationships during contract 
performance is the location of contractor employees when they are carrying out their duties.  
An overwhelming 75% majority of respondents emphatically expressed the need for close 
communications on a face-to-face basis between all members of the acquisition team.  The 
professional interaction that will occur through physical proximity outweighs any risks that 
might surface.  The day-to-day working conditions requiring communication, efficient 
interaction, responsive feedback/input, and professional interface to advance learning and 
understanding all support a blended workforce.  Past attempts at separation have shown 
this to severely hinder smooth accomplishment of the contracting functions.  The 25% who 
said contractor employees should not be in the same spaces as civil servants were not 
denying the benefits of personal interaction but rather were implying that the risks are more 
than should be accepted.  Access to sensitive and proprietary data, security considerations, 
and the potential for conflicts of interest was of real concern.  Personal service concerns 
appear to be diminishing. 
 Percentage of Contracted Services 
The last area related to restrictions on the extent of contractor participation is the 
idea of confining the percentage of effort that activities can place on contract.  A Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) report recommended that each contracting activity be limited to 
no more than 25% of their workforce that may be contracted out.  The researchers decided 
to ask not only where the percentage limitation on the workforce should be established, but 
also what percentage of the workload should be limited to outsourcing.  Regarding 
workforce, just over 50% of the respondents said that it should be under 25% and the total 
reaches three-fourths of the respondents when one goes to a 50% limitation.  Just over 45% 
of the respondents believe that contracting out should be constrained to under 50% of the 
total workload while that percentage increases to 65% if half of the workload is the limitation.  
Experience and Training Requirements 
The DOD acquisition workforce has been criticized over the years for its lack of skills, 
knowledge and abilities to execute its responsibilities.  The Report of the Commission on 
Government Procurement, the Packard Commission report and several other studies from 
similar groups have pointed to the need for a professional workforce meeting minimum 
standards established for education, training and experience.  Recommendations from 
these studies served as the impetus that created the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) and led to the standards in place today.  It would be justifiable to 
expect that anyone performing contracting functions for DOD should meet these standards 
and qualifications.  Should this expectation be extended to contractor personnel performing 
procurement functions for the Government?  And if so, how difficult would it be to impose 
and enforce DAWIA standards on contractors?  This was the issue explored in both surveys.  
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The Policy and Senior Management survey asked about DAWIA implications and whether 
DAWIA should be imposed on contractors, while the Management and Operating Personnel 
survey queried participants as to the level of difficulty encountered if an attempt were made 
to compel contractors to comply with DAWIA.  Seventy percent of the policy survey 
respondents felt there are DAWIA implications whereas about 65% felt that DAWIA or 
DAWIA-like requirements should be imposed.  Forty-five percent of the 
management/operating personnel said it would be difficult or very difficult to impose and 
enforce DAWIA requirements, while, in contrast, over 45% noted that it would be easy.  
Although not an overwhelming majority, most participants felt that DAWIA is important to the 
issue of using contracted employees.   
The argument for application of DAWIA includes the beliefs that these requirements 
are critical elements in the performance of complex functions to ensure individuals have the 
ability to think logically, act competently, stay current in the field, meet contractual 
expectations, and perform in a proficient manner.  Proponents believed that contractors 
should be held to the same standard of competence as DOD personnel. Those opposing 
application of DAWIA claim: it will cost the Government an additional expense for 
contractors to meet the standards; most contractor employees are former Government 
personnel and probably already have these certifications; DAWIA is a statutory requirement 
placed on the Government and not industry; some are already using DAWIA standards as 
an evaluation criterion in source selections or use DAWIA language in statements of work to 
describe desired labor categories, and it will inhibit competition.  There appear to be valid 
arguments on both sides.  It seems as if the argument for DAWIA focuses primarily on the 
level of skills and competencies personnel should hold, while the argument against mainly 
suggests that DAWIA qualifications are already being used to a certain extent and to push 
any further would be costly to the Government.   One might conclude that if DAWIA is 
already being used in this environment to one extent or another, full application of this 
qualification should not be a difficult stretch.  Further, although there may be added expense 
to the Government to bring contractor employees up to a certain level of competence, failure 
to do so may be even more costly in the less-than-satisfactory performance of contracting 
functions, even though there might be Government oversight. 
Impact on the Contracting System 
The research examined the affect contracted procurement services might have on 
the contracting system by looking at three aspects: (1) the development of future 
Contracting Officers, (2) the development of procurement options by agency management, 
and (3) the extent to which companies might not want to participate in Government 
procurement.  The first two areas were addressed on both surveys while the last was asked 
only on the policy survey. 
 Contracting Officers 
Over 65% of the respondents felt that contracting out procurement functions could 
have a damaging impact on the development of future Contracting Officers, slightly over 
20% felt it would not have any affect, and less than 10% thought it might have a beneficial 
impact.  Respondents believing a damaging impact could occur pointed to the critical need 
to nurture and cultivate a competent and professional workforce.  Significant contract 
specialist experience is needed to progress through the basic and intermediate levels to 
ultimately reach the advanced and expert proficiency levels required of Contracting Officers.  
One needs to be exposed to the broadest cross-section of contracting tasks that permits 
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development of the critical thinking skills and competencies so fundamental to making 
complex Contracting Officer decisions.  It was argued that contract specialists need to 
experience the various avenues one might pursue in accomplishing a particular objective.  
They need to grasp the underlying mechanics and inner workings and, in fact, they need to 
fail from time-to-time to discover the weaknesses and risks surrounding particular courses of 
action.  They need to rotate through various assignments in contracting to undergo and be 
exposed to the specific facets these duties offer.  Contract specialists need to be mentored.  
Not only must they eventually acquire strong managerial skills but they must also develop 
leadership capabilities.  The Government acts through its Contracting Officers and, by 
extension, its contract specialists.  They are the “face to industry” with which the 
Government speaks and acts.  They exhibit authority, execute responsibilities, create 
relationships and perform duties all as part of the Government’s side of the buyer-seller 
relationship.  All of these abilities are accumulated on the job, integrated with appropriate 
levels of training and education.  Many would argue that the “culturing” acquired through 
mentoring must be achieved by interaction with a Government workforce, while others would 
assert that capable and adept contractor personnel can greatly assist to the same degree.  It 
can be rationalized that the existence of contractor personnel working as contract specialists 
in a Government organization can bring new dimensions to the performance of procurement 
duties.  An important ingredient frequently missing in buying offices is the sensitivity and 
understanding of commercial and industrial procurement practices that work well, or do not 
function well, in the business world.  Sound business methods and the decisions that result 
from genuine business thinking are vital to any “business” even if it is the business of 
Government procurement.  The research has suggested, however, that most of the 
contractor staff employed to perform contracting functions are former Government 
acquisition personnel who have had little, if any, industry experience to bring to the 
procurement table.  Some have even complained that the Government contracting 
knowledge they do bring is outdated and lacks currency.  The business manager’s role 
required of contracting professionals today differs from the contracting technician’s role of 
even a few years ago.  The research thus far has suggested that contractor employees 
performing procurement functions are dedicated, trustworthy and reliable.  Their loyalty to 
the US is unquestioned.  However, because their livelihood is derived from a private entity, 
there could be an inkling of suspicion on the part of Government managers that these 
employees might not always be placing the best interests of the Government ahead of all 
others.  This thought could carry into the interactions between Government contract 
specialists and contractor personnel where proposed courses of action might not be the 
most beneficial to the Government.  Ruling out ignorance or incompetence for the moment, 
some would question that contractor employees would investigate all viable alternatives 
before coming forth with a proposed solution, particularly if one or more alternatives were 
perceived as detrimental to their company.  
 Procurement Options 
One of the major concerns regarding procurement of contracting functions is the 
long-term affect this would have on the ability of agency management to develop and 
consider procurement options.  Over 40% of the respondents believed that this will expand 
the procurement options while less than 25% believed it will limit such options.  Almost 30% 
felt it would neither limit nor expand the procurement options.  Most notably, Policy and 
Senior Management personnel mostly believed that it will enhance options.  Arguments can 
be made for both the notion that options are expanded and the concern that options are 
limited.  Several valid points support the former.  Contractors can free up Government 
personnel to perform more complex or value added tasks; they can come with specific skills 
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and expertise to supplement Government weaknesses; they usually operate in a competitive 
environment and, therefore, have developed innovative approaches that can be shared with 
the Government; they are not as stove-piped in their thinking and training, and they come at 
a time when in-house resources and capabilities appear to be extremely low.  One of the 
chief reasons set forth by proponents of the “expand” position is that contractor employees 
bring knowledge of industry best practices and business concepts that can be shared with 
contract specialists.  This could be a way of introducing commercial procedures and actions, 
which might greatly assist in executing a more effective and efficient procurement system.  
Consider, however, the sources from which these contractor personnel might come.  Many 
buying organizations claim that their contractors use former Government civil servants and 
military personnel, which increases their ability to perform contracting functions.  But this 
almost assures that they will have had little industry experience.  Even those individuals who 
have previously worked for companies holding prime contracts with the Federal Government 
have been in the Contracts Division and interfacing directly with their Federal counterparts.  
Not until you get to someone with experience in the Procurement or Subcontracts 
Department of a company will you find an individual likely to be immersed in business 
practices.  If employees come from outside this realm, they probably have had little 
“Government” experience with which to execute their contracting responsibilities and will 
most likely have a significant learning curve in becoming familiar with the Federal 
procurement world.  The prime reasons set forth by those who claim it will limit options 
involve: (1) a belief that a contractor’s objectivity will be questioned because they might not 
always have the Government’s best interests at heart; (2) the restrictive nature of firewalls 
and other safeguards necessary to ensure prevention of conflicts of interest; (3) a denial of 
valuable training and experience for junior Government personnel; (4) contractual limitations 
placed on organizations as to how they can use contractor employees; (5) experience with 
contractors where little assistance with options was provided; and (6) fewer experienced civil 
servants available to adequately assess and evaluate contractor performance.  Those who 
felt there would be no affect on the ability to develop procurement options essentially 
believed that talented individuals will make a considerable contribution regardless of their 
origin: Government or contractor.   Further, they point out, it really is up to management to 
decide how to act on specialists’ input, no matter what the source 
 Market Participation 
The extent to which companies are willing to participate in procurements when one 
or more other companies are involved in performing contracting functions for the 
Government should be of some concern.  The health of the industrial base is often 
measured by the amount and nature of competition.  If companies become suspicious of 
their treatment in Government competitions, their eagerness to continue may be dampened.  
The result could be that less information is forthcoming, particularly confidential and private 
data, or worse, that companies withdraw from Government competitions altogether.  The 
“large” contractor dependent on Government contracts, particularly if it is a sole source, is 
less likely to disengage but could potentially restrict the flow of information.  Companies with 
a significant amount of commercial business in addition to public contracts could very well 
decide to no longer stay connected with Government procurement.  Over one-half of the 
respondents are concerned about a negative impact.  Most of the respondents from the 
Services, over 75%, believed that a negative affect could occur, but no one from the 
Defense Agencies held this belief.  Many of those from the Defense Agencies have had 
experience with contracted procurement services and can report their views from actual 
situations.  The primary concern from those expressing a negative impact centers on the 
fairness and objective treatment of competing firms.  The inappropriate use of proprietary 
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data, biased evaluations, and undue influence by private companies all can lead to distrust 
in the integrity of the contracting process.  Some would point out that all of these abuses 
could occur with Government personnel as well but Federal laws impose civil and criminal 
sanctions on these individuals which is not the case with contractor employees.  This affect 
is subtle and difficult to measure because it entails industry perceptions.  It is unlikely that 
most companies, if questioned, would cite their distrust of the system as the reason for non-
participation.  
 Integrity of the Contracting Process 
This area was brought out on both surveys.  Although some of the respondents 
asserted that the best way to ensure integrity is to completely avoid using contractors, most 
provided thoughts and ideas they felt would help to maintain a robust contracting system.  
Many pointed to proactive efforts that will maintain necessary components of integrity.  
Sensible policies that discuss the legal, ethical, and practical aspects are critical.  Integrity 
has to do with the image and reputation of the system.  The actions, or inactions, resulting 
from “challenges” to the system, such as fraudulent or abusive events, shape the character 
and personality of the system.  How the Government handles a breach of our laws and 
ethics policies, both by civil servants and contractors, is highly visible and reaches to the 
heart of our moral fiber.  It is the responsibility of every member of the acquisition team to do 
his or her utmost to preserve the highest quality of our collective personality and culture.  
Certainly, safeguards and precautions are vital.  Methods to discourage or prevent conflicts 
of interest, illegal actions, and other similar activities must be in place.  Internal Government 
efforts, such as oversight, audits, reviews, surveillance, awareness training, and firewalls 
can and should be used.  External efforts focused on contractors are also important and 
could include non-disclosure statements to protect sensitive data, financial disclosure, and 
ethical and integrity certifications.  Going a step further, it could be argued that contractor 
employees who have been entrusted with the same responsibilities as civil servants should 
face the same consequences for contraventions of that trust.  Civil and criminal sanctions 
should apply equally to all who are accountable for public endeavors.  A very recent (March 
2008) GAO report cited the need for additional conflict of interest safeguards for contractor 
employees who work alongside DOD civil servants. 
 Procurement Policy 
This topic was broached to the Policy and Senior Management personnel in both the 
surveys and interviews.  Over 60% believe that a policy statement would be extremely 
helpful in clarifying top management’s position on all aspects of this issue.  Their main 
concern is the range in difference of opinion concerning the definition of inherently 
governmental functions and a more direct application to contracting functions is needed.  
The 35% who do not believe a policy statement is necessary believed that sufficient policy 
and guidance already exists and any further language on the subject would probably serve 
to make things more restrictive.  Key elements that should be included if such a policy were 
published varied.  Respondents felt a policy should be very flexible and include some or all 
of the following: (1) identify those to whom the policy applies, (2) identify functions that are 
considered acceptable for contracting out, (3) cite safeguards to be used, (4) identify 
sanctions for failure to comply with the policy, (5) provide conflict of interest mitigation 
strategies, (6) establish approvals and approval levels, (7) emphasize that contractors have 
no decision authority, (8) specify that contractors cannot commit the Government, (9) 
suggest best practices in using contractors, (10) identify risks and how to manage them, (11) 
identify what contract types should be used,  (12) require non-disclosure agreements and 
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financial disclosure statements, (13) suggest metrics to be used in evaluating contractor 
performance, (14) enumerate required contractor credentials or qualifications, and (15) 
outline the extent to which contractors can participate in Government events outside the 
workplace. 
Conclusions 
Contracting out of procurement functions has been effective, however, robust 
metrics to measure and assess contractor performance are lacking.  Almost all 
respondents stated that contracting out of procurement functions was effective, however, 
most utilized mission attainment and perceptions of overall contractor performance as 
metrics.  These measures should not be discounted, as they are clearly important to the end 
user.  However, they represent a fuzzy account of effectiveness without clear criteria.  There 
were no comprehensive or universal metrics nor framework utilized for determining 
effectiveness across process, workforce, and outputs with regard to quantitative measures 
(objective) and qualitative measures (subjective).  Any specific metrics cited were generally 
being utilized in an ad hoc and inconsistent manner.  In light of capacity and capability 
shortfalls, the ability to utilize contractors to complete essential missions is considered a 
success.  However, long-range assessment of effectiveness against established criteria is 
not occurring. 
The phrase “inherently governmental function” continues to be inconsistently 
interpreted and applied throughout DOD.  The blurred distinctions between inherently 
governmental and non-inherently governmental functions caused by the discretionary ability 
of agencies to decide its borders will continue to trouble the acquisition process until 
clarification has occurred.  The Acquisition Advisory Panel has recommended that OFPP 
update the principles agencies use in determining which functions must be performed by 
Government employees.  This study has served to confirm that such a recommendation is 
valid and pressing. 
Personal services relationships are almost inevitable in the close working 
circumstances required between Government contracting employees and contractor 
personnel performing procurement functions.  The lines between the buyer-seller 
relationship and the employer-employee relationship have become more distorted than ever.  
Contract award requires much higher-level review and interaction with the author of 
documents.  These exchanges, if done between Government Contracting Officers and 
contractors could be interpreted as personal services.  The co-location of contractor 
employees in Government facilities certainly creates the appearance that they are 
Government employees if not actual treatment as such.  The contracting functions that 
might be contracted out are frequently so closely intertwined with functions that must be 
performed by Government personnel that a personal services relationship will almost 
certainly develop. 
The contracting community is seriously concerned about the potential for 
conflicts of interest, both organizational and personal, when contractors are used to 
perform contracting functions.  The issue of conflicts of interest has come up on 
numerous occasions during this research.  Legal concerns almost always turn into a 
discussion of conflicts of interest and ethical considerations frequently result in the same 
scenario.  Government employees have been so carefully trained over the last several years 
regarding not only inappropriate but also illegal behavior that they are very sensitive to not 
only actual situations but also the perception of conflicts.  One step to lessen the potential 
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for conflicts of interest would be to establish firewalls within the organization that prevent 
contractor employees from operating outside the specific boundaries of their particular 
project.  In reality, this becomes very expensive to structure and enforce.  One drawback is 
that this does not allow contractor personnel to transfer knowledge and freely interact with 
Government contract specialists outside their firewall, which has been cited as a benefit to 
having contractors present in the first place. The Acquisition Advisory Panel believes that 
because the FAR provides considerable leeway to agencies in addressing actual or 
potential conflicts of interest and because there is a lack of guidance in mitigating such 
conflicts leading to inconsistent application of the regulations, uniform regulatory language is 
needed. 
Specific measures must be taken to ensure ethical standards are maintained 
and the integrity of the contracting process is protected.  One might assume that so 
much education has gone into shaping the ethical character and identity of the acquisition 
workforce in recent years, that this conclusion would be unnecessary.  The Darleen Druyun 
affair caused considerable consternation within the acquisition workforce, particularly 
contracting community.  This situation came up during interviews in the context of ethical 
principles and an imperative need to protect the integrity of the acquisition and contracting 
processes.  It caused acquisition organizations to “pull back” and reexamine the 
fundamental structure of their ethical climate.  Are the right checks and balances in place to 
prevent or discourage such events?  Does the senior leadership put correct and suitable 
emphasis on ethical principles and moral values?  Are instances of ethical and standards of 
conduct transgressions handled in a vigorous fashion?  Are subtle indiscretions and 
instances of wrongdoing dealt with promptly and aptly?  Have we assured industry, with 
overt measures, that such irresponsible actions will not be repeated?  A majority of survey 
respondents deem that ethical issues are clearly associated with contracting for 
procurement services and that specific actions are necessary to protect the integrity of the 
contracting process. 
Contracting out of procurement services will have a negative affect on the 
ability of the Federal Government to develop Contracting Officers but may expand the 
ability of Government agencies to develop procurement options.  Over 65% of the 
respondents maintained the former. Contracting Officers grow from the experience of having 
worked as contract specialists.  They need to grasp the underlying fundamentals, concepts 
and basics; understand the implications of particular courses of action; and experience 
various assignments that require critical thinking, interpretation of regulations and policies, 
judgment skills, cultural awareness and the ability to make trades.  All of these skills and 
abilities are acquired on the job, interspersed with appropriate levels of training and 
education.   As the decision is made to increase the number of contractors in the workforce, 
there will be fewer full time civil servants hired, which ultimately reduces the pool of potential 
Contracting Officers.  If lower level functions are contracted out, they may be ill-prepared to 
do the more complex tasks later in their careers. Over 40% of the respondents felt 
procurement options would be expanded.  They cited that contractors can bring new ideas 
to the discussion, they can interject industry business methods, they allow Government 
personnel to perform more difficult tasks, they can come with specific skills and expertise, 
and they may have innovative approaches which can be shared with the Government.   
Government procurement has long been reproached for its lack of understanding of 
commercial methods and sound business concepts and practices.  Contractors may, for 
example, be able to accomplish and supply market research and planning alternatives that 
would be more difficult for Government personnel to provide. 
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There is mixed opinion regarding the affect contracting out of procurement 
services would have on companies participating in the marketplace for Government 
contracts.  This research started with the premise that there could be a negative affect on 
the willingness of some companies to either compete for Government contracts or to be 
open with information, technology and data if contractors were performing Government 
contracting functions.  If companies become suspicious of their treatment in Government 
competitions, their eagerness to continue may be dampened.  Firms are more likely to 
question the integrity of the process if non-Government personnel handle proprietary 
information and participate in or influence acquisition strategies and source selections.  
Vendors could lose confidence in the fairness and objective treatment of offerors.  Although 
a majority held this view, several respondents, with many years of experience in using 
contracted procurement services believed that there would not be a negative affect on 
market participation.  In all of their dealings with industry, they have not seen any perceived 
or real impact on market participants.  They felt that offerors are very willing to do business 
with the Government even though other companies are performing contracting functions. 
Government contracting functions are being performed by contractors 
because buying organizations lack sufficient human resources to accomplish 
mission requirements.  Time and again throughout the surveys and interviews, the chief 
response to a question about the need to use contractors was that the levels of Government 
personnel are too low to permit adequate performance of the workload.  Contracting Officers 
and contract specialists are overwhelmed and feel they are working in sweat shops.  In 
certain geographical areas, the same positions in other Federal agencies are far less 
demanding and provide the same level of compensation.  Openings in these agencies are 
very attractive.  It is literally impossible to fill vacant positions with qualified applicants. 
Downsizing actions taken in the acquisition workforce over the last several years, large 
numbers of retirements, hiring freezes, slowly developing intern programs and a 
cumbersome personnel recruitment system all have added to the problem.  Although hiring 
authority has improved in very recent years, there is a significant gap between the entry 
level and the journeyman level employee.  All of these conditions have caused some 
supervisors to solve their human capital dilemma by contracting out. 
A majority of senior contracting personnel believe that contracts for 
procurement services should be of a temporary nature.  Over 60% of senior contracting 
personnel believe it should be on a temporary basis and limited to surge or emergent 
demands while the Government recruits and trains organic resources.  There is recognition 
that a periodic reevaluation of need and internal capability should be the deciding point to 
continue under contract.  Although these contracts are viewed as “temporary,” if the long-
term plan is to convert back to the Government any functions contracted out after sufficient 
staff has been recruited and hired, then the timeframes could be in years.  If the contracts 
are for certain functions, such as market research or requirements development, in which 
the contractor is typically engaged in a specific acquisition under a task order, then these 
are of a more temporary nature.  There is not a unanimous opinion that they be temporary.  
Some felt they were recognizing reality by pointing out the long-term problem of getting 
additional Government billets, and that contracts should be placed on a permanent basis 
until and unless a cadre of trained Government 1102s is in place, which will take years.  
Contract closeout is an example of a recurring need in which organizations may never be 
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Contractor personnel performing procurement functions should be co-located 
with Government contracting personnel.  There is a need for close communications on a 
face-to-face basis between all members of the acquisition team. Contractor personnel must 
be an active part of the Government team, building solid working relationships and learning 
from each other.  Physically separating Government and contractor employees hampers 
communication and would not create a very conducive work environment or atmosphere 
and might tend to develop an “us” versus “them” mentality.  With multi-functional 
Government teams, it could be detrimental to segregate out the contractor employees.  
Services involve personal interaction and relationships.  Physical separation simply 
artificially complicates performance of a cohesive objective.  The interface that occurs 
through physical proximity outweighs most risks that might surface.  Professional interaction 
and synergy are needed to efficiently perform the functions. There is a need to be close to 
the customer for effective support and to reap the efficiencies of real-time decision-making. 
Also, co-location will aid in the performance of the Government’s responsibility for contractor 
oversight.  Examples exist in which contractor employees were physically separated but 
were relocated to the Government facility because the ability of Government personnel to 
interact with contractors was very difficult.  It is true that there is the potential for direction by 
the Government leading to personal services, and physical separation would assist in the 
perception that the services are not personal.  Additionally, access to sensitive and 
proprietary data, security considerations, and the potential for conflicts of interest is of real 
concern. Safeguards and security measures must be taken to protect against such 
occurrences. 
The percentage of the contracting workforce and/or the percentage of the 
contracting workload placed on contract for performance by contractor employees 
should not exceed an established maximum.  This study evaluated a limitation in terms 
of workforce and workload.  The surveys indicate that most individuals advocate a maximum 
somewhere between 25% and 50% of either measure of effort.  Although full time 
equivalents are easy to measure and a percentage of an activity’s end strength is easy to 
calculate, it is the view of this research that the percentage limitation be applied to workload 
as opposed to workforce.  Individual contracting members of a buying organization perform 
a range of tasks and duties.  Cutting them out of the organization slices through these tasks 
without regard to the complexity or nature of the tasks involved.  Further, when focusing on 
workload, an activity can group various tasks that are candidates for performance by 
contractors, such as contract closeout duties, and apply the percentage to the grouped 
tasks.  Government contract specialists do not perform just one set of duties, such as 
contract closeout, but are typically engaged in a fuller range of responsibilities.  Workload 
considerations also permits the organization to think in terms of grouped tasks that can 
easily be described in statements of work, are fairly homogeneous, may be of low risk, and 
might be easily severable and require far less interaction with Government personnel, 
thereby potentially even allowing performance at the contractor’s facility.  
Requirements similar to those found in the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) could be imposed on contractor employees performing 
Government procurement functions without difficulty.  Sixty-five percent of the senior 
contracts leadership believed that DAWIA or DAWIA-like certification requirements should 
be imposed on contractor personnel performing contracting functions for the Government.  
There is a feeling that these requirements are critical elements in the performance of 
complex functions and that contractors should be required to have the same level of 
competence as Government personnel.  Contracting tasks have become more complicated, 
of a high-risk nature, and demand intellectually capable personnel who can reason through 
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the issues with common sense and wisdom.  Many of the contractor personnel working in 
Government offices are former civil servants or military who achieved DAWIA certification 
while in the Government.  They most likely already hold the requisite credentials.  If serious 
thought is given to requiring DAWIA, the extent to which standards already exist that are 
comparable to DAWIA-type requirements should be explored.  Professional association 
certification programs, industry association and corporate training programs, and academic 
certificate programs are all examples of existing or potential methods for alternatively 
meeting DAWIA-type standards.  
There is general opposition among Navy and Marine Corps contracts leaders 
to the notion of contracting out procurement functions.  Through interviews and from 
the surveys, it has become apparent that most of the Navy and Marine Corps contracting 
leadership are generally opposed to contracting out procurement functions.  Although they 
will acknowledge that some contracting functions, such as contract closeout, are being 
effectively performed by contractors and might not otherwise be accomplished in a timely 
fashion, the vast majority of tasks are, in their estimation, so closely intertwined with 
inherently governmental functions that they must be performed by Government civil 
servants.  Even in those cases in which a buying organization is utilizing contractors fairly 
extensively, there is a feeling that if sufficient qualified personnel were available they would 
rather accomplish all mission requirements with Government employees. 
A policy regarding the contracting out of procurement functions is needed.  
Sixty percent of the senior leadership believed a policy is needed to set the general 
boundaries for contracting out and would be extremely helpful in clarifying top 
management’s position on all aspects of this issue.  Their main concern is that there is too 
much difference of opinion concerning the definition of inherently governmental functions 
and a more direct application to contracting functions is needed.  This is coupled with the 
perceived need for an identification of conflict of interest mitigation strategies, metrics to be 
used in evaluating contractor performance, appropriate sanctions for contractor 
transgressions, the qualifications and credentials that should be required of contractors, the 
hidden risks involved, and best practices in using contractors, to name just a few. 
Recommendations 
Metrics should be developed and robustly utilized to monitor and assess 
contractor performance of Government contracting functions.  This research has found 
that the acquisition workforce believes that the procurement of contracting functions have 
been relatively effective based on only two primary factors: (1) was the mission 
accomplished in that the contracting functions were performed, and (2) did the contractor 
perform well enough to be considered for future contracts.  As was discussed earlier, there 
are obvious shortfalls in the existing means to determine effectiveness, in that it lacks clearly 
defined criteria and the degree to which the value of effectiveness is determined.  To aid in 
the development of valid metrics to determine effectiveness, it is recommended that 
organizations use the model depicted in Appendix 1.  This study suggests specifics that 
could be used as a starting point for creation of organization-unique metrics and measures 
for local application that can be inserted into the appropriate sections of the model.   Data 
requirements should be tailored within the model framework for each unique application and 
should strike a proper balance to ensure that they can elicit contractor performance 
consistent with strategic organizational performance goals.  Activities should utilize this 
model framework as the basis of construct for any contracting action for procurement 
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functions.  Higher level management and policy personnel can use this model to gather and 
disseminate informational and actionable metrics within their organizations.  The value of 
this model is that it brings together the quantitative (objective) and qualitative (subjective) 
dimension together with the three types of metric categories (process, workforce, and 
outputs) and overlays these on the six phases of the contracting process.  The contractor’s 
work effort must be evaluated and assessed.  Government contracting personnel will have 
the principal responsibility for performing these evaluations.  In actuality, assessing the 
performance of a contractor performing Government contracting functions is not unlike the 
assessment that must occur when Government managers and supervisors are evaluating 
their own civil servant workforce.  Many of these judgments are highly subjective in nature 
but nonetheless must be performed.  It is suggested that this model will assist in that difficult 
task. 
The Department of Defense should issue a policy regarding the contracting out 
of procurement functions.  There is overwhelming evidence, as brought out in surveys 
and interviews, that some type of policy should be disseminated from the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense that will guide the Services and Defense Agencies through the 
challenges created by utilizing contractors to perform Government contracting functions.  
This is not to say that organizations have not already successfully carried out the 
responsibility of awarding and administering contracts under which contractors are 
effectively and productively executing these duties.  At a minimum, the policy should 
address the areas brought out earlier in this paper.  Such a policy will go a long way in 
helping to clarify many of the issues currently plaguing DOD acquisition organizations.   
Safeguards to protect the integrity of the contracting process when using 
contractor support to accomplish contracting functions should be strengthened and 
rigorously enforced.  Utilization of contractor employees to perform Government 
contracting functions is relatively new and has posed a new set of complex challenges.  This 
research has confirmed the existence of serious challenges to the procurement process that 
have already been known on a fairly widespread basis.  Not the least of these is conflicts of 
interest, both organizational and personal.  Other challenges that may increase as more and 
more contractors become involved in performing contracting actions are ethical problems, 
personal services issues, legal issues, and general overall threats to the integrity of the 
contracting process.  Several measures are already in place to protect the Government from 
improper and unethical behavior on the part of both civil servants and contractors.  In many 
cases, however, experience has shown that these have not been enforced with the 
thoroughness and as meticulously as they should be imposed.    Contracting personnel 
interviewed and surveyed for this research have repeatedly pointed to the potential for 
biased and less-than-objective action on the part of contractor employees whose loyalties 
and motivations may, from time to time, be at odds with the best interests of the 
Government.  The public image and reputation of the procurement process is vital.  The 
“fishbowl” environment within which this process takes place sets an even greater 
responsibility for preserving an untarnished image on all members of the acquisition 
workforce. 
The prohibition on the use of personal services contracts should be removed.  
Throughout this study, references to the difficulties encountered by Government 
organizations attempting to avoid personal services situations have continually arisen.  
Although a contract may have been carefully crafted to eliminate any potential for such a 
relationship, including a precisely defined statement of work, actual contract execution may 
be riddled with instances where the line has been crossed.  Some organizations have taken 
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extreme measures, at some expense, to structure working relationships that meticulously 
avert any opportunity for personal services.  Other organizations have essentially ignored 
the rules because they are too unrealistic and unworkable.  It has been demonstrated in this 
study that the close working relationship so important to effective execution of contracting 
duties requires a significant amount of interaction and direction that is of a personal services 
nature.  This recommendation is consistent with a recommendation by the Acquisition 
Advisory Panel, which called for removal of the restriction regarding supervision of 
contractor employees by Government personnel.  All of the other aspects of the employer-
employee relationship, such as hiring, firing, performance appraisal, compensation, 
promotion, etc., remain exclusively within the contractor’s area of responsibility. 
Civil and criminal penalties currently applicable to Federal employees should 
be extended to contractor employees who are performing contracting functions for 
the Government.  It has been noted in this study that contractor personnel performing 
procurement functions on behalf of the Government are not subject to the same penalties 
and consequences that would be enforced upon civil servants for violations of statutes, 
standards of conflict and ethical principles.  The Government is potentially at significant risk 
for unlawful or dishonest actions taken by contractor employees acting on its behalf.  
Contractor employees are not liable for the work they perform or the recommendations they 
make.  Sanctions do exist for illegal or improper contractor behavior, such as suspension or 
debarment, but this generally fails to recognize employee misbehavior.  Companies that 
may have been injured by the unauthorized and prohibited actions of a contractor employee 
performing contracting actions may have recourse against the Government to obtain a 
remedy for an offense, but the Government, in turn, does not currently have recourse 
against that employee except to complain to the contractor and seek removal.  It has been 
expressed by many that contractor personnel performing Government contracting actions 
should be held to the same standards and consequences for wrongdoing as civil servants.  
This could occur by extending appropriate civil and criminal penalties to those contractor 
individuals performing contracting functions. 
A hierarchy of contracting functions should be developed as a classification of 
tasks that can be used to support various decisions and reporting requirements.  
Appendix 2 presents a proposed “Hierarchy of Contracting Functions” as a conceptual 
method of arraying and evaluating contracting tasks or functions that are typically performed 
by Government buying organizations.  The hierarchy can be uniquely tailored to each 
organization to reflect their specific duties at the micro level.  The hierarchy can also be 
used by DOD and the Services/Defense Agencies as a macro-level approach to 
categorizing and distinguishing tasks and duties by specific characteristics.  This 
taxonomical approach to classifying functions permits organizations to identify 
characteristics that differentiate functions from one another.  Once an organization has 
defined the objectives of its classification, e.g., candidates for contracting out, individual 
tasks can be placed in the hierarchy according to the interpretation it has made about each 
task.  Explicit justification for the category of placement should be maintained. The hierarchy 
can then be used by an organization as an inventory of functions for a variety of purposes.  
One such purpose would be to support submission of function designations under the FAIR 
Act.  The hierarchy could also be used by organizations as a common framework to 
compare the classification of tasks and supporting rationale with each other.  Additionally, 
capability gaps in skill levels identified by the DOD Competency Model could be overlaid on 
this hierarchical model to determine where a particular function under examination resides in 
the overall classification scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
“Because they remain uncategorized by any formal measure, the exact number of 
PMFs [private military firms] that have entered the market is difficult to establish and 
it most definitely remains in constant flux.  The global number is estimated to be in 
the mid-hundreds.” (Singer, 2003, p. 79)   
The purpose of this research is to help the US Department of Defense and other 
government security communities better understand the evolving PM (private military) sector 
(Avant, 2005; Jager & Kummel, 2007; Singer, 2003).  We anticipate our readers will be 
government agents, members of the international community, or others who wish to make 
informed decisions regarding the use of PMFs. This report discusses a beginning step in 
establishing a long-term program of research on the PM sector at NPS.  It is expected that 
knowledge about the sector will be built incrementally through a series of individual studies; 
no one study will provide a complete picture of the relevant features of the sector.  However, 
we believe a good starting point is to develop quantitative data about the industry, which this 
report attempts to do.  We suggest three reasons why this is an appropriate place to begin.   
First, while there are several conceptual and qualitative publications on the sector, 
there are very few quantitative studies.  Therefore, there is an important gap in our 
knowledge that we propose to fill with rigorous quantitative data. 
Second, without even rudimentary quantitative data, we have no way of knowing 
whether the firms that have been studied as individual cases (such as MPRI and Executive 
Outcomes) or those firms that have been given significant media attention (such as 
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Blackwater and Halliburton) are typical industry participants or outliers.  Thus, our starting 
point is to ensure that we have a reasonably accurate picture of the sector by compiling 
quantitative data on it.  We need rudimentary data about the industry’s size in aggregate 
(i.e., the demography of firms—cf. Singer’s quote above), which major public corporations 
(such as the prime US defense contractors) are active in the sector and in what capacity, 
and the major capabilities of firms.  Much of the data presented in this report fulfills these 
needs.   The data is basic, but since our collective understanding of the sector is also fairly 
basic, this information may well be of some utility to readers of this report.  As well as giving 
us a sense of what we think we already know, the data also provides a platform on which 
further studies can be built; i.e., it provides a context in which future research can be set.  To 
proceed to these more advanced topics, we must first pass through the entry gate; that is, 
we must ensure that the basic building blocks for comprehension and analysis are in place. 
We think that at least some of the data we exhibit is new and has—as far as we know—
never been presented before. 
Third—and perhaps most importantly—while most of our data lends support 
to already-published literature, the process of studying a large data set and 
attempting to analyze it has brought to light certain discrepancies, inconsistencies 
and anomalies between the way the sector is sometimes described and the reality of 
the empirical data.  This has led us to attempt our own re-description of the sector in 
a way we believe is more congenial to the data we have collected.   
2. Methodology Used and Background to this Study 
The data used in this report was collected primarily by three NPS MBA students 
(Jared Mitchell, Don Robbins and Chuck Dunar) working on their thesis project in the fall of 
2007 under the supervision of Nick Dew and Bryan Hudgens.  The combined faculty and 
student input into the data collection effort approximates one man-year of work.   
Data collection proceeded through three phases.  We started by assembling a list of 
firms known to be active, or to have been active at one time, in the PM sector.  We screened 
various publications about the industry for an initial list of PMFs (for example, Avant, 2005; 
Singer, 2003).  Based on this initial list of names, we assembled further names of firms 
using a snowball method (Goodman, 1961); i.e., our searches for information on the initial 
names invariably turned up new firms, which we then added to the list.  We kept working on 
the snowball until we exhausted the search for new names; i.e., further searches did not 
reveal any new firms.  Almost all of this searching was conducted online, using various 
databases available through the NPS library and public resources available via online 
search engines.  Using this methodology, we assembled a list of 550 firms “named” by one 
source or another as having been active in the sector. 
Second, we found that many firms in the sector have a website which offers 
information about the organization.  Using these and other resources, we assembled more 
detailed data on the firms in our sample—such as their founding date, founder background 
information, country of origin, and data on the capabilities these firms purport to have. 
Third, one of us conducted follow-up and fill-in data gathering on specific firms as 
part of the writing of this report. 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 432 - 
=
=
Further elements leading to the assembly of this report included coding data in our 
database, analyzing the raw and coded data, and presenting it in easily understood formats.  
Coding (for instance) of capabilities was conducted by two of us (one student, one author).  
This process was particularly lengthy and laborious, since it involved over 2,500 lines of 
data on capabilities, many redundant descriptions of capabilities, and much recoding work in 
order to get the data into a “clean” format.  Individual fields were coded independently, and 
critical variables (such as codings of Singer’s “Tip of the Spear” schema and Avant’s 
categorization scheme for contract types) were coded by both coders.  Though we have not 
yet measured inter-rater reliability of these codings, we estimate that more than 80% of 
codings are identical. 
The analysis process involved several iterations in order to produce the final charts, 
graphs and data presented in this report. The final portion of the research process involved 
both finding ways to display the data in formats that are easy for the reader to understand 
and writing this report. 
The limitations of this study are worth particular attention.  For most data categories, 
the data on PMFs is incomplete. For instance, we managed to find data on the founding 
dates of approximately 230 firms (approximately 40% of our sample).  We obtained data (at 
least in some rudimentary form) on capabilities for approximately 70% of firms, but the 
quality of this data (measured in terms of its comprehensiveness and trustworthiness) varies 
considerably.  The bottom line of our data-collection effort is that we can only analyze the 
data available, doing our best to verify its reasonableness as we go.  We cannot attest for 
the accuracy of some aspects of this data—for example, that the capabilities firms purport to 
have are “true.”  Of course, the accuracy of self-reported data is a problem for researchers 
generally, and not for our study alone.  
However, we do not know of any database on the industry that is more 
comprehensive than the one we have assembled.  As far as we know, the sample size we 
have used is much larger than any other so far studied in the sector, and this should make 
our results more robust because of the (generally) favorable statistical properties of large 
samples.   
3. Organizational Demographics of the PM Sector 
Founding Dates, Population and Industry Growth 
For this study, we traced data on 550 firms that appear to have been active in the 
PM sector.  Of these, we were able to find data on the founding dates of approximately 230 
firms.  Based on this sample of 230 firms, the following pattern of industry entry emerges: 
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Figure 1.  Pattern of PMF Founding by Year 1970-2006 
Further examination of the data indicates that half the firms for which we managed to 
find founding dates were founded between 1995 and 2007; the other half were founded 
before 1995.  This makes the PM sector a relatively young industry: half the industry is less 
than 13 years old; thus, the median age of firms is quite low.  This fact is an interesting 
contrast to the history of mercenary companies, which, of course, has very deep roots—
stretching back at least until the Early Modern period (15th and 16th Centuries) (Oritz, 






















































Figure 2.  PMF Founding Pattern by Region 
Figure 2 suggests that the recent wave of entry of PMFs is predominantly a US 
effect.  Note in particular the trend lines for firm foundings: the US trend line is rather steep, 
whereas the UK and ROW (rest of world) trend lines are almost flat.  What this trend 
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suggests is that PMF growth is being driven by US effects—such as outsourcing strategy in 
the late 1990s and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  
One possible way of thinking about entry into the PM sector is to categorize it as 
occurring in different “eras.”  Table 1 indicates data on the average number of firms founded 
in three different eras.    
Table 1.  Summary of PMF Foundings in Three Different “Eras” 
 SUM YEARS AVG 
PRE-1970 35 25 1 
1970-1989 64 20 3 
1990-2001 120 12 10 
2002-2006 48 5 10 
 
If we examine this data graphically, we observe a different picture of the trends in 
PMF founding (note the trend lines are generally quite flat in Figure 3).  Here, we can see 
that the surge in PMFs is a consistent feature of the post-Cold War era that is driven by new 
US firms entering the sector.  This means that the sector growth is not a post-9/11 




















Figure 3.  PMF Foundings 1990-2006 
Geographic Distribution of PMFs 
We found it comparatively simple to retrieve data on the nationality of PMFs.  We 
found data for over 500 firms (90%) of our population.  Note that our data is very consistent 
with the IPOA’s (International Peace Operations Association) surveys (2006 and 2007) that 
were based on much smaller samples. 
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Figure 4.  Geographical Distribution of PMFs 
As is evidenced in the chart, the industry is a 50% US phenomenon and 20% UK.  
However, this was probably not always so.  The tremendous growth in the number of US 
firms entering the industry in the past 10 years (see Figure 2) has probably changed the 
international composition of the industry.  Prior to the burst of US entry, the industry was 
probably more cosmopolitan in its composition. 
Several factors might explain this international distribution.  One factor might be 
outsourcing and privatization, which may make PMFs more prevalent in the US and UK.  
Another factor may be demand factors—i.e., provision of surge capacity for the US and UK 
to meet their commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan and to the War on Terror.  A further factor 
may come from the supply side—i.e., a distinct geographical pattern governing the 
distribution of skills required for establishing PMFs.  This requires the combination of 
specialist military/security skills and generalist entrepreneurial skills. These may be more 
prevalent in the US and UK.  Lastly, we have not yet tested this distribution for correlation 
with more general factors, such as defense spending in these particular geographies (PMFs 
per $BN defense spend), population (PMFs per million), or economic scale (PMFs per $BN 
GDP).  Future research might endeavor to explore these and other possible relationships. 
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Figure 5. PMF Founder Backgrounds  
(based on Data on 116 firms) 
Figure 5 presents the data we managed to collect on founder characteristics for 116 
PMFs (approximately 20% of our sample).  What this reveals is initially unsurprising: most 
PMFs are founded by individual entrepreneurs or entrepreneurial teams that have prior 
military experience.  However, the proportion of firms founded by individuals with special 
operations experience is a surprise: almost 40% of firms were founded by individuals with 
this background.   
One possible explanation for this result is that our sample is skewed: perhaps firms 
founded by individuals with special operations experience are more likely to “tout” their 
qualifications.  Other possibilities include both demand-side and supply-side factors.  On the 
demand side, perhaps special operations skill sets are in particularly high demand in the PM 
sector, or these activities are seen as particularly good or easy targets for contracting-out.   
On the supply side, one again wonders about the combination of skills required for 
running a successful PMF: perhaps individuals with entrepreneurial tendencies are more 
likely to select into special operations domains, or perhaps special operations experience 
tends to nurture particular organizational skills and self-confidence that lead individuals to 
participate in an entrepreneurial endeavor.   
Based on our initial analysis, founder characteristics would make a good topic for 
future research on the PM sector. 
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Named subsidiaries of Public firms
 
Figure 6. Public-private: PMF Status 
Data we gathered indicates that well over 90% of the firms in the PM sector are 
privately held.  Only a few firms (25) active in the sector are publicly held. This number is 
based on a generous definition of the industry and, therefore, includes the major defense 
contractors (the “primes”) and many firms that mainly supply IS/IT-related products and 
services to the DoD and other security agencies worldwide.  The number of “pure play” 
public PMFs is, in fact, very low: only two firms in our sample meet this definition (DynCorp 
and ArmourGroup).   
One important issue inherent in this analysis is the lack of transparency in the 
industry; this flaw is frequently highlighted by critics.  PM-sector firms are perceived to be 
rather secretive (Avant, 2005).  Our data points to the fact that there are two elements 
involved in this secrecy:  
 First, private firms generally lack transparency to outsiders, regardless of their 
industry.  Some of this is a systematic side- effect of being private, not the result of 
deliberate policy. After all, they are not required to be transparent, and they have no 
reason to be.  If most PMFs are private, then one would expect the industry to lack 
transparency regardless of its activity type.  
 Second, PMFs have other legitimacy-related concerns and sometimes security-
related reasons for shying away from the public eye.  Thus, their privacy, 
opaqueness, ambiguity and general lack of transparency may be a deliberate 
strategy.  This element is over-and-above what is common to all private firms.  
A second concern brought to light by our data is that—despite some claims to the 
contrary (for instance, Valero, 2008)—it seems rather unlikely that the PM sector will ever 
emerge as a significant aspect of the so-called military-industrial complex.  The sector’s 
organization is quite dissimilar from that of equipment manufacturers; unlike the 
manufacturing sector, the PM sector simply has not the economies of scale that have driven 
a concentration of large players (the “primes”).  Instead, the industry is highly dispersed—
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4. Capabilities/Activities Analysis 
Our database contains 2,500 lines of data on the capabilities/activities of 395 PMFs. 
The comprehensiveness of this data varies by firm; but as a starting point, we believe it is a 
useful approximation of what firms in the sector do.  To help analyze the data, we began 
with the categorizations provided in the literature on the PM sector, i.e., Singer (2003) and 
Avant (2005).  
A Starting Point: Singer’s Categorization of PMFs 
One popular device that emerged from Singer’s (2003) book on the PM sector is the 
”tip of the spear” analysis.  Singer used this tool to help explain the industry and then used 
case studies of particular firms in different places on the spear to illustrate the analysis in 
more depth.  For instance, he posed EO (Executive Outcomes) as the quintessential 
“Military Provider Firm,” MPRI as an example in the “Military Consultant Firm” category, and 




Figure 7. Singer’s “Tip of the Spear”  
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Avant’s Refinements to Singer’s Categorization Scheme: Form Firms to 
Contracts 
Deborah Avant (2005) proposed a slightly different approach to the analysis Singer 
provided.  She found that it was difficult to classify individual firms using Singer’s typology 
because many firms are diversified, offering a variety of services that appear in different 
places on the spear (e.g., Blackwater does close protection, firearms training, has a 
parachuting training team and produces an armored vehicle, among its activities).  
Moreover, Avant found that firms move around the spear, offering different services to 
different buyers at different points in time.  For these reasons, Avant proposed that contracts 





Figure 8. Avant’s Analysis of the Spear 
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A Further Revised “Tip of the Spear” Analysis: From Firms, to Contracts, to 
Capabilities 
Singer’s analysis focused on firms; Avant’s analysis focused on contracts.  In what 
follows, we offer an extension of these analyses that focuses on capabilities.  This analysis 
is premised on the observation that firms are not only diversified and move around the 
spear, but that an analysis of what tasks firms have been performing over time does not 
capture firms’ potential movement around the spear.  There is an even broader scope of 
latent activity.  One way to investigate this latent potential is to collect data on the 
capabilities firms claim they have.  The following section focuses on these capability sets. 
Capabilities are critical because underlying contracts (transactions in the 
marketplace) are firm-level capabilities.  The concept of capabilities is widely used for 
analysis in the strategic management literature because it focuses on the building blocks for 
activities that are present in a firm (and, therefore, an industry sector).  Firms distinguish 
themselves by their capabilities—firms are able to get contracts others cannot access 
because they can either do things other firms cannot or can do them at a lower cost than 
their competitors can.  Therefore, in strategic management, capabilities are often thought of 
as crucial underlying variables that explain the relative performance of firms (Barney, 1991; 
Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
Based on our attempts to cluster the approximately 2,500 individual capabilities in 
our data set, a rather different image of the “tip of the spear” emerged.  By our analysis, the 
spear is much more heterogeneous than either Singer or Avant’s analysis suggests.  The 
key result of our analysis of individual capabilities is that the PM sector is by no means 
unitary.  In fact, it is made up of quite different sub-sectors, which are probably better 
thought of as a patchwork quilt than as elements up and down the spear.  This is particularly 
true for the category “Military support firms,” which contains a smorgasbord of sub-sectors.  
These sub-sectors are essentially unrelated to one another in terms of the underlying 
capabilities they require to support contracts in any particular area.  This means that the 
firms competing for contracts in these sub-sectors tend to come from very different 
industries (for instance, some services are ”add-ons” provided by major defense contractors, 
while other services are provided by firms with capabilities that are largely undifferentiated 
from civilian/commercial skill sets, such as logistics or many IS/IT security activities).  This 
led us to present a revised “tip of the spear” diagram, displayed in Figure 9 below (in the 
figure, the individual elements are not sized or ordered to represent the data, but merely to 

































































Figure 9.  Revised “Tip of the Spear” 
 
D. Capability Analysis 
Our data suggests that approximately half of the firms in our sample of 395 are 
engaged in some kind of protective and security services; 75% do advisory and training 
work, and almost 90% are engaged in some kind of support services (variously defined).  
This data points clearly to the intermingling of service provisions up and down the spear that 
Avant and Singer (and others) have remarked on as a characteristic of the sector. 
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Figure 10.  PMF Activity Summary  
(number of active firms) 
For the exact percentages, see the table below: 
Table 2. Proportions of PMFs Active in PM Sub-sectors 
 % of Firms Active (Sample 396) 
Protection Services 53% 
Advisory/Training 76% 
Support Services 86% 
 
Another way to display this data is as proportions of the spear—i.e., to examine the 
























Figure 11.  Number of PMFs Active in Different Sub-sectors 
Viewed this way, about 25% of the different activities occurring in the sector can be 
classed as protective services, 35% as training and advisory, and 40% (almost half) as 
support services of various kinds. 
Overall, we think this data will alarm some observers and satisfy others.  Some 
people will be alarmed to find out that there are around 200 firms offering military 
competencies of various kinds for sale in the marketplace.  From this perspective, it is rather 
worrisome that there is an industry that specializes in fielding various kinds of (private) mini-
armies to the highest bidder.  Others will find this fact reassuring rather than worrisome—for 
them, a significant number of firms means competition, which means efficiency.    
Protective and Security Services 
We conducted further analysis of the content of each PM sub-sector.  Results for the 




















Figure 12.  PMFs Engaged in Protective Services  
(209 total) 
This data indicates that about 2/3 of firms who are active in the provision of 
protective services are involved in close protection of individuals and assets, i.e., stationary 
guarding and convoy protection.  When an individual thinks of private military and security 
contractors, this is probably what comes to mind.  Our data indicates that this role, indeed, is 
the mainstay of the protective services business.  
However, there are other protective services activities.  About 30 firms are known to 
be active or capable of providing protective services for marine assets.  A similar number of 
firms have capabilities for conducting a variety of operations.  The kind of services 
mentioned here include assault capabilities, rapid reaction forces, and special operations 
units.  A variety of miscellaneous services were also mentioned, as well as the provision of 
dog teams by a handful of firms. 
Training and Advisory Services 
Most firms that offer advisory (consulting) services also offer training services. There 
is considerable overlap between these services, as indicated in Figure 13:  
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Figure 13.  PMFs Engaged in Training and Advisory Activities  
(240 firms) 
There is a wide range of advisory/consulting services.  Commonly mentioned 
advisory services are risk/threat analysis, counter terrorism and current tactics.  However, 
we found that a very diverse range of advisory capabilities are offered in the marketplace.  
This suggests that—globally, at least—this sector is quite well-developed and 
comprehensive in its offerings.  
The same is true for training; our data indicates a very diverse range of training 
services are offered by firms—options too numerous to list.  According to our data, 
approximately 200 firms are active in the training market to some degree or another.  
Support Services 
Based on our earlier analysis displayed in Figure 9, it was apparent that diversity is 
also a hallmark of the support services offered in the PM sector.  However, some services 
are more widely available than others, as indicated by Figure 14 below:  
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Figure 14.  PMFs Offering Support Services  
(data from 335 firms) 
Two pieces of data seemingly jump out of Figure 14.  First, consistent with Avant’s 
analysis of contracts, intelligence support services are widely available in the sector.  This 
category includes a range of services such as surveillance, intelligence analysis, various 
counter measures, and information gathering.  The number of firms active in this service 
area indicates that significant competition exists. The second most available service is 
IS/IT/Communications.  Again, the provision of these services appears to be highly 
competitive, with many firms offering a diverse range of activities in the marketplace. 
Geographic Distribution of Capabilities: Do Different Geographies Have 
Different Capability Sets? 
Are some geographies “tippier” than others?  Do some geographies have a 























Figure 15.  Regional Capabilities Distribution  
(% of firms offering services in sub-sectors) 
When examining this data, we must remember first that the chart shows 
percentages, not absolute numbers of each geographic region’s firms active in each 
capability.  This distinction is important because approximately half the industry is based in 
the US, and this would otherwise distort the data. 
The pattern that emerges from Figure 15 is that US firms are slightly more likely to 
be involved in support services and slightly less likely to be involved in protection services. 
However, overall, there is little difference between regions when the service mix is analyzed 
at this level.  Of course, the service mix might show a geographic bias in narrower capability 
segments.  We have not yet studied this data. 
Two observations might be worth noting when we investigate the data on capabilities 
this way.  First, a focus on this lower unit of analysis (i.e., a lower unit of analysis than whole 
firms) offers us the opportunity to examine clusters of capabilities (for instance, across 
different geographies) while temporarily ignoring firms.  In principle, this might be a 
reasonable analytical strategy; it is well known that most firms recruit to fill contracts from 
databases on individuals, and that these individuals typically appear on the databases of 
more than one firm (Singer, 2003).  Therefore, what might be important is the availability of 
these individuals and their capabilities to groups of firms, rather than what individual firms 
do.  In other words, firms might merely be “shells” that hide underlying capability sets that 
are more important at the national and regional level than at the firm level. 
Second, the overall similarity of the industry across geographic regions points 
somewhat to the international nature of the business.  While there is significant variation in 
the specific offerings of individual firms, in general about 50% of firms offer protective 
services; this is true globally—regardless of a firm’s national origins.  The geographic 
proportions hold steady for training/advisory services and support services. 
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Reprise: Defining and Bounding the PM Sector 
Analysis of PMF capabilities invariably leads us back to the question of what, and 
who, belongs inside the sector (Oritz, 2007b).  In conducting our survey, we initially used a 
generous definition of firms “active” within the PM sector in some form or another.  But 
clearly, the definition of “sector” and “participant” is important here.  Figure 16 summarizes 
the various ways we think the sector might be defined:   
 
Figure 16.  Defining the PM Sector 
In this diagram, the vertical axis explains what activity is taking place.  The activities 
are arrayed according to Singer’s “tip of the spear” heuristic.  The horizontal axis illustrates 
where activities are occurring—either in hot zones (how hot, of course, varies) or at home 
(i.e., some other safe location).  
The most restrictive definition of the “industry” would focus on Segments 1 and 2 in 
this figure.  The 2006 IPOA survey used a somewhat restrictive definition of the sector—
referring to firms engaged in armed security operations, which yielded a sample of 100 
firms.  In its report on PMFs, Human Rights First (2008, p. 1) used a similar definition, 
explaining that: 
There is no universal, agreed definition of the term “private security contractor” […]  
Human Rights First uses here an essentially functional definition of the term in light 
of the actual activities of such contractors fielded in Iraq and Afghanistan with a basic 
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things, to include guarding government (and contractors) facilities, protecting 
government personnel (and other government contractors) and United Nations (U.N.) 
and other international organization staff as well, and providing security for convoys. 
Interestingly, in its 2007 follow-on report to that discussed above, the IPOA 
broadened its survey to include an identified sample of 334 firms.  While we can’t be 
completely sure of the Institute’s criteria for inclusion in its sample, we suspect that it reflects 
Segments 1 and 2 in the diagram above, plus Segments 3 and 4, and possibly some firms in 
Segment 5.   
The two problem zones (or “gray areas”) in analyzing the PM sector are Segments 5 
and 6.  Some elements of Sector 5 fall more easily inside what we believe most analysts 
would agree as defining the PM sector.  For instance, Blackwater’s North Carolina training 
range, which includes various weapons ranges, is sometimes touted as the best in the world 
for some types of military training.  Many aspects of MPRI’s (Military Professional 
Resources, Inc.) advisement activities would also clearly fall in this segment.  However, 
where should we classify activities such as Cubic’s virtual training systems?  Should we 
include firms such as Cubic in the PM sector, or exclude it?  We think there are arguments 
on both sides. 
Even more problematic is Segment 6 in the diagram.  There are two issues here.  
First, we often cannot tell where the activities of support firms take place based on reports 
on the industry or on declarations by the firms themselves.  Second, there is the question of 
whether the activities themselves belong inside the industry.  IS/IT/communications firms are 
particularly troublesome in this regard.  Let’s examine, for example, CACI.  It is a major 
provider of support services to the DoD and to the intelligence communities.  Or, we could 
study Mantech.  It builds and maintains databases that track potential terrorists and provides 
a range of other IT-related support services to the intelligence communities.  If these 
services are largely performed at home, should we define them as inside the PM sector?  
And what about the services themselves—the things these firms do certainly appear to be a 
very different kind of business than that performed by DynCorp and ArmorGroup.  They are 
involved in non-traditional types of “warfare.”  However, according to some arguments, if 
these types of activities reflect the way conflict is evolving into the future, firms like CACI and 
Mantech are—arguably—critical precursors of a new wave of private defense-sector firms.  
Should they be included in our sample of the PM sector, or left out?    
It is important to note that in reporting on PM-sector demographics, there are 
legitimate rationales for using different definitions of the industry.  We used an expansive 
definition of the industry; we included all the segments above.   
To conclude, our analysis points out that the private military sector is by no means a 
unitary industry: it actually is an amalgam of several different elements that have 
independent drivers and are developing along different trajectories.  In our analysis, the 
evolution of the supply side of the industry is, therefore, rather complex and dynamic.  This 
complexity is partly driven by a set of demand drivers we believe to be richer and more 
diverse than is often acknowledged.  In our analysis, the demand factors driving the long-
term evolution of the industry involve the private sector, non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), non-military government departments, and international organizations.  Short-term 
demand factors are more military-related and involve co-opting a sector that has, in large 
part, traditionally served other customers.  These factors are dynamically shaping the 
evolution of a heterogeneous and adaptive industry sector. 
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of Defense for Production and Logistics from 1990 to 1993. He was responsible for weapons 
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I Introduction 
Services acquisition in the US Department of Defense (DoD) has continued to 
increase in scope and dollars in the past decade.  In fact, even considering the high value of 
weapon systems and large military items purchased in recent years, the DoD has spent 
more on services than on supplies, equipment and goods (Camm, Blickstein & Venzor, 
2004).  The acquired services presently cover a very broad set of service activities—
including professional, administrative, and management support; construction, repair, and 
maintenance of facilities and equipment; information technology; research and development, 
and medical care. 
As the DoD’s services acquisition continues to increase in scope and dollars, the 
agency must give greater attention to proper acquisition planning, adequate requirements 
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definition, sufficient price evaluation, and proper contractor oversight (GAO, 2002).  
Recently, the Director, Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) has identified 
inappropriate use of services contracts in the DoD (Director, DPAP, 2007, March 2) and is 
taking action to improve contracting for services throughout the Department (Director, 
DPAP, 2006, August 16).   In many ways, the issues affecting services acquisition are 
similar to those affecting the acquisition of physical supplies and weapon systems.  
However, the unique characteristics of services and the increasing importance of services 
acquisition offer a unique and significant opportunity for conducting research in the 
management of the service supply chain in the Department of Defense. 
We have addressed the need for research in the area of services acquisition by 
undertaking a series of research projects.  Thus far, we have completed two research 
projects; the current research is our third research project in this area.    
The first research project was exploratory in nature, wherein we tried to understand 
the major challenges and opportunities in the service supply chain in the DoD (Apte, Ferrer, 
Lewis, & Rendon, 2006). As a part of this research study, we conducted in-depth case 
studies on acquisition of services in three different organizations: Presidio of Monterey, 
Travis AFB and the Naval Support Detachment Monterey (NSDM). The major conclusions of 
that research are:   
1. The Department of Defense’s services acquisition has continued to increase in 
scope and dollars in the past decade.  The GAO found that since FY 1999, the 
DoD’s spending on services has increased by 66%; indeed, in FY 2003, the DoD 
spent over $118 billion—or approximately 57% of the DoD’s total procurement 
dollars—on services (GAO, 2005, March).  The DoD procures a variety of services, 
including both the traditional commercial services and services unique to defense.  In 
terms of amount spent, the following four service categories together represent over 
50% of total spending on services: (a) professional, administrative, and management 
support services, (b) construction, repair and maintenance of structure and facilities, 
(c) equipment maintenance, and (d) information technology services. 
2. Presidio of Monterey (POM) has contracted maintenance of about 155 buildings and 
structures to Presidio Municipal Services Agency (PMSA), a consortium of the cities 
of Monterey and Seaside.  The PMSA agreement has allowed the two cities to apply 
their expertise to routine municipal services and the Army to focus on its military 
mission. Through this partnership and contract with PMSA, the POM has realized a 
41% reduction in expenses when compared with previous base operation costs and 
private contracts.  We recommend that the DoD explore and evaluate the possibility 
of establishing such synergistic contractual relations with cities adjacent to other 
bases in support of their respective operations. 
3. Proactive and frequent communications are essential for a successful services 
contract.  We found a successful example of this at Travis AFB, where 60th CONS 
uses Business Requirement Advisory Groups (BRAGs) as the mechanism for 
conducting such communications. BRAGs are cross-functional teams made up of 
personnel representing the functional organizations involved as customers in the 
services contracts.  These cross-functional teams plan and manage the service 
contracts throughout the service’s lifecycle.  As the DoD increases the use of 
centralized contracting organizations and regional contracts, the use of proactive and 
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frequent communications will be even more essential for the successful management 
and performance of these contracts.   
4. Our visits and interviews at Travis AFB, Presidio of Monterey (POM), Naval Air 
Station Whidbey Island (NAS WI), and the Naval Support Detachment Monterey 
(NSDM) confirmed the GAO’s finding that: While the Army’s and Navy’s creation of 
centralized installation management agencies can potentially create efficiencies and 
improve the management of the facilities through streamlining and consolidation, 
implementation of these plans has so far met with mixed results in quality and level 
of support provided to activities and installations (GAO, 2005, June). 
5. The centralization of contracting offices and the use of regional contracts will result in 
additional dynamics for the DoD’s acquisition of services.  The Department’s use of 
centralized contracting organizations and regional contracts will require even more 
proactive and frequent communications between the contracting organization and 
the customer.  Although it is still too early to assess the effectiveness and efficiency 
of centralized contracting organizations and regional contracts, this research has 
indicated that centralization and regionalization of services contracts are growing 
trends in the DoD and will significantly change how services contracts are managed. 
6. Given the unique characteristics of services (such as intangibility, co-production, 
diversity and complexity), establishing service specifications, and measuring and 
monitoring the quality of delivered service are inherently more complex than with 
manufactured goods.  Hence, it is critical to have onboard a “knowledgeable client” 
and the necessary number of skilled contracting personnel to define the 
requirements and to supervise vendors and assure quality of outsourced services. 
The DoD has been aggressively complying with OMB’s Circular A-76, which directs 
all federal government agencies “to rely on the private sector for needed commercial 
services” (OMB, 2003).  This has resulted in dramatic growth in DoD spending on 
services, with a simultaneous downsizing of the DoD civilian and military acquisition 
workforce.  We believe that the downsizing trend is not in sync with the critical need 
to have a necessary number of skilled contracting personnel onboard.  This could 
mean that in the DoD’s outsourced services, either the needs are not being fully 
satisfied, or the value for the money spent is not being realized. 
7. As the DoD acquires more services than goods, the acquisition of services and the 
use of service contractors are becoming increasingly critical aspects of the DoD 
mission.  However, the management infrastructure for the acquisition of services is 
less developed than for the acquisition of products and systems.  For example, there 
is a less-formal program-management approach and lifecycle methodology for the 
acquisition of services, which is confirmed by the lack of standardization in the 
business practices associated with the services acquisition process.  This results 
from the fact that the functional personnel currently managing the services programs 
are not considered members of the DoD acquisition workforce and are typically not 
provided acquisition training under Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) requirements. 
Review of the current literature also shows that the use of a well-defined, disciplined 
approach and infrastructure for the management of projects is critical for a project’s success 
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in meeting cost, schedule, and performance objectives (Kerzner, 2006). In the absence of a 
well-defined management infrastructure, project teams are left to create an ad-hoc approach 
to managing the project.   Based on our exploratory research, we believe that this is the 
current situation in many DoD services acquisition programs.  Both the lack of a well-defined 
program management infrastructure and the lack of a lifecycle approach to services 
acquisition project management are putting the success of these critical services at risk.  
The risks of not meeting the service acquisition’s cost, schedule, and performance 
objectives are, consequently, higher in critical DoD service projects.  As the DoD increases 
its acquisition of services—particularly in light of anticipated budget cuts and dwindling 
resources—the Department must ensure that its service acquisition projects are effectively 
and efficiently managed. 
The lack of a developed program management infrastructure for the acquisition of 
services was a critical research finding that warranted further study.  Thus, our second 
research project was geared towards studying the program management infrastructure in 
service supply chain in the DoD.  In this research, too, we conducted two additional in-depth 
case studies and developed a conceptual model of a service lifecycle that can be used to 
analyze and design the DoD’s services acquisition process.  In our project report (Apte & 
Rendon, 2007), we discuss the program-management approach, identify basic project-
management concepts, describe how these concepts are being used in the acquisition of 
defense weapon systems, and recommend how they can be adapted in the acquisition of 
services in the DoD. 
The program-management approach essentially consists of a well-defined, 
disciplined methodology and infrastructure.  The program-management approach also 
includes a centralized, coordinated management of project activities.  This includes the use 
of a project lifecycle, integrated processes, designated managers with project authority, 
integrated cross-functional teams, and an enabling organizational structure. 
Our research on managing the service supply chain within the DoD, and specifically 
in the Air Force, has identified the following findings: 
The traditional approach to managing services acquisition does not include a 
disciplined methodology and infrastructure.  Nor does it include a centralized, coordinated 
management of project activities involving the use of the project lifecycle, a designated 
project manager, integrated cross-functional teams, and an enabling organizational 
structure. 
However, our research did identify two innovative approaches to managing services 
acquisition programs.  The Air Education and Training Command (AETC) approach 
incorporates a well-defined, disciplined methodology and infrastructure.  Through the use of 
both the Program Management Flight and AETC Contracting Squadron, the AETC is able to 
provide centralized, coordinated, pre-award management of services acquisition programs.  
And although in the post-award management, the AETC approach does not maintain an on-
site program manager, it does maintain an on-site administrative contracting officer.  Thus, 
regardless of its success, this situation has the potential to result in disparate and broken 
communications between all parties involved in managing the services acquisition program. 
On the other hand, the Air Combat Command (ACC) model for services acquisition 
management using the Acquisition Management and Integration Center (AMIC) approach 
includes a well-defined, disciplined methodology and infrastructure, as well as a centralized, 
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coordinated program-management approach.  The AMIC approach is unique in that it 
provides a cradle-to-grave acquisition approach to services acquisition management.  This 
integrated approach results in management efficiencies to include an effective process 
orientation, maximum resource availability and maximum training effectiveness. 
II Current Research Focus 
The objective of this current research is to develop a more comprehensive 
understanding of how services acquisition is managed at a wide range of military bases 
throughout the Department of Defense.  This current research is focused on answering the 
following research questions: 
1.  What types of services are typically procured at military installations, and what dollar 
amount is annually spent on these services? 
2. What type of acquisition strategy, procurement method, and contracts are used in 
services acquisition? 
3. How is the service acquisition process managed? What management concepts—
such as a lifecycle, a program-management or a project-management approach—
are used? 
4.  What type of organization/management structure is used to manage the services 
acquisition? 
5. What training is given to contract and project/program management staff? 
6. Are there any significant differences between the way services are acquired and 
managed in different DoD departments? 
Development and Review of Survey Instrument 
The methodology for this current research involves the application of a survey 
instrument recently developed for this specific purpose.  The MBA student team of Compton 
and Meinshausen, under the guidance of Apte, Apte, and Rendon, developed the survey 
instrument as part of their MBA research project (Compton & Meinshausen, 2007).  The 
developed survey was pilot tested for validity and will be then used to collect additional 
empirical data regarding the current state of services acquisition management at the 
installation level across the military departments. 
The services acquisition research survey consists of questions focusing on specific 
demographic data for each military department, major command, region, and military 
installation.  The survey also asks specific questions related to the approach, method, and 
procedures used in the acquisition of services for specific categories of services.  The 
specific categories of services included in this research are listed in Figure 1.  These service 
categories are considered to be the most common services acquired by the various DoD 
departments.  The 7 service categories included in this research accounted for more than 








Figure 1.  Service Categories 
The survey instrument includes core questions related to the methods and 
procedures used in the acquisition of services for these seven categories of services.  
These core questions focus on the following areas (Compton & Meinshausen, 2007): 
Contract Characteristics.  The purpose of this category of questions is to gain insight 
into the dominant procurement method and contract type used in the acquisition of services 
at the installation.  The characteristics examined in this section are degree of competition 
(competitively bid or sole-source), contract type (fixed-price or cost-type), and type of 
contract incentive (incentive-fee or award-fee or award-term). 
Acquisition Management Methods.  The purpose of this category of questions is to 
gain insight into the types of management methods and approaches used for the acquisition 
of these services at each phase of the contract-management process.  For each of the 
contract-management phases, the survey asks whether the phase was conducted at a 
regional, installation, or some other organizational level.  This core question category also 
focused on whether a project-team approach was typically used in the acquisition of the 
respective service category at the installation level. 
Project-team Approach. The purpose of this category of questions is to explore the 
installations that identified a project-team approach in the services acquisition management 
method described above. The questions explore the position of the services acquisition 
project team leader, such as a Program/Project Manager or Contracting Officer. This 
category of questions also explored information on the owner, generator, and approving 
authority of the requirement (the specific service being acquired).  This category of 
questions provides additional insight into how a project-management approach is being 
used in the acquisition of services. 
Service Acquisition Leadership. The purpose of this category of questions is to 
explore services acquisitions in which a project-management approach was not dominantly 
used.  The questions explore the position of the person leading the services acquisition.  
This category of questions also explored information on the owner, generator, and 
approving authority of the requirement (the specific service being acquired).  
The last category of core questions is focused on the use of a lifecycle approach, 
length of assignments for services acquisition management personnel staff, use of market 
research techniques, level of staffing in services acquisition management, and level of 
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training of services acquisition management personnel.  These questions use a Likert scale 
to measure the responses.   
Finally, the last category of survey questions solicits feedback and any general 
comments regarding the topic of services acquisition. This survey instrument will also allow 
the researchers to collect data that will be subsequently analyzed to answer the research 
questions.  This research will then require more sophisticated statistical analysis—as 
discussed in the next section of this paper.    
III Preliminary Hypothesis 
The objective of this study, understanding acquisition of services at diverse military 
bases, is dependent on the survey responses. By designing the survey in a specific way, we 
have been able to guide the present and past direction of the study of the responses. We 
analyzed the preliminary results and recorded the findings. However, we plan to further 
quantitatively analyze the responses, based on the survey currently in progress, in order to 
provide rigor to and validation of our conclusions. 
Planned Quantitative Techniques/Analysis 
We plan to analyze the responses statistically to find the proportions of various 
characteristics and management approaches in principal nodes (depicted in rectangles in 
Figure 2 and Figure 3) across the seven categories described (Figure 1) in the previous 
section. In this analysis, an understanding of the causes of predominantly or seldom-used 
approaches will lead to better insight into the acquisition management methods of services. 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 describe our investigation of the data across the seven categories.  
 














Figure 3. Management Approaches 
Creation of an appropriate survey to guide the data collection and answer the 
research questions was a challenging task. Therefore, the responses from the preliminary 
feedback were time-constrained and, hence, minimal (Compton & Meinshausen, 2007). 
Currently, two student teams guided by Apte, Apte, and Rendon (one in the Air Force and 
the other in the Navy) are working with the existing survey engine. We believe these studies 
will result in sufficient data and will lead to substantial statistical analysis offering insight into 
the management of service acquisition.  
The analysis will explore relations, if they exist, between the secondary nodes 
(depicted in circles in Figure 2 and Figure 3). We will be interested in finding the correlation 
between various independent and dependent variables that will represent these secondary 
nodes and other possible issues discovered. The analysis will also explore whether and how 
the dollar amount spent has any effect on the contract characteristics or different 
management approaches, the principal nodes. Based on the level of responses received, 
we plan to simulate the data if necessary. If the data turns out to be inconclusive in any of 
these aspects, then that in itself will be an important finding. It may suggest there is no 
efficient process in place for the acquisition of services—which may, in turn, lead to a 
recommendation for better management. 
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Preliminary Findings  
We now offer some of our findings based on the existing preliminary data. Data 
collected for the secondary nodes dealing with the length of service of Contracting Officer 
Representatives and Quality-assurance Evaluators shows that 83% of personnel serve in 
their billets 2 or less years.  This is illustrated in Figure 4. We believe the 33% who serve a 
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Figure 4.  Length of Service  
Data collected for the level of staffing and training (for which results are shown in 
Figure 5) confirm GAO reports regarding the understaffed, under-trained and under-qualified 
services acquisition workforce (GAO, 2001). These findings clearly indicate that the 
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Figure 5.  Levels of Staffing, Training, and Qualification 
As per the secondary node of lifecycle approach, the data collected shows that 50% 
of the respondents disagreed that a lifecycle approach is used at their respective installation 
for both routine and non-routine services.  Based on this response, Compton and 
Meinshausen (2007) reached the conclusion that “the lack of a lifecycle approach for routine 
and non-routine services has the potential to place the government at a higher level of risk 
due to improper planning for the various phases in a service’s lifecycle” (p. 32).      
Finally, Figure 6 shows that respondents primarily agree there is no inconsistency 
between requirements identification and Statements of Work/Objectives. 
Therefore, we infer that the cost increase is not due to miscommunication of 
requirements and objectives. Data also shows that respondents agreed that market 
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Figure 6.  Positive Responses 
Thus, based on the data collected so far, our preliminary observations suggest that 
the current state of services acquisition management at the installation level suffers from 
several deficiencies; these then result in increasing service contracts. Some of the key 
aspects are deficit billet and manning levels (which are further aggravated by insufficient 
training and the inexperience of acquisition personnel), and the lack of strong project-team 
and lifecycle approaches. Each of these contributes to ineffective and inefficient 
management.       
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Introduction 
Sun Tzu wrote first about the importance of logistics over two thousand years ago 
(Griffith, 1963, pp. 72, 74),67 followed by Von Clauswitz 150 years ago—who again echoed 
the importance of logistics to overall mission success (Greene, 1943, pp. 136, 179)68; now, 
logistics is a Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act functional area. Since Sun 
Tzu, much literature, many experiments, lessons learned, and the DoD’s continual 
searching for better logistics answers have stressed the continued importance of getting the 
right things to the right place at the right time.  Much like human transportation history 
evolution—beginning first with people walking or running from point a to point b, followed by 
thousands of years being transported by real “horse” power, then automobiles, airplanes, 
and rockets—logistics too has progressed over the years: focusing first on Mass-based 
Supply, then Just-in-Time Supply Chain Management, and now on Sense and Respond 
logistics. 
The Robotic Systems Joint Project Office (RSJPO), an Army-Marine Corps effort that 
supplies various robots to the AORs of Iraq and Afghanistan, has also evolved through the 
three logistics methods.  During each approach, many positive benefits were discovered.  
Along with those benefits, there were and are still today challenges to be confronted and 
overcome.  The Robotics Program’s experience and lessons learned since it began “real 
time” theater support in 2003 can aid all logistics programs by exemplifying the better ways 
to provide the best logistics with the knowledge, skills, and tools available today.  All 
logistics functions, as shown by the Robotics Program, can be provided incredibly fast, quite 
inexpensively, and with superior quality and customer satisfaction. 
Mass-based Inventory 
For many long years, logistics relied on provisioning and sparing as the logical 
answer to supporting any weapons system.  Numerous logisticians were trained in the art 
and science of sufficient inventory and spares, which would keep systems functioning for the 
fielded units anytime and anywhere.  Budgets were predicated against these projected 
numbers.  Many logisticians established careers tracking, analyzing, projecting, adjusting, 
and readjusting Mass-based Support for all weapons systems.  This logistics approach did 
provide weapons system support that could function appropriately in the field (Van Creveld, 
1977, pp. 206, 214).  Warfighters (customers) were required to learn which spares were 
critical and in what numbers, while also trying not to have too much inventory of all the 
wrong things lying about taking up needed space and expending too much available budget.  
                                                
67 Sun Tzu gives the projected costs for supporting war efforts as well as stating logistics for his time 
equated to 60% of the total costs incurred. 
68 Von Clausewitz surmises total war requires everything relates, including logistics, to providing the 
soldier at the right place at the right time to be perfectly effective.   
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The robotics program first began by utilizing Mass Based logistics to support the initial 
fielding of 162 robots.   Since the majority of suppliers were small businesses (in DoD 
parlance, “Mom & Pops”) and were finding it difficult to spare or keep up with production, the 
Program Manager declared that a portion of the total available robots would function as 
spares.  Central Command (CENTCOM) controlled all robots as theater-provided equipment 
(TPE), rather than granting one of the Services total ownership.  However, as the robots 
were fielded, Command found that the robots worked exceptionally well and replaced 
warfighters in critical danger missions.  The Services would not release critical robotic 
assets and demanded many more robotic platforms be sent into the field.  Very quickly, 
CENTCOM and the Project Manager realized Mass Based Logistics would not support well 
the customer’s demand.  Another logistics approach was quickly required.  What support 
program would allow the small businesses to produce, supply, and keep up with an ever-
increasing field demand? 
Just-in-Time   
Just-in-Time (J-I-T) logistics support promised to better align suppliers with 
customers in providing the right item at the right time in the right place.  J-I-T also promised 
to reduce inventories and spares to near zero.  In order to achieve these objectives, quality 
would need to be more strictly monitored; deliveries would need to be timed better; suppliers 
would need real-time communication with the customers’ system to better predict when they 
needed to provide needed items.  Production needed to be stable so suppliers could more 
easily meet demand (Kotler, 1997, pp. 214-215).  The Robotics program moved toward J-I-T 
within six months as Massed-based supply could not keep up.  The Project Manager and 
Suppliers gathered data on which robotic parts lasted or failed and how often.  Often, the 
same supply approach (one new robot for one damaged or eliminated robot) was carried 
over from the Mass-based Approach.  Rebuilding damaged robots grew from the J-I-T 
approach.  Both the Project Manager and the Robotic Suppliers needed faster and more 
accurate information each day.  Tracking robots and their status and location in the field 
became a pressing point.  No in-house DoD information system existed to provide this ever-
increasing communication need.  The Project Manager partnered with Avantix and T&W 
Communications to create the Catalog Ordering Logistics Tracking System (COLTS) 
program.  The program utilizes UID formats and capabilities to provide the Project Office, as 
well as the suppliers, with critical, daily information to meet the warfighters’ demands.  The 
J-I-T approach provided more accurate robot fielding.  Separate warfighter units only 
received robots that were truly mission required, rather than potentially hording robots as 
back ups.  The logistic footprint was reduced as robots were repaired, rebuilt, or supplied as 
needed.  The biggest challenge for the Robotic Project with J-I-T was caused by 
interruptions or breaks in the transportation chain—disruptions to the process of getting 
required robots to their place of need.  This is a story we’re all familiar with in air travel: one 
weather delay for the airlines causes a major ripple effect to all airlines and passengers 
trying to get to the right place at the right time.  Once again, the Robotics Program needed 
another improved logistics solution! 
Sense and Respond   
This Sense and Respond section will flow from a TAV brief given at TACOM in 
Winter 2007 by the current Robotics Program Manager (Varian, 2007).  Sense and Respond 
logistics arose from the inability of J-I-T to completely satisfy the warfighter customer. 
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The relationship/JPO chart shows how the Robotics System Joint Program fits into 
the joint Army/Marine PEO.  Joint Robot Repair Fielding (JRRF) is just one of the areas 
necessary for total Program success. 
Joint Robot Repair Fielding (JRRF)
• Provide in-Theater Support for Joint Service Theater Provided Equipment (TPE) Ground Robots. 
• Single “Belly Button” for OIF/OEF Training, Sustainment, Assessment, and Accountability
- 162 Bots (2004)        - 1800 Bots (2005)      - 4300 bots (Now) - 6000+ est’d (2008)
• Pre-Deployment Training Sites; JRRTs; and Mobile Training Teams – Joint Reserves (61%)
• 4 Hour Robot Turn-Around Standard – Leveraging “Joint Float Pool Concept”
• Web-Accessible Real-time Supply Chain Management with integrated IUID/RFID – Key step toward 
sense and respond logistics
- Accountability - Parts Reordering - Reliability Tracking        - Trouble Desk Info
• 2007 Robotic Measures of effectiveness – Robots save lives
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The above graphic relates the Robotic program and explains how the customers’ 
needs continue to rapidly expand.  The Program has instituted no more than four hours for 
any robotic replacement, anywhere, anytime. 
Global Information Grid (GIG)
Uses transparency, 
transportation flexibility 
and robust IT to leverage 
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r i ti s 
have access
IUID / RFID + 
COLTS = TAV
Prime metric:  Right mat rial, right place, right time  
The figure above relates how the COLTS software program specifically helps 
achieve the overall goals for Sense and Respond.  It is the full implementation of COLTS 
that allows IUID/RFID to provide a Total Asset Visibility (TAV). To facilitate Sense and 
Respond, TAV and real-time information flow will be critical to sustainment of tomorrow. The 
following chart provides the driving tenets for all people involved with the Sense and 
Respond Robotics logistics support. 
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What Joint Robotics Repair Facility Is Doing
1. Define the WAR-FIGHTER :As the private or crew member in the heat of it.
2. Understand what is important to the WAR-FIGHTER:
Equipment that works
3. Define PBL in a term the WAR-FIGHTER understands.
We structure our support to be reactive to the private or crew member 






By defining processes, the following charts illustrate how the Robotics Program office 








Purely, a CONUS  experiment for finite period (e.g. 60-90 days)
Experiment based on pre-deployment fielding plan (PDFP)
PDFP to include rudimentary Sustainment Plan and an Assessment Plan
Field 3 
Is there formal acquisition cycle that currently exists ?
Successful  results of Field 1 and 2 may enable 
acquisition cycle entry at MS B or C
1-2-3 Should be institutionalized and taught by DAU
Services would be responsible for running with the ball 
to enter the cycle at MS B or C
Field 2 (OCONUS)
User (warfighter) generates ONS/UNS
A demonstrated capability is fielded
Theater Deployment Plan (TDP) Validated
A robust Sustainment and Assessment Plan 
Required, Information sharing implemented 
ATEC, TRADOC, FORSCOM 
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Inventory Control Point (ICP) 
Pre-fielding process 
90 days 









1-10 days concurrent 
With process A
Equipment fielded 










Sustainment plan provided 
Supplier & Equipment Data entered into COLTS
IUID candidates identified (decision chart)
COLTS IUID XML data generated and uploaded
COLTS IUID status  updated and tracked.
Customer (Theater) Provided  SLAMIS data



























































































The Robotics Program has completely embraced the IUID (Item-unique 
Identification) method and is continually discovering capability benefits from the warfighter 




==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 473 - 
=
=
COLTS (SCM) value to the RSJPO
• Integrated IUID capability. COLTS USES the data not just generates the data.
– Vendors see data and have “buy in” with the IUID process
– Ability to mark equipment “on site” virtual IUID NOT REQUIRED
• WEB Based centralized database: There is no requirement to “exchange”
between databases. It is one stop for common tasks
– Email notification on trigger events
– Equipment modification notification generated and tied to equipment
– All stake holders have access to the data and all see the same thing 
– Data exportable to Excel™ and data interchange is possible i.e. DAASC, ULLS, etc.
– Reports generation automatically or data mine to customize
• Configuration management up to 15 levels
• Consumption tracking:
– Real-time parts usage and consumption data. 
– Real-time maintenance data (TTR, Man-hours, WO processing, etc) 
• 100% Property accountability:
– All items are assets. As such nothing is “forgotten” items are always “issued” or 
“transferred” but never forgotten
 
We could spend a great deal of time relating what the Robotics program has 
achieved by presenting numerous charts and graphs of how improvements have been made 
over the course of the program.  But rather than take up valuable time and space, we 
thought just the bare facts presented below say it all… 
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• A misplaced hyphen cost $280K
• IUID enables Serialized Item Maintenance (SIM 
is a DoD Mandate)
– IUID Enables real time configuration management
– IUID Saves repair parts cost
• Aug 06-Mar 07 $29M for repair parts on 1 vendor
• Aug 07-Mar 08 $ 5M for repair parts on same vendor
• IUID eliminates human induced error
– Average human has a typing error rate 5.47%. For 
every 100 key strokes 6 will be wrong 
Just the facts (1 Jan 07 – 1 Dec 07)
• COLTS Supply & Maintenance Data 
– 6073 Work orders completed
– 26,375 maintenance actions 
– 64,419 Inventory events (Parts movement)
– 78,467 Asset events (Robot actions/movement/repair, etc)
– 4,816 Items shipped
– 64 EOD/Engineer robots rebuilt from a destroyed condition. Cost savings 
approximately 3.2 million dollars.
• IUID integration saves the RSJPO time, money and ultimately lives on the 
battlefield.
– No more “lost” data due to human error
– Shorter repair cycle time as a result of IUID “scan in & scan out”
– More fidelity of data tracked in COLTS due to IUID decision process.
– Routine logistics processes streamlined with IUID and hand scanner.
– Configuration management integrated with all SCM actions. SIM is a reality
• Operational rate on all NS-E/COTS supported platforms has been in excess of 
98% since Apr 05. 
• In excess of 3307 soldiers trained on robotics operation
 
What more need we say about Sense and Respond logistics and the benefits it has 
provided to the warfighter? 
 =
=
==================^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜW=ÅêÉ~íáåÖ=ëóåÉêÖó=Ñçê=áåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ====- 475 - 
=
=
Conclusion:   
Many presenters and numerous authors continue to assert the rate of change in our 
era will continue to geometrically expand.  The Robotics Program since 2003 has rapidly 
traversed through Mass-based, Just-in-Time, and Sense and Respond logistics approaches, 
always trying to improve support to the warfighter.  Each logistics approach provided 
benefits and challenges.  Each moved into another logistics support scheme built on the 
previous lessons learned and added new features—with the final goal of reducing the 
logistics footprint, expending less dollars, and providing the best equipment (which works 
well when required) to the right warfighter at the right time.  The next chart captures each 





z More is better
z Mountains of stuff 
measured in days of 
supply
z Uses massive 
inventory to hedge 
against uncertainty 
in demand and 
supply






z On-time is better
z Inventory is reduced to 
a minimum and kept 
moving
z Uses precise demand 
prediction and static 
optimization to purge 
uncertainty
z Works great, except 
when it doesn’t
Tomorrow (Sense and Respond)
Prime Metric: 
Speed/Quality of Effects
z Adaptive is better
z Inventory is dynamically 
positioned throughout
z Uses transportation 
flexibility and robust IT 
to handle uncertainty
z Initial S&R models look 
promising









Even now, the Robotics Program’s Sense and Respond approach is not the final 
logistics answer.  New features (active and passive RFID among others) are being tested, 
data are being gathered and analyzed, and better processes are being implemented to 
continually improve the Program’s logistics.  Other DoD and industry programs should take 
note and seek out people from this Robotics Program in order to discover better ways to 
fully support the warfighter.  The perfect logistics answer is still to come. 
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Logical Decisions for Contracting: Integrated Decision 
Technology for Acquisition and Contracting 
Author: LCDR Roy Garrison, USN 
Author: Professor Daniel Dolk, NPS 
Author: Professor Albert Barreto, NPS 
Abstract 
Decision technologies in the form of decision-oriented software systems have 
proliferated dramatically over the past two decades.  Most of these systems tend to be 
stand-alone systems that are focused on a relatively narrow set of analytical techniques for 
solving quite specific problems.  Many applications, however, require a combination of these 
technologies to address complex decision-making problems.  What is missing in the DSS 
landscape is an environment in which to create a DSS Generator that integrates requisite 
technologies flexibly and quickly to construct a robust application.  We discuss the notion of 
an integrated decision technology environment (IDTE) in the context of Federal acquisition 
and contracting.  Specifically, we show how the application of existing decision support 
technologies can assist Federal Government contracting personnel in determining which 
vendor proposal offers the best overall value to the customer in competitive solicitations.  
The intent is to establish a model that, when implemented, will ensure that contracting 
personnel evaluate proposals both consistently and fairly for simplified acquisition 
procedures (SAP).  The proposed system, Logical Decisions for Contracting (LDC), 
integrates several decision support technologies—including a weight-based ranking model, 
a multi-criteria decision analysis software system, an expert system, data mining, and a data 
warehouse.  We describe the data, model, knowledge, and user interface components of 
LDC, present a use case, and show how virtualization technology can facilitate the 
implementation of this DSS.  We conclude by discussing how this approach can be 
generalized to embrace a fuller portfolio of decision technologies which can, in turn, address 
a wider array of more complex contracting applications.   
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“Alternative Designs for a Joint Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) 
Capability Certification Management (JC3M) System” 
Author: Gregory A. Miller 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Systems Engineering Department 
777 Dyer Rd. 
Monterey, CA 93943 
Phone: (831) 656-2957 
Fax: (831) 656-3129 
E-mail: gamiller@nps.edu  
Abstract 
US DoD has tended to design Command & Control (C2) systems without 
consideration for them to interoperate for synergistic effects since each is designed for one 
warfighting function.  As systems have grown biologically into a System of Systems, 
achievement of mission-level effects has disappointed.  Architecting the C2 SoS as a whole 
is improbable.  However, capabilities-based acquisition requires interoperability certification 
based on delivering a warfighter capability via SoS.  Students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School examined this problem.  Their result is the Joint Capability Command and Control 
Management (JC3M) system. This paper summarizes their efforts.  A systems engineering 
process was applied to elicit requirements, create and simulate alternative solutions, and 
recommend a solution with lifecycle cost estimates.  The simulation tools selected to support 
the project were CORE, to model function and data flow; Arena, for timing and resource 
utilization; and POW-ER (Project, Organization, Work for Edge Research), for organizational 
design and processes.  The use of these tools to complement each other is unique.  Results 
indicated that JTEM Capability Test Methodology (CTM) was projected to perform better 
than other alternatives, with the median LCC.  The final recommendation is to monitor JTEM 
CTM for further maturation as it promises improvements in the utility of C4I SoS evaluations. 
Keywords: interoperability assessment, modeling, systems engineering 
Introduction 
Across the US Department of Defense (DoD), early C4I systems were designed, 
acquired, and fielded independently.  Each addressed a single warfighting function, such as 
logistics, fire support, or intelligence.  Over time, warfighting has grown in complexity, 
tempo, and scope.  Complex endeavors are characterized by participants from not only 
different services but also from different functional areas.  They must respond with agility 
across a spectrum of action and across smeared boundaries between tradition levels of 
warfare. The current scenario requires a network-centric force, which in turn requires true 
C2 interoperability. 
Individual C4I systems, most not designed, acquired, or managed as a collective 
enterprise, are being integrated as such and are forming an interdependent entity—a 
System of Systems (SoS)—in which emergent behavior dominates and capability delivery 
cuts across system boundaries.  System-level acquisition and testing only result in individual 
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systems meeting specific performance requirements.  The Joint Interoperability Test 
Command (JITC) tests for end-to-end connections “in the most operationally realistic 
environment possible” (rather than delivery of desired capability) to assess interoperability.  
Successful information exchange results in “certification.”  This is the baseline system for 
DoD interoperability certification.  However, complex interactions of effects drive changing 
configurations of C4I SoS with no formally established requirements for performance 
evaluation.  Capability-based testing of a SoS is not well understood.  However, the principle 
to ensure interoperability through testing during development (National Research Council) is 
still valid. 
The baseline interoperability certification process is inadequate because it does not 
address how the actual SoS supports complex endeavors.  Recent revision to the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System emphasizes that true interoperability is 
characterized by “end-to-end operational effectiveness [...] for mission accomplishment” 
(CJCS, 2007).  Guidance for writing Capability Development Documents (CDD) requires 
Net-Ready Key Performance Parameters that assess “the net-ready attributes required for 
both the technical exchange of information and the end-to-end operational effectiveness of 
that exchange” (DoD, 2004).  This is consistent with the NATO definition of interoperability 
(NATO, 2002) and that proposed by the Software Engineering Institute (Kasunic & 
Anderson).   Capability Portfolio Managers (DEPSECDEF, 2006, September) and Functional 
Capabilities Boards (CJCS, 2007) play a role in capabilities-based, cross-program 
interoperability.  Even so, no system can assess the capability of a SoS requiring integration 
of functions and interfaces across multiple systems.  Thus, a JC3M system is important 
because it provides a process for test planning to verify true interoperability.  It documents 
traceability between capabilities and construction, and it provides confidence that the C4I 
SoS works. 
In response to this need, the Joint Test Evaluation Methodology (JTEM) team is 
addressing Joint SoS interoperability testing at the Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) 
level.  Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM), the acquisition organization 
for the Marine Corps, is approaching the issue from a service perspective.  
MARCORSYSCOM has tasked the Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity 
(MCTSSA) to develop Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) C4I Capability Certification 
Testing (MC3T), a methodology for managing the MAGTF C4I SoS as a single system.  
MC3M will manage the MAGTF C4I SoS as a set of SoS-level capabilities, rather than as a 
fixed hardware or software baseline. 
NPS students assigned to the JC3M project team adopted a systems engineering 
approach to the problem of architecting a C4I SoS assessment system that will identify 
desired effects-based capabilities and ensure that the system being tested meets those 
requirements.  The JC3M project sought a lifecycle balanced solution for existing test 
organizations. The processes can be utilized by service and joint test agencies. 
Approach Description 
The student design team adapted several systems engineering process models 
(Acosta et al, 2007) and tailored them to this problem.  As illustrated in Figure 1, it begins 
with identifying a customer’s needs and proceeds through several phases until a final 
solution is recommended.  One can see this is a modification of INCOSE’s SIMILAR (state 
the problem, investigate alternatives, model the system, integrate, launch the system, 
assess performance, and re-evaluate) process model (INCOSE, 2007) that incorporates 
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elements of the Systems Engineering and Design Process (Paulo, 2005) taught at USMA 
and at NPS. 
 
Figure 2.  A Tailored Systems Engineering Process 
During the problem refinement phase, research into the problem space was 
conducted, stakeholders were identified and interviewed, functional decomposition was 
started, and a value system was developed.  Based on the preliminary functional analysis 
and value hierarchy, several alternatives were created.  Those alternatives were screened, 
and ultimately, five alternatives entered the modeling and simulation phase.  The predicted 
performance values generated by the models were used to objectively analyze those 
alternatives by comparing them to each other along with lifecycle cost estimates.  The use of 
a LCCE as part of the analysis of alternatives in this problem domain is vital.  Those testers 
and test planners must be paid for; it matters little if the final system provides the best 
solution if that solution is unaffordable.  Finally, a solution was recommended, along with 
caveats.  Both the JTEM project and MC3T project will make use of those 
recommendations. 
It should be noted that this team did an excellent job connecting values identified 
early by stakeholders, supported by a thorough functional analysis. They integrated, into the 
value hierarchy, the values resulting from modeling and simulation that drove the final 
decision process. 
Problem Refinement & Functional Analysis 
Developing a real problem, or effective need, in this situation proved more 
challenging than anticipated.  Stating the central issue so that the stakeholders would 
receive some utility from the final solution proved slippery.  In fact, just identifying the “right” 
stakeholders was a challenge.  From the perspective of C4I system users, any process to 
certify a system is interoperable within a SoS adds value when that certification signifies the 
SoS’ ability to support the complex endeavor.  Verifying that it conforms to technical 
standards and that it can exchange data is a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite.  
Whereas, in the acquisition community, a program manager manages resources spent for 
certification.  If test results are compared to criteria outside the scope of his or her program 
or are not explicitly stated in requirements documents, there is high risk with little gain.  The 
test community, therefore, finds itself in the middle—being the honest broker representing 
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with in-house testers inside the acquisition community, as primary stakeholders.  The final 
list included the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), Marine Corps Operational Test 
and Evaluation Activity (MCOTEA), Army Test and Evaluation Command, Navy Operational 
Test and Evaluation Force, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, MCTSSA, 
and the JTEM Project team under the Director of Operational Test & Evaluation.  As this 
team was mostly composed of MCTSSA employees, a major influence was the new MC3T 
project, which provided an initial primitive need for a “system that defines and compares 
System of Systems performance measures to warfighter needs in an objective and 
measurable way” (Finn, 2007).  They needed a system that defined threshold values for C4I 
SoS performance in operational warfighting terms and then a way to obtain those 
performance measures. 
The team examined the larger context of the problem to find the underlying need.  
The team researched the most up-to-date interoperability certification and the latest 
direction within the DoD that examines realizing desired capabilities.  While the existing 
directives and instructions seem clear in identifying roles and responsibilities in a traditional 
sense, little light was shed on the root of the issue.  All stakeholders were queried on how 
they plan a C4I SoS assessment, what resources they use to do so, how component 
systems under test are identified, how performance requirements are codified, how conflicts 
are resolved, and what metrics they use to assess their own performance (Acosta et al., 
2007).  The written questions sought to reveal how they knew they succeeded and what 
areas were most ripe for improvement.  The responses from JTEM and JITC were 
professional, insightful and frank. 
A basic functional hierarchy began to evolve around the three major functions: 
planning a C4I SoS evaluation, conducting the evaluation, and reporting results.  The 
identification and definition of performance threshold values was of primary concern and all 
stakeholders seemed to be completely satisfied with their ability to execute and report on an 
evaluation event.  Therefore, the problem scope was focused on the planning phases.  
Further decomposition resulted in a draft functional model, shown in Figure 2 (Acosta et al., 
2007). 
 
Figure 3.  Initial JC3M Functional Decomposition 
This project focused entirely on function 1.0, Plan a C4I SoS Evaluation.  Further 
functional evaluation identified required inputs and outputs of the system, process activation 
and termination, and evaluation measures for each of the lowest level functions. 
Eventually, several alternatives were to be compared objectively.  The basis of that 
comparison was how well they achieved the functional and non-functional requirements.  By 
combining a complete functional hierarchy with critical non-functional attributes and 
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assigning evaluation measures to each, a value system was created.  This classic systems 
engineering paradigm completed the initial requirements analysis work.  A part of that value 
hierarchy—with only the critical evaluation measures that were eventually used in the final 
comparison of alternatives—is in Figure 3.  This is a small sample of the information gained 
through the analysis.  However, it is telling because it codifies how designers will know if we 
“got it right.” 
 
Figure 4.  Part of JC3M Value Hierarchy 
(Acosta et al., 2007)   
The lighter-colored boxes indicate the evaluation measures that defined the needs 
for a set of modeling tools and that would drive the final analysis.  A more complete 











































divided by the 
number of 
measures 
generated by the 
alternative.  
 
Ratio level data, 
from 0–100% 
Elapsed time (in 
days) of 
planning for  C4I 



























change in labor 
hours to conduct 
planning phase of 
JC3M by the 








































be perceived as 
objective, 
increasing the 
value of the 










generate data to 
support fielding 
decisions 
sooner.   
Identifies 
predicted utility 
of alternative.  
 
 
Quality of the 
planning 
products drives 




in cost of SoS 
evaluation based 
on size.  
 
 




on SoS size.  
Predicts changes 









on SoS size.  
Table 1.  Evaluation Measure Details 
Design Alternatives 
There were three existing alternatives completed or in the final stages of 
development in response to the problem at hand.  Additionally, the team sought to architect 
two additional systems.  This would present the stakeholders a broad range of possibilities, 
while keeping the effort required for modeling and simulation manageable. 
The first of the known alternatives was the Federation of Systems (FEDOS) system 
used at MCTSSA in 2005.  FEDOS was designed to assess the performance of C4I systems 
when assembled into the MAGTF C4I SoS.  FEDOS began at the order of the Deputy 
Commander for C4I Integration and Interoperability (C4II) at MARCORSYSCOM, that 
tasked MCTSSA to assess SoS and systems interoperability.  A working group of 
stakeholders in the system developer community decided which systems would participate, 
which requirements were to be tested, and the schedule of events to include test planning, 
test conduct, and results reporting. 
Because the MAGTF C4I SoS was not designed in compliance with an architecture, 
there were no overarching SoS performance measures or threshold criteria.  This lack of 
doctrinal performance criteria meant that MCTSSA test personnel had to engage in long, 
and at times, inconclusive negotiations with stakeholders to define threshold values that 
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were used to measure performance and determine if components passed or failed the test.  
The MARCORSYSCOM Product Groups, responsible for developing, fielding, and 
supporting C4I systems, were not ordered to participate in FEDOS, and a passing grade 
was not required for a milestone decision.  It was perceived as a no-win situation for Product 
Groups: after a system had successfully passed Operational Tests by demonstrating 
compliance with system-level performance requirements in their respective CDD or 
equivalent, FEDOS tested component systems in ways they had not been designed for, but 
would be used in the field.  The acquisition community’s perception was that FEDOS was a 
risk with no off-setting benefit.  Despite this shortcoming, FEDOS was relatively successful 
as the first USMC event specifically designed from the beginning as a SoS evaluation 
Because FEDOS is the only alternative solution that has been used by a C4I test 
organization for a true SoS event, it was considered the “status quo” or baseline JC3M 
alternative solution.  As with all good analyses of alternatives, the first option to consider is 
“do nothing,” or, in this case, “do it like FEDOS.” 
The second alternative was MAGTF C4I Capability Certification Test (MC3T) 
developed at MCTSSA as a replacement for FEDOS.  Other participants in MC3T 
development include the Space and Naval Warfare Center (SPAWAR) Systems Center in 
Charleston, S.C., and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC).  More 
importantly, representatives of the MARCORSYSCOM Product Groups actively participated.  
Product Group representatives defined a "Capabilities Package" complete with system 
requirements and DoD Architecture Framework documents that depict the systems under 
their cognizance.  MCTSSA analyzed the Capabilities Package and produced a 
Consolidated Requirements Assessment (CRA). The CRA was an agreement between the 
stakeholders on what needed to be tested, the required resources, and the Information 
Assurance compliance requirements. Once the CRA was approved, MCTSSA produced a 
Technical Proposal.  The Technical Proposal defined the technical solution that the IPT 
proposed in order to meet the requirements in the Consolidated Requirements Assessment 
(CRA), including staffing, C4I systems architecture design, monitoring network architecture 
design, test cases, data capture and analysis plan, information assurance plan, and risk 
assessment.  The Technical Proposal is confirmed, becoming the Technical Solution, which 
makes up nearly 90% of the Test Plan, includes detailed test procedures with reference 
documentation.  The most promising aspect of MC3T is that MCCDC and 
MARCORSYSCOM have developed truly integrated architecture framework products.  The 
operational activities doctrinally defined in the Marine Corps Task List are explicitly 
supported by specific systems working together.  The idea that form should follow function in 
designing for network-centric effects-based operations is consistent with the latest direction 
for architectures (DoD, 2007). 
The third alternative was JTEM’s Capability Test Methodology (CTM).  The purpose 
of JTEM is to “develop, test, and evaluate M&P (Methods and Processes) for defining and 
using a distributed LVC (Live, Virtual, and Constructive) joint test environment to evaluate 
system performance and joint mission effectiveness [...] focus on developing and enhancing 
M&P for designing and executing tests of SoS” (JTEM, 2007b).  Figure 4 is an IDEF0 
representation of the CTM process. 
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Figure 5.  JTEM CTM in IDEF0 
(Acosta et al., 2007) 
One of the more promising aspects of JTEM’s CTM is that test characterization 
explicitly examines requirements from families of CDDs in the context of missions based on 
the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) (CJCS, 2002) and Combatant Command standing 
operations plans and orders.  More detailed descriptions can be found in JTEM’s Joint Test 
and Evaluation (JT&E), Capability Test Methodology (CTM) Method and Process (M&P) 
Model Description (JTEM, CTM, M&P).  The complexity of scenarios developed for the LVC 
test environment reflects real-world complex military action involving disparate forces 
executing closely linked complicated tasks, including operations other than war. 
Two new alternatives that offer significant differences from the existing systems were 
developed.  The classic morphological box (Zwicky process) was applied and guided by the 
high-level functions identified earlier and then used, in part, to identify evaluation measures.  
Nine alternatives were initially defined.  Through several screening iterations and re-
evaluation against the root problem, only two remained: “Systems Capabilities Review” 
(SCR Alternative) and “Functional Capabilities Board” (FCB Alternative). 
The Systems Capabilities Review (SCR) alternative combines two of the original nine 
alternatives.  It is composed of a group of stakeholders: C4I SoS user representatives, test 
agency representatives, system developers and program managers.  The test agency 
representative chairs the group, which meets, as required, to support a C4I SoS evaluation, 
at the Systems Command level.  Inputs to SCR include source documents such as 
Capabilities Development Documents (CDD), Operational Requirements Documents, Test 
and Evaluation Master Plans (TEMP), Concept of Operations documents, Joint Integrating 
Concepts, Joint Operating Concepts, and system level metrics.  First, the SCR reviews SoS 
capabilities specifications, examines the systems engineering artifacts already created (such 
as supporting DoD Architecture Framework documents and technical performance 
measures) and creates a list of implied and stated SoS capabilities.  Next, the SCR reviews 
system-level documents and creates a system-level capabilities list.  Third, the SCR maps 
system-level capabilities to SoS evaluation measures.  The SCR identifies gaps in the 
evaluation measure list and creates the balance of evaluation measures necessary to 
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evaluate the performance of the C4I SoS.  Figure 5 illustrates how SCR performs the JC3M 
subfunction 1.3.2 “Define Measures.” 
The Functional Capabilities Board (FCB) alternative relies on an existing group—the 
JCIDS C2 Functional Capabilities Board—to define the performance measures of the SoS.  
The existing role of FCB is to perform “organization, analysis, and prioritization of joint 
warfighting capabilities within an assigned functional area” (CJCS, 2007).  Inputs to the FCB 
Alternative include the UJTL and subsets, Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
documentation, acquisition program documentation, and system trouble reports.  The 
additional effort proposed in this alternative represents an increase in the work performed by 
the C2 FCB but is in the same functional area and engages in the similar tasks.  Unlike the 
SCR, the FCB meets on demand, rather than as required, to support SoS evaluations.  First, 
the FCB will identify the configuration of the SoS by determining the component systems.  
Next, the FCB will identify the SoS capabilities.  SoS CONOPS are reviewed to determine 
evaluation measures.  Finally, the FCB will generate the SoS evaluation measure list for use 
in C4I SoS evaluations.  As the systems under the cognizance of the Joint Command & 
Control Capability Portfolio Manager are explicitly listed (DEPSECDEF, 2006, September), 
their participation in this alternative would be required.  The FCB, under JCIDS, has a long-
term mandate, and provides a short-term solution to the lack of SoS performance measures.  
The relationship between the FCB and C4I test organizations and the list of subtasks 
needed to complete the Define Measures task, is illustrated in Figure 6.  Because the FCB 
is external to the test organization, some analysis of the performance measures generated 
by the FCB will be necessary.  Additionally, it is understood that a working group within the 
FCB would perform the required analysis. 
Figure 6.  SCR Alternative Sub-functions 
(Acosta et al., 2007) 
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Figure 7: FCB Alternative Sub-functions 
(Acosta et al., 2007)   
Both of these new alternatives developed by the JC3M team rely on supporting 
integrated architectures and CONOPS documentation, in addition to documentation 
normally examined as part of C4I interoperability test preparation. The difference between 
these alternatives is in the approach taken to complete process 1.3.2 “Define Measures” in 
the JC3M Functional Hierarchy.  The SCR alternative incorporates all tasks as part of the 
test planning process.  The FCB Alternative utilizes an external team that meets year-round 
to provide capability measures to the test agency. 
Five alternatives had now been defined in some detail, as well as evaluation 
measures to be used to compare those alternatives.  Only determining the actual values or 
values obtained from simulation models for each alternative remained. 
Modeling & Results 
Modeling and simulation were used extensively in this project.  With the exception of 
FEDOS, no other alternative under consideration existed.  The only means to gather 
performance data in support of decision-making, short of “building” each alternative, was 
through simulation.  It was the most cost-effective means to obtain the required evaluation 
measures in a repeatable and objective fashion.  Several modeling tools were used to 
generate the necessary data.  Figure 7 illustrates which tools were used to obtain the 









Models of each alternative were built based on the functional architectures already 
created.  Elements unique to their physical instantiations were added.  In other words, 
complete functional models in IDEF0 were created with Vitech’s CORE to support the 
simulation models built in Arena and POW-ER (Project, Organization, and Work for Edge 
Research).  Within Arena and POW-ER, the attributes that differentiated the alternatives 
from each other— organizational structure, relationships with external systems, and 
processing of certain inputs—were included.  The IDEF0 view of the systems actually 
proved insightful in terms of explicitly describing the relationship between the functions, at all 
levels of abstractions, in terms of their inputs and outputs.  The models were executed by 
providing input to simulate a system under test along with its supporting information.  The 
results of several iterations with variations in the input data sets were gathered and used to 
populate the table of evaluation measures with raw data.  The “off-line evaluation” indicated 
the use of desk-top evaluation by test and development community representatives, similar 
to the JTEM Rock Drills.  It could be considered a kind of human-in-the-loop simulation or 
just another kind of model or prototype that has been used successfully in this problem 
domain (JTEM, 2007b). 
POW-ER is a project organization modeling and simulation tool that integrates 
organizational and process views.  POW-ER was developed via the Virtual Design Team 
(VDT) computational modeling research at Stanford University.  POW-ER addresses 
organizational elements that impact the ability to work effectively, including policies and 
structures (culture, communication, decisions, meetings); staffing, hiring, and training needs 
for workforce plans.  Using POW-ER, the team modeled the organizational structure, the 
relationship between individuals within those organizations, and individual task allocations.  
Use of CORE to support functional analysis proved most helpful as it allowed the modelers 
Figure 7: JC3M M&S Supporting Evaluation Measures 
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to represent the same functional architecture in the refined IDEF0 models as a functional 
flow in FFBD format.  That allowed the creation of PERT-like sequencing of tasks required 
when modeling work processes in POW-ER.  POW-ER’s ability to predict and analyze 
backlogs proved useful designing and troubleshooting alternative models because it allowed 
the team to identify backlogs in the workflow of models. The analysis of backlogs in the 
workflow enabled the team to identify the optimized arrangement of tasks and personnel for 
FCB and SCR since they were created for this project.  No such changes were made to the 
other alternatives.  Based on modeler-defined parameters, such as the amount of effort 
required for each task, the number of full-time equivalents available with appropriate skills 
and number of hours in a work-week, the POW-ER simulation tool can calculate a project’s 
duration based on simulated duration.  Simulated duration factors the “hidden work” that 
traditional Critical Path Method does not.  The “hidden work” associates an amount of 
rework that delays into each task based upon random variables described for each task by 
the modeler.  The simulated duration provided the number of days to plan an evaluation for 
each alternative (Acosta et al., 2007). 
Arena is a commercial tool available from Rockwell Automation.  It provides a 
numerical evaluation of a system by imitating the system’s operations or characteristics over 
time. Arena allowed the team to conduct numerical experiments in order to predict the 
behavior of an alternative, given a set of conditions. Two evaluation measures required 
assessing the changes in output as a function of the changes in inputs: Elasticity of Labor 
and Elasticity of Duration.  Arena allowed the team to run simulations on the alternative 
models with varying sets of inputs.  Those input data sets represent the number of systems 
with their associated documentation that a SoS test event would typically cover.  The 
baseline data set was the group of systems used during the FEDOS event.  It included over 
90 systems, which included AFATDS, EPLRS, GCCS-J, SINCGARS and TBMCS.  There 
were 14 SoS capabilities examined, including blue force common operational picture, call for 
fire, common logistics and theater ballistic missile tracking.  Variation in the input data set 
was accomplished by changing the number of individual systems, the number of old SoS 
capabilities, and the number of new SoS capabilities under test for each data set.  The same 
input data set was used for one run of each alternative, enabling a true head-to-head 
comparison.  The model in Arena was designed so that the subprocess tasks would vary in 
duration, based on varying the input systems under test.   Thus, Arena displayed the output 
changes of the entire alternative process that corresponded to each of the varying inputs.  
The output changes (as a percent of the baseline), compared to the percent change of the 
input became the values for elasticity of duration and elasticity of labor (Acosta et al., 2007). 
The models were validated against actual data from the FEDOS event of 2005.  
Since the original labor hour timesheets for planning that event were available, validating the 
models was relatively simple.  The FEDOS process model was built in CORE, which 
supported the more elaborate models in POW-ER and Arena.  Then, the outputs were 
compared to the appropriate actual data from FEDOS.  The number of labor hours and 
calendar day predictions from Arena and POW-ER were within 1% of the actual values 
(Acosta et al., 2007). 








Figure 8.  JC3M Modeling Overview 
(Acosta et al., 2007) 
This study represents the first time these modeling tools were used together to 
complement each other.  The simulations predicted key parameters of each alternative 
design.  Without such an approach, no objective or repeatable means to compare the 
alternatives against the requirements in those areas would have been possible.  There is a 
high degree of confidence in the computer-based measures because the results for the 
FEDOS models were validated against known historical data and the other models used 
elements from the data, based on a task mapping from each alternative back to the FEDOS 
process. 
There were still two evaluation measures that could not be determined by computer-
based simulation: percent traceable measures and quality of planning outputs.  The team 
was able to engage SMEs from several NAVSEA and NAVAIR field activities to participate 
in assigning a value for quality of planning products.  The team assembled and then 
presented with all five alternatives. They were then allowed to ask questions in order to 
ensure clear understanding of how each process worked along with built-in limitations.  
Each SME responded to specific questions about the predicted quality of planning products 
coming from each process, with regard to their effectiveness in examining interoperability 
within a SoS, conformance to standards, and usability.  The responses were based on a 4-
point Likert scale for each alternative.  Percent of traceable measures was more simple to 
determine once a key assumption was accepted.  A proxy was defined as the number of 
authoritative sources considered, divided by the total number of authoritative sources 
available.  This assumption is valid if there is a linear relationship (as a set) between the 
number of measures created and the number of sources used in creating those measures. 
The final listing of the raw scores is provided in Table 2. 
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Ideal Value 100% Less is better 4 is Ideal Less is better Less is better 
FEDOS 0 140 3.17 0.87 0.87 
MC3T 72 121 3.25  0.78 0.78 
JTEM CTM 92 73 3.42  1.04 0.83 
SCR 92  158 3.00  0.98 0.98 
FCB 88 127 2.75  0.72 0.72 
Table 2.  Raw Evaluation Measures 
The extremely short duration to plan an event for the JTEM CTM process should be 
noted.  This is to be expected because of that system’s reliance on SMEs in so many 
different fields, which minimizes cross-checking with multiple stakeholders.  On the other 
hand, the JTEM CTM elasticity of labor was the worst. 
Considering so many measures, how could a single “best” alternative be found?  The 
team chose to apply classic multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT).  While MAUT has its well-
documented limitations, it presents a means to compare the alternatives on a single 
weighted sum of utilities associated with each evaluation measure.  Raw scores are 
converted to a value or utility score; that value is then multiplied by its global weight, and the 
resulting weighted values are summed to an overall value.  The same SMEs who 
participated in the process to obtain planning, product-quality figures also participated in the 
process to determined value functions and swing weights.  It should be noted that this team 
used the mathematically rigorous Wymorian standard scoring functions for value curves to 
convert raw scores to utility.  Additionally, they were very precise about their application of 
swing weights and rigor of the analytical hierarchy process to obtain weights (Acosta et al., 
2007).  So, the weaknesses inherent in MAUT were minimized via these tools and 
















(0 – 1) 
FEDOS 0.00 0.04 0.39 0.06 0.14 0.63 
MC3T 0.02 0.05 0.39 0.07 0.16 0.71 
JTEM CTM 0.24 0.06 0.40 0.04 0.15 0.89 
SCR 0.24 0.02 0.37 0.05 0.10 0.79 
FCB 0.22 0.05 0.34 0.08 0.18 0.87 
Table 3.  Overall Utility of the Alternatives 
The last step in the process to consolidate the elements of the alternatives was to 
create a lifecycle cost estimate (LCCE) for each alternative.  All costs associated with 
development, implementation, operations and support through disposal and transition were 
estimated.  Actual data from the FEDOS event, to-date actual costs and to-completion 
estimates (directly from their respective project managers) for development of JTEM CTM 
and for development of MC3T were relatively easy to capture, once complete definitions for 
those phases and cost-breakdown structures were developed.  Because the SCR and FCB 
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alternatives were similar to MC3T in scope and effort, development costs were based on the 
MC3T numbers.  As operations and support for such a system is dominated by labor costs, 
the annual cost for each alternative was based on applying the prevailing man-hour rates to 
the labor hour counts from the POW-ER models.  Disposal and transition costs were 
assumed to be the same for each alternative because those efforts were practically identical 
in terms of level of effort and duration.  Table 4 summarizes the LCCE for each alternative. 
Lifecycle Year 
Alternatives 1 2 3 4…9 10 
Total Cost 
($) 
FEDOS        
   Development 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Implementation 1,052,527 0 0 0 0 1,052,527 
   Operational & Maint. 0 419,497 419,497 419,497 2,200 3,908,178 
   Transition and Disposal 0 0 0 0 50,000 50,000 
Total Cost 1,052,527 419,497 419,497 419,497 52,200 5,010,706 
MC3T       
   Development 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   Implementation 1,169,414 0 0 0 0 1,169,414 
   Operational & Maint. 0 525,537 525,537 525,537 2,200 4,756,500 
   Transition and Disposal 0 0 0 0 50,000 50,000 
Total Cost 1,169,414 525,537 525,537 525,537 52,200 5,975,913 
JTEM CTM       
   Development 1,030,000 2,470,000 0 0 0 3,500,000 
   Implementation 0 0 1,169,414 0 0 1,169,414 
   Operational & Maint. 0 0 0 558,535 2,200 2,253,410 
   Transition and Disposal 0 0 0 0 50,000 50,000 
Total Cost 1,030,000 2,470,000 1,169,414 558,535 52,200 6,972,824 
FCB       
   Development 1,021,835 0 0 0 0 1,021,835 
   Implementation 1,301,282 0 0 0 0 1,301,282 
   Operational & Maint. 0 650,223 650,223 650,223 2,200 5,753,985 
   Transition and Disposal 0 0 0 0 50,000 50,000 
Total Cost 2,323,117 650,223 650,223 650,223 52,200 8,127,101 
SCR       
   Development 952,007 0 0 0 0 952,007 
   Implementation 1,169,414 0 0 0 0 1,169,414 
   Operational & Maint. 0 624,451 624,451 624,451 2,200 5,547,811 
   Transition and Disposal 0 0 0 0 50,000 50,000 
Total Cost 2,121,421 624,451 624,451 624,451 52,200 7,719,232 
Table 4.  LCCE Summary 
The JC3M team determined the most expensive alternative was the FCB Alternative, 
at a cost of $8.13 million over the 10-year projected lifecycle. The team calculated the cost 
of FCB as a cost to the DoD. While the senior SMEs who generate the performance 
measures do not charge their efforts directly to a C4I test organizations, their time and effort 
is a cost to the DoD.  The team determined that MC3T was estimated to cost approximately 
$960,000 more than FEDOS, which it replaced. While this is nearly a 20% difference, the 
increase can be directly attributed to the increase in scope, duration, and level of effort 
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involved in MC3T, which anecdotally supported the increased cost of MC3T (Acosta et al., 
2007).  More importantly, the development cost for JTEM-CTM is the largest (its 
development is spread over several years).  However, the O&S costs are the lowest.  This 
result is significant because a test agency (or test branch within a development agency) 
deciding between these options would incur only the costs to implement such an option and 
then would reap the benefit of keeping annual costs very low. 
Recommendations 
A complete analysis of the alternatives based on the preceding data was conducted 
to determine the “best” alternative.  That is, which alternative is projected to provide the 
greatest utility for the cost?  Figure 9 summarizes the results.  Again, the utility is a weighted 
sum of several different attributes, all tied directly to the overall goal of ensuring testing for 
true interoperability, which is a pre-requisite for any C2 SoS supporting a disparate 
networked force. 
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Figure 9.  Utility versus LCC 
(Acosta et al., 2007) 
The JTEM CTM process is projected to perform slightly better than the other options 
and maintains a LCCE less than the two other alternatives with the closest utility scores.  
The attributes that drive this performance are the number of days to plan an evaluation, the 
quality of planning products and the percentage of traceable measures.  It should also be 
noted that a nearly straight line could be drawn between FEDOS, MC3T and FCB.  That 
leaves the SCR Alternative below the line and JTEM CTM above it.  However, the better 
way to examine this figure is to consider an efficient frontier of utility for every cost value.  A 
linear frontier is formed by a line connecting the points for FEDOS, MC3T, and CTM.  Thus, 
the FCB and SCR points are “below” that line—meaning they are less efficient and 
dominated by CTM. 
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It must be noted that there is some difference in the confidence we have in the 
performance measures.  Because FEDOS and MC3T were used in actual full-scale SoS test 
events, their performance is based on historical documentation.  JTEM CTM’s performance 
measures are based on desk-top simulations called “rock drills,” in which test community 
personnel exercised certain aspects of the system in an artificial scenario.  Additionally, 
members of the JTEM team participated in this study, which validates nearly every aspect of 
JTEM CTM that was considered and confirms the expected simulation output.  The results 
from the SCR and FCB alternatives were purely from the simulation.  However, the 
simulation was based on modifying parts of models validated through FEDOS data. 
With regard to cost, similar logic can be applied.  Those numbers from FEDOS and 
MC3T are based on actual costs.  The cost estimates for the other alternatives, dominated 
by the labor of annual operations, were driven by the simulation output for number of labor 
hours. 
In spite of the differences in confidence levels, the overall results should be 
considered valid.  The JTEM CTM had the median LCCE, with the lowest O&S cost.  This is 
significant because O&S is a recurring cost, borne by every C4I test organization that 
implements one of the alternatives.  Development costs of JTEM CTM are the largest 
portion of its LCCE—a nonrecurring cost borne by OSD and not borne by any single C4I test 
organization. 
Summary & Next Steps 
This team was the first to apply a disciplined systems engineering process to the 
problem of re-engineering the business of testing for C4I interoperability certification.  The 
JTEM project is the only other organization to examine this issue from the perspective of 
optimizing a lifecycle-balanced solution to meet explicitly stated and quantifiable needs.  No 
group has applied an integrated set of computer-based simulation tools to quantitatively 
predict the performance of competing options and compare that performance to lifecycle 
cost.  Knowing that C4I systems never perform in a vacuum, but always interoperate as part 
of a larger SoS, developers and testers will benefit from the results of this study.  Ensuring 
interoperability across services and between civil authorities and multinational organizations 
begins with an effects-based approach.  Only by testing for interoperability against 
performance measures that are linked to desired effects in the battle-space can C2 SoS 
support warfighters engaged in complex endeavors.  
Based on the insights into the problem domain and potential solutions, there are 
areas that need further study.  The team believed the C4I acquisition and testing 
communities would benefit from a dedicated Joint C4I SoS manager to provide consistency 
in an evolving environment.  Their role could include documenting C4I SoS capabilities, 
long-range SoS capabilities planning, and testing requirements management; supporting 
developmental and operational testing; and addressing ad hoc SoS configuration, resulting 
from new threats and concepts (Acosta et al., 2007).  These roles represent overlap 
between the acquisition community and those responsible for communicating needed 
capabilities to them.  It is hoped that codifying the relationship between the Joint C2 
Capability Portfolio Manager and the C2 FCB will be a move in this direction. 
Next, as changes to the SoS configuration are made, the likelihood of capability 
failures increases.  The JC3M team believes risk management strategies should be 
developed and applied to the C4I SoS.  The JC3M team’s preliminary list of risks includes 
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the lack of a single entity responsible for SoS performance; the lack of an objective, 
repeatable, and methodical approach to address individual system problems impacting SoS 
functionality; varied levels of maturity of systems within the C4I SoS architecture; and varied 
interfaces between individual systems. 
Finally, systems that are components of the C4I SoS have their capabilities defined 
as if they exist in a vacuum, and their impact on C4I SoS capabilities is generally not 
considered.  The DoD C4I SoS acquisition process should require component system 
sponsors to define C4I SoS level effects; establish a funding line for SoS testing; and 
include SoS effectiveness testing as part of operational testing (Acosta et al., 2007). 
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